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Foreword of Vice-President Katainen 
and Commissioner Thyssen
The Europe 2020 strategy 
is the EU’s agenda for 
growth and jobs for 
the current decade. 
It emphasises smart, 
sustainable and inclusive 
growth as a way to 
overcome the structural 
weaknesses in Europe’s 
economy, improve its 
competitiveness and productivity and underpin a sustainable social market economy. 
The Europe 2020 targets are monitored in the framework of the European Semester. 
Through this framework, the Commission supports the EU Member States in coordinating 
their economic policies and addressing the economic challenges facing the EU.
This publication by Eurostat provides up-to-date data in the areas covered by the Europe 
2020 strategy. These data are an important tool for our policymaking and help monitor 
progress towards the strategy’s objectives.
After a difficult start to the decade, under the shadow of the financial and economic 
crisis, Europe’s economy is now growing at its fastest rate in a decade. Employment is 
at a record high, and if it continues to grow at the current pace, the employment target 
of the Europe 2020 strategy is within reach. We have already met our greenhouse gas 
emissions objective and are very close to reaching our education targets. We are on track 
with the Europe 2020 renewable energy and energy efficiency targets, but further efforts 
are still needed. However, we still need to make considerable progress on attracting more 
investment in research and innovation and in fighting poverty and social exclusion.
To ensure we meet the objectives of the Europe 2020 strategy, the Commission will 
continue to boost investment, pursue structural reforms in Member States and ensure 
responsible fiscal policies. Implementation of the Investment Plan for Europe is a key 
element of this strategy. Focusing in particular on social challenges, on 17 November 
last year the EU endorsed the European Pillar of Social Rights. The Pillar is designed as 
a compass for a renewed process of upward convergence towards better working and 
living conditions in the European Union. 
We need to build on the favourable economic situation we are now enjoying to achieve 
smart, sustainable, inclusive and long-lasting growth in Europe.
       
Jyrki Katainen Marianne Thyssen  
Vice-President — European Commission Commissioner — European Commission 
Jobs, Growth, Investment  Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and 
and Competitiveness  Labour Mobility, Responsible for Eurostat
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Smarter, greener, more inclusive?  5
Foreword of Eurostat’s  
Director-General
Eurostat — the statistical office of the European 
Union — provides crucial information for EU 
institutions, national governments, businesses 
and members of the civil society about 
important economic, social and environmental 
developments in the EU. In particular, Eurostat 
produces annual flagship publications, which 
present statistical analyses on key EU policy 
initiatives. 
The flagship publication ‘Smarter, greener, more 
inclusive? — Indicators to support the Europe 2020 strategy’ presents the progress of 
the EU and its Member States towards the targets of the Europe 2020 strategy. The 
2018 edition continues the tradition of the previous releases. Mostly based on data 
produced by the European Statistical System (ESS), it analyses EU development in the 
five thematic areas of the Europe 2020 strategy: employment, R&D and innovation, 
climate change and energy, education, poverty and social exclusion. 
The description of long-term trends provided by the strategy’s headline indicators is 
complemented with additional contextual indicators, which help understanding the 
driving forces behind the main trends. Country profiles for each Member State give 
a detailed picture of the situation at national level in relation to the national Europe 
2020 targets.
Impartial and objective statistical information is essential for evidence-based decision-
making. Eurostat is fully committed to supporting the implementation and monitoring 
of the Europe 2020 strategy by producing high quality statistics and making them 
available to users. 
Mariana Kotzeva 
Director-General of Eurostat
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Overview of trends in the Europe 2020 
headline indicators
Nine headline indicators and additional sub-
indicators support the monitoring of the 
Europe 2020 strategy’s eight targets. The 
development of these indicators since 2008, the 
baseline year for monitoring the Europe 2020 
strategy, shows a rather mixed picture. Substantial 
progress has been made in the areas of climate 
change and energy, as well as in education. On 
the other side, the targets on R&D investment, 
employment and poverty alleviation are still at a 
distance, although more recent developments for 
the employment target are promising.
The Europe 2020 strategy 
Europe 2020 is the EU’s agenda for jobs and 
growth for the current decade. It emphasises 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth as a way 
to strengthen the EU economy and prepare its 
structure for the challenges of the next decade. As 
its main objectives, the strategy strives to deliver 
high levels of employment, productivity and social 
cohesion in the Member States, while reducing the 
impact on the natural environment. 
To reach these objectives, the EU has adopted 
eight ambitious targets in the areas of 
employment, research and development (R&D), 
climate change and energy, education, and 
poverty reduction, to be reached by 2020. These 
have been translated into national targets to 
reflect the situation and possibilities of each 
Member State to contribute to the common goals. 
A set of nine headline indicators and additional 
sub-indicators provides an overview of how fast 
the EU is progressing towards its overall targets 
and how far it still is from reaching them. 
Since 2008, substantial progress has been made 
in the area of climate change and energy through 
the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and 
the increase in the use of renewable energy 
sources. Positive developments are also visible 
in the area of education, where the EU is within 
reaching distance of both headline targets. While 
the most recent developments in R&D investment 
and poverty alleviation are less promising, the 
EU’s employment target can still be reached if 
the growth recorded over the past few years 
continues.
The analysis in this 2018 edition of ‘Smarter, 
greener, more inclusive?’ aims to shed light on 
the trends in the headline indicators over the 
past eight years, from 2008 up to 2016 or 2017 
(depending on data availability).
Employment rate
72.2 % of the EU population aged 
20 to 64 were employed in 2017, 
up from 71.1 % in 2016. This is 
the highest share that has been 
observed since 2002. As a result, 
the distance to the Europe 2020 employment 
target of 75 % narrowed to 2.8 percentage points. 
Compared with other non-EU G20 economies in 
the world, the EU’s employment rate was higher 
than in most of these countries in 2017, with only 
Japan and Australia showing higher rates. 
Although the labour market prospects of younger 
people have been improving in the EU, in 2017 
the employment rate for young people aged 20 
to 29 was considerably lower than for those aged 
30 to 54. Older people (aged 55 to 64) are another 
vulnerable group on the labour market: although 
their employment rate has grown continuously 
over the past decade, it has remained low 
compared to younger age groups. Despite women 
becoming increasingly well qualified and even 
out-performing men in terms of educational 
attainment, their employment rate has remained 
lower than those for men. However, the gender 
employment gap has narrowed for all age groups 
since 2002 and in 2017 was at 11.5 percentage 
points. 
Other factors influencing integration into the 
labour market are educational attainment levels 
and country of origin. Just slightly more than half 
(54.9 %) of those with at most primary or lower 
Executive summary
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Table 0.1: Europe 2020 headline indicators, EU-28, 2008 and 2013–2017
Topic Headline indicator 2008 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Target
Employment 
Employment rate age group 20–64, 
total (% of population)
70.3 68.4 69.2 70.1 71.1 72.2 75.0 
   •  Employment rate age group 20–64, 
females (% of population)
62.8 62.6 63.5 64.3 65.3 66.5 :
   •  Employment rate age group 20–64, 
males (% of the population) 77.9 74.3 75.0 75.9 76.9 78.0 :
R&D Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (¹) (% of GDP) 1.84 2.02 2.03 2.04 2.03 : 3.00 
Climate 
change and 
energy
Greenhouse gas emissions (²) 
(Index 1990 = 100) 90.6 80.4 77.4 78.0 77.6 : 80.0 
Share of renewable energy in gross 
final energy consumption (%) 11.1 15.2 16.1 16.7 17.0 : 20.0 
Primary energy consumption 
(Million tonnes of oil equivalent) 1 693 1 571 1 509 1 532 1 543 : 1 483
Final energy consumption 
(Million tonnes of oil equivalent) 1 180 1 108 1 063 1 086 1 108 : 1 086
Education
Early leavers from education and training, 
total (³) (% of population aged 18–24) 14.7 11.9 11.2 11.0 10.7 10.6 < 10,0
   •  Early leavers from education and 
training, females (³)  
(% of population aged 18–24)
12.7 10.2 9.6 9.5 9.2 8.9 :
   •  Early leavers from education and 
training, males (³) 
(% of population aged 18–24)
16.7 13.6 12.8 12.4 12.2 12.1 :
Tertiary educational attainment, 
total (³) (% of population aged 30–34) 31.2 37.1 37.9 38.7 39.1 39.9 ≥ 40,0
   •  Tertiary educational attainment, 
females (³) (% of population aged 30–34) 34.3 41.4 42.3 43.4 43.9 44.9 :
   •  Tertiary educational attainment, 
males (³) (% of population aged 30–34) 28.0 32.8 33.6 34.0 34.4 34.9 :
Poverty 
and social 
exclusion 
People at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion, EU-27 (⁴) (Million people) 116.1 121.6 120.8 117.8 116.9 : 96.2 (⁵)
People at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion, EU-28 (⁴) (Million people) : 122.8 122.0 119.0 118.0 : :
People at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion, EU-28 (⁴)(⁶) (% of population) 23.7 24.6 24.4 23.8 23.5 : :
   •  People living in households with 
very low work intensity, EU-28 (⁶) 
(% of population aged 0–59)
9.2 11.0 11.3 10.7 10.5 : :
   •  People at risk of poverty after social 
transfers, EU-28 (⁶) (% of population) 16.6 16.7 17.2 17.3 17.3 : :
   •  Severely materially deprived people, 
EU-28 (⁶)(⁷) (% of population) 8.5 9.6 8.9 8.1 7.5 6.7 :
(1) 2016 data are provisional.
(2) Total emissions, including international aviation and indirect CO
2
, 
but excluding emissions from land use, land use change, and 
forestry (LULUCF).
(3) Break in time series in 2014 (switch from ISCED 97 to ISCED 2011).
(4) The indicator ‘People at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ 
corresponds to the sum of persons who are: at risk of poverty 
after social transfers, severely materially deprived or living in 
households with very low work intensity. Persons are only 
counted once even if they are present in several sub-indicators.
(5) The overall EU target is to lift at least 20 million people out of the 
risk of poverty and exclusion by 2020. Due to data availability 
issues, the target is evaluated only for the EU-27. 
(6) EU-27 data for 2008.
(7) 2017 data are estimates.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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secondary education in the EU were employed in 
2017, compared to 84.0 % for those with tertiary 
education. The employment rate of non-EU 
nationals (aged 20 to 64) was 14.8 percentage 
points lower than the overall rate in 2017. 
Gross domestic expenditure on research 
and development (R&D)
R&D expenditure in the EU stood 
at 2.03 % of GDP in 2016, compared 
with 2.04 % in 2015. Gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D as a percentage 
of GDP has increased slightly 
between 2008 and 2012, as a result of depressed 
GDP growth and a wider EU effort to boost public 
expenditure on R&D, and has stagnated around 
2 % of GDP since then. This means that by 2016, 
the EU was still 0.97 percentage points below its 
target for 2020, which calls for combined public 
and private R&D expenditure to be increased to 
3 % of GDP. 
Business enterprise remains the largest R&D 
performing sector in the EU, accounting for 64.9 % 
of total R&D expenditure. The business sector 
has also recorded the largest increase since 2002. 
The ‘higher education’ and ‘government’ sectors 
contribute less to total R&D expenditure, at 23.0 % 
and 11.2 %, respectively. Although the R&D shares 
of these two sectors have been growing at a 
slower pace, they have been more resilient to 
economic fluctuations.
Greenhouse gas emissions, share of 
renewable energy in gross final energy 
consumption, and energy efficiency
By 2016, emissions of greenhouse 
gases (GHG) across the EU had 
fallen by 22.4 % compared with 
1990 levels. Thus, the EU is 
expected to exceed its Europe 
2020 target of reducing GHG 
emissions by 20 % by 2020. All sectors, except 
fuel combustion in transport and international 
aviation, contributed to the reductions between 
1990 and 2016. Although energy industries were 
responsible for the largest reductions in absolute 
terms over this time period, it was still the sector 
responsible for the largest share of total emissions 
in 2016.    
The EU’s GHG emissions per capita are below the 
levels observed in many other major economies 
such as Australia, Canada and the United States. 
Despite large variation among per capita GHG 
emissions globally, a trend towards greater 
convergence can be observed between 1990 
and 2015: per-capita emissions decreased in the 
EU, the United States and Russia but increased in 
emerging economies such as China.
The share of renewable energy in gross final 
energy production, the Europe 2020 strategy’s 
second climate change and energy target, 
increased from 16.7 % in 2015 to 17.0 % in 2016. 
Therefore, the EU remains 3.0 percentage points 
below the Europe 2020 renewable energy target of 
20 %. Solid, liquid and gaseous biofuels still provide 
the biggest share of total renewable energy in the 
EU, and are the largest renewable energy source 
used in transport and for heating and cooling. 
Hydropower remains the dominant renewable 
energy technology in the electricity sector. 
However, the shares of wind and solar energy have 
increased substantially thanks to effective support 
schemes and large cost reductions. Compared to 
other economies in the world, in particular most 
emerging and industrialised countries, the EU’s 
renewable energy share is relatively high. 
The EU has also made progress towards its 
energy efficiency objective, although the trend 
has slightly reversed in recent years. The 2020 
target for final energy consumption was reached 
temporarily in 2015. Due to the subsequent 
increase in consumption in 2016, an additional 
2.0 % decrease is now required by 2020. With 
respect to primary energy consumption, the EU 
must achieve a further reduction of 3.9 % until 
2020 in order to reach the Europe 2020 target of 
increasing its energy efficiency by 20 % compared 
with projections. In 2016, the EU consumed 10.0 % 
less primary energy than in 2005, but 2.3 % more 
than in 2014. Energy efficiency policies have 
helped achieve substantial reductions in primary 
energy consumption, but some of the reductions 
can also be attributed to lower economic output 
in the aftermath of the economic crisis and 
relatively warm years, such as 2013 and 2014. 
Executive summary
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Globally, only one major economy has reduced 
primary energy consumption more than the EU: 
Japan consumed 18.4 % less primary energy in 
2016 than in 2005.
Early leavers from education and training 
and tertiary educational attainment
The share of early leavers from 
education and training, defined 
as the share of 18 to 24 year olds 
with at most lower secondary 
education and not in further 
education and training, has 
fallen continuously since 2002, both for men and 
women. In 2017, the indicator stood at 10.6 %, 
compared with 14.7 % in 2008. Thus, Europe is 
steadily approaching its headline target for 2020 of 
less than 10 % of early leavers. 
Young men are more likely to leave education and 
training early compared to women, even though 
the gap has been narrowing since 2004. Figures 
for women are already below the overall EU target, 
standing at 8.9 % in 2017. Residents not born in the 
reporting country are more likely to leave formal 
education early compared to natives. 
Early leavers from education and training face 
particularly severe problems in the labour 
market. In 2017, 55.7 % of 18 to 24 year old early 
leavers from education and training were either 
unemployed or inactive. This share has increased 
by 10.1 percentage points compared to 2008.
The share of 30 to 34 year olds who have 
completed tertiary education has also improved, 
reaching 39.9 % in 2017. This means that the Europe 
2020 target of 40 % has almost been achieved 
three years in advance. However, the EU’s tertiary 
attainment rate still lags behind the rates of some 
other major world economies such as Korea, 
Japan, Canada and the United States.
Disaggregated by gender, the data reveal that 
growth in the share of tertiary graduates has 
been considerably faster for women, who already 
(1) Due to the structure of the survey on which most of the key social data is based (European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions), a large part of the main social indicators available in 2010, when the Europe 2020 Strategy was adopted, referred to 2008 
data for the EU-27 as the most recent data available. This is why monitoring of progress towards Europe 2020 headline targets takes EU-27 
data from 2008 as a baseline year (see European Commission, Social Europe — Current challenges and the way forward. Annual Report of the 
Social Protection Committee (2012), Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2013, p. 12).
met the Europe 2020 target in 2012 and by 2017 
reached 44.9 %. Progress has been slower for men: 
by 2017, only 34.9 % of 30 to 34 year old men have 
attained tertiary education.
People at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion
The Europe 2020 strategy 
aims to reduce the number 
of people at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion by 20 
million by 2020, compared 
with the 2008 level (1). In 2016, 118.0 million people 
were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the 
EU-28, which was around 0.1 million more than 
in 2010, but one million less than in 2015. The 
development of risk of poverty or social exclusion 
in the EU over the past decade has been marked 
by two turning points: in 2009, when the number 
of people at risk started to rise because of the 
delayed social effects of the economic crisis, and in 
2012, when this upward trend reversed. The share 
of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
has recently decreased and is approaching the 
levels observed before the economic crisis in 
2008. Still, almost every fourth person (23.5 % of 
the population) in the EU remained at risk in 2016, 
20.7 million more than foreseen by the Europe 
2020 target. Significant additional efforts are thus 
necessary to reinforce the recent positive trend 
and close this gap.
The most widespread form of poverty or social 
exclusion in the EU is monetary poverty. In 2016, 
about 86.9 million people, representing 17.3 % of 
the total EU population, were at risk of poverty 
after social transfers. The second most common 
dimension of poverty or social exclusion was very 
low work intensity, affecting 39.1 million people 
or 10.5 % of the EU population. The third form 
of poverty or social exclusion — severe material 
deprivation — affected 37.8 million people in 2016. 
This equalled 7.5 % of the total population aged 
0 to 59 in the EU. People may be simultaneously 
A
B C
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affected by two or more forms of poverty, but are 
nevertheless only counted once for the headline 
indicator.
The three dimensions of poverty and social 
exclusion captured by the headline indicator 
have developed unevenly since 2010. Monetary 
poverty has been moderately but steadily 
increasing; the overall amount of people living 
in households with very low work intensity has 
not changed drastically since 2010; at the same 
time, the amount of materially deprived people 
first increased from 2009 to 2012, but has since 
decreased. Thus, developments in the headline 
indicator were mainly driven by changes in the 
number of severely materially deprived people.
The most vulnerable groups appear to be the 
same across all three dimensions of poverty, 
namely young people, unemployed and inactive 
persons, single parents, households consisting 
of only one person, people with low educational 
attainment, foreign citizens born outside the EU, 
and those residing in rural areas. Of all the groups 
examined, the rate of risk of poverty is the highest 
among the unemployed and single parents with 
one or more dependent children.
Introduction
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Providing statistical support to Europe 2020
(1) Eurostat, Smarter, greener, more inclusive?  — Indicators to support the Europe 2020 strategy, Publications Office of the European Union, 
Luxembourg.
(2) European Commission, Europe 2020  — A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final, Brussels, 2010.
(3) See: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/europe-2020-indicators/europe-2020-strategy/headline-indicators-scoreboard 
The 2018 edition of Eurostat’s annual ‘flagship 
publication’ entitled ‘Smarter, greener, more 
inclusive? — Indicators to support the Europe 
2020 strategy’ (1) provides statistical support for 
the Europe 2020 strategy, the EU’s agenda for 
jobs and growth for the current decade, and 
monitors progress towards its headline targets. 
The publication presents the most recent official 
statistics disseminated by Eurostat, with the aim of 
providing statistical analyses related to important 
European Commission policy frameworks and 
relevant economic, social and environmental 
phenomena. Impartial and objective statistical 
information is essential for evidence-based 
political decision-making and defines Eurostat’s 
role in the context of the Europe 2020 strategy (2). 
It involves developing and choosing relevant 
indicators to support the strategy, producing 
statistical data and assuring the indicators’ quality.
The analysis in the five thematic chapters is based 
on the Europe 2020 headline indicators, developed 
to monitor the strategy’s targets. Other indicators 
focusing on specific subgroups of society or on 
related issues that show underlying trends are 
also used to deepen the analysis and present a 
broader picture. The data used mainly come from 
official European Social Surveys such as the EU 
Labour Force Survey (EU LFS) or the EU Statistics 
on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC), as 
well as from administrative sources. Data on 
EU-28 aggregates and individual Member States 
are presented and, where available, comparisons 
are made with the members of the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) and EU candidate 
countries, as well as non-European countries 
such as the United States and Japan. For some 
of the headline indicators, maps presenting 
the performance of Europe’s regions and their 
progress towards the national Europe 2020 targets 
are included, even though the targets only apply 
on a national level.
The thematic chapters analyse past trends, 
generally since 2002 or 2008, up to the most 
recent year for which data are available (2016 
or 2017). They aim to document and analyse 
the trends shown by the headline indicators 
and the distance to the Europe 2020 targets. 
Supplementary indicators are also used to provide 
the broader context. The most recent data on 
the headline indicators and information on the 
Europe 2020 strategy are available on a dedicated 
section of Eurostat’s website: Europe 2020 headline 
indicators (3).
Introduction
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The Europe 2020 strategy
(4) European Council, Conclusions, 17 June 2010, EUCO 13/10, Brussels, 2010.
The Europe 2020 strategy was adopted by the 
European Council on 17 June 2010 (4) as the 
successor to the Lisbon strategy. It emphasises 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth as a way 
to strengthen the EU economy and prepare its 
structure for the challenges of the next decade. 
Three key priorities and eight targets
The Europe 2020 strategy puts forward three 
mutually reinforcing priorities to make Europe 
a smarter, more sustainable and more inclusive 
place to live: 
• Smart growth, through the development of an 
economy based on knowledge, research and 
innovation. 
• Sustainable growth, through the promotion 
of resource-efficient, green and competitive 
markets. 
• Inclusive growth, through policies aimed at 
fostering job creation and poverty reduction. 
Under these three key priorities, the EU adopted 
eight targets (see Table 0.1). 
The eight targets belong to five thematic areas: 
employment, education, poverty and social 
exclusion, climate change and energy, and R&D 
and innovation (see Figure 0.1). 
These five areas are strongly interlinked. For 
example, higher educational levels are associated 
with improved employability and increasing the 
Targets
Smart growth • Increasing combined public and private investment in R&D to 3 % of GDP
• Reducing school drop-out rates to less than 10 %
• Increasing the share of the population aged 30–34 having completed tertiary education 
to at least 40 %
Sustainable growth • Reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 20 % compared to 1990 levels
• Increasing the share of renewable energy in final energy consumption to 20 %
• Moving towards a 20% increase in energy efficiency
Inclusive growth • Increasing the employment rate of the population aged 20–64 to at least 75 %
• Lifting at least 20 million people out of the risk of poverty and social exclusion
Table 0.1: The Europe 2020 strategy’s key priorities and headline targets
Europe 2020
R&D and
innovation
Employment Education
Climate change
and energy
Poverty and
social exclusion
Figure 0.1: Europe 2020 strategy thematic areas
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employment rate helps to reduce poverty. A 
greater capacity for R&D and innovation across all 
sectors of the economy, combined with increased 
resource efficiency, would improve competitiveness 
and foster job creation. Investing in cleaner, low-
carbon technologies would help the environment, 
contribute to the fight against climate change 
and create new business and employment 
opportunities (5). 
The EU targets have been translated into national 
targets. These reflect each Member State’s 
situation and the level of ambition they are able to 
reach as part of the EU-wide effort to implement 
the Europe 2020 strategy. However, in some cases 
the national targets are not sufficiently ambitious 
(5) European Commission, Europe 2020 — A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final, Brussels, 2010 (p. 11).
(6) European Commission, Taking stock of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2014) 130 final, Brussels 
(p. 12–16).
(7) European Commission, Taking stock of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2014) 130 final, Brussels.
to cumulatively reach the EU-level targets. For 
instance, fulfilling all national targets in the area 
of employment would bring the overall EU-28 
employment rate up to 74 %, which would still 
be one percentage point below the Europe 2020 
target of 75 % (6). 
Taking stock of Europe 2020 — how to 
pursue smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth?
In March 2014, the Commission published a 
Communication ‘Taking stock of the Europe 
2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth’ (7). The mid-term evaluation revealed that 
progress towards the Europe 2020 targets had 
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been mixed: while the EU was on course to meet 
its targets on education, climate and energy, it was 
still far from fulfilling the employment, research and 
development, and poverty reduction targets (8). 
Taking account of Member States’ different situations 
in the economic cycle, the 2018 Annual Growth 
Survey (9) invites Member States to continue 
building on the ‘virtuous triangle’ of economic 
policy: boosting investment, pursuing structural 
reforms and ensuring responsible fiscal policies. 
Focus is placed on reforms to boost investment, 
including in human capital, and to improve the 
functioning of product, service and labour markets, 
which will increase innovation, competitiveness, 
productivity and long-term growth. 
(8) European Commission, Taking stock of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2014) 130 final, Brussels 
(p. 21).
(9) European Commission, 2018 European Semester: Annual Growth Survey, COM(2017) 690 final, Brussels.
(10) For more information on the Stability and Growth Pact see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/node/4287/ 
The European Semester: annual cycle of 
policy coordination
The success of the Europe 2020 strategy crucially 
depends on Member States coordinating their 
efforts. To ensure this, the European Commission 
has set up an annual cycle of coordination of 
economic policies known as the European 
Semester. Its main purpose is to foster structural 
reforms, to create more jobs and growth in 
line with the Europe 2020 strategy, to boost 
investment, to ensure sound public finances 
(avoiding excessive government debt) and 
compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP) (10), and to prevent excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances in the EU.
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Figure 0.2 presents the stages of the European 
Semester policy cycle. These include:
• Adoption of the Annual Growth Survey 
(AGS) (11) by the European Commission, which 
sets out overall economic and social priorities 
for the EU and its Member States.
• Publication of the Commission’s Alert 
Mechanism Report (AMR) (12), the draft 
Joint Employment Report (13) and 
recommendations for the euro area (14), 
accompanied by a Staff Working Document. 
• Publication of a country report by the 
Commission services for each Member State, 
analysing its economic and social situation and 
progress on implementing the country-specific 
recommendations and towards the Europe 2020 
strategy. For the Member States selected in the 
Alert Mechanism Report, it also includes the  
‘in-depth review’ of possible imbalances.
• Submission of the National Reform 
Programmes (NRPs) (15) and Stability and 
Convergence Programmes (SCPs) by each 
Member State, presenting concrete reforms and 
measures towards implementing the country-
specific recommendations and the Europe 2020 
strategy. 
(11) For more information on the Annual Growth Survey see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2018-european-semester-annual-
growth-survey_en 
(12) For more information on the Alert Mechanism report see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2018-european-semester-alert-
mechanism-report_en 
(13) For more information on the Draft Joint Employment Report see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2018-european-semester-draft-
joint-employment-report_en 
(14) For more information on the Recommendation for the Euro Area see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2018-european-semester-
recommendation-euro-area_en 
(15) For more information on the National Reform Programmes see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/european-semester/european-
semester-timeline/national-plans_en 
(16) European Commission, Reflection paper on deepening the economic and monetary union, COM(2017) 291, Brussels, 2017.
• Adoption of the proposals for country-
specific recommendations for each Member 
State (except those under a stability support 
programme) by the Commission, followed 
by formal Council endorsement of the 
country-specific recommendations. The 
recommendations focus on the issues which 
require the most urgent attention in the next 
12 to 18 months due to their macro- and socio-
economic significance. The recommendations 
are also consistent with the Europe 2020 
strategy.
The ‘Reflection paper on the deepening of the 
Economic and Monetary Union’ (16), adopted on 
31 May 2017, includes avenues that the European 
Commission will consider to further reinforce the 
European Semester. These include:
• Foster further cooperation and dialogue 
with Member States, involving also national 
parliaments, social partners, National 
Productivity Boards and other stakeholders.
• Increase further the focus on the aggregate 
euro-area dimension, with a stronger role for the 
euro-area recommendations. 
• Make a closer link between the yearly process 
of the European Semester and a multi-annual 
approach to reforms of national governments.
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Europe 2020 in a broader policy perspective
(17) Jean-Claude Juncker, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth Fairness and Democratic Change, Strassbourg, 15 July 2015.
(18) European Commission, Commission Work Programme 2018: An agenda for a more united, stronger and more democratic Europe, COM(2017) 
650 final, Strasburg, 2017.
Ten priorities for the EU
Before being elected president of the European 
Commission in July 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker 
presented his political agenda, highlighting ten 
priority areas, in a document entitled ‘A New Start 
for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth Fairness 
and Democratic Change’ (17) (see Box 0.1). 
The 2018 Commission work programme ‘An 
agenda for a more united, stronger and more 
democratic Europe’ (18) sets out concrete actions 
and proposals for completing the work on 
President Juncker’s ten political priorities before 
the end of its mandate, as well as a series of 
forward-looking initiatives for the future of 
Europe. To boost jobs, growth and investment, 
the Commission will pursue work to deliver on the 
Circular Economy Action Plan and to complete the 
Digital Single Market, the Energy Union, the Capital 
Markets Union, the Economic and Monetary 
Union, and the Banking Union. An initiative on fair 
taxation in the digital economy, a social fairness 
package and a proposal to improve the EU 
food supply chain will all contribute to a deeper 
and fairer internal market with a strengthened 
industrial base. There will also be targeted new 
measures to complete the Security Union and 
deliver on the EU Agenda on Migration and the 
Global Strategy, and to strengthen the Union 
Civil Protection Mechanism. The Commission will 
pursue its balanced and progressive trade policy 
to harness globalisation by finalising agreements 
with Japan, Singapore and Vietnam, and will 
Box 0.1: The ten European Commission priorities
1.   A new boost for jobs, growth and 
investment (a)
2.   A connected digital single market (b)
3.  A resilient Energy Union with a forward-
looking climate change policy (c)
4.   A deeper and fairer internal market with a 
strengthened industrial base (d)
5.   A deeper and fairer Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) (e)
6.   A balanced and progressive trade policy to 
harness globalisation (f)
7.   An area of Justice and Fundamental Rights 
based on mutual trust (g)
8.  Towards a new policy on migration (h)
9.  Europe as a stronger global actor (i)
10.  A Union of democratic change (j) 
(a) For more information on the investment plan see: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/jobs-growth-and-investment_en
(b) For more information on the digital single market see: https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-market_en
(c) For more information on the energy union see: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union-and-climate_en
(d) For more information on the internal market see: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/internal-market_en
(e) For more information on the economic and monetary union see: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/deeper-and-fairer-
economic-and-monetary-union_en
(f) For more information on the trade policy see: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-
harness-globalisation_en
(g) For more information on justice and fundamental rights see: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/justice-and-fundamental-rights_en
(h) For more information on migration policy see: http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/migration_en
(i) For more information on the EU as a stronger global actor see: https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/stronger-global-actor_en 
(j) For more information on making the EU more democratic see: https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/democratic-change_en
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pursue negotiations with Mexico and the South 
American free-trade bloc Mercosur.
Reinforcing economic governance
In June 2015, the President of the European 
Commission, in cooperation with the President of 
the Euro Summit, the President of the Eurogroup, 
the President of the European Central Bank 
and the President of the European Parliament, 
presented a report titled ‘Completing Europe’s 
Economic and Monetary Union’ (19), also known 
as the Five Presidents’ Report (20). It proposed a 
roadmap for strengthening the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) by taking actions on four 
fronts: economic, financial, fiscal and political. 
As a follow-up to the Five President’s 
report, the European Commission issued a 
Communication ‘On steps towards completing 
the Economic and Monetary Union’ (21). It laid 
out a plan for strengthening the European 
Semester by better integrating European and 
national dimensions, placing a stronger focus on 
employment and social performance, promoting 
convergence by benchmarking and pursuing best 
practices, and by supporting structural reforms 
through the provision of EU funds and technical 
assistance.  
(19) European Commission, The Five Presidents’ Report: Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union, 22 June 2015.
(20) The report was prepared by the president of the European Commission, in cooperation with the presidents of the Euro Summit, the 
Eurogroup, the European Central Bank and the European Parliament.
(21) European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Central Bank on steps 
towards Completing Economic and Monetary Union, COM(2015) 600 final, Brussels, 2015.
(22) European Commission, Further steps towards completing Europe’s economic and monetary union: A roadmap, COM(2017) 821 final, Brussels, 
2017.
(23) European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Monetary Fund, COM(2017) 827 final, Brussels, 
2017.
(24) European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive laying down provisions for strengthening fiscal responsibility and the medium-term 
budgetary orientation in the Member States, COM(2017) 824 final, Brussels, 2017.
(25) European Commission, New budgetary instruments for a stable euro area within the union framework, COM(2017) 822 final, Brussels.
(26) European Commission, A European Minister of Economy and Finance, COM(2017) 823 final, Brussels, 2017.
(27) European Commission, European Pillar of Social Rights, 2017: Gothenburg, Sweden.
In December 2017, the European Commission 
published a Communication on ‘Further steps 
towards completing Europe’s economic 
and monetary union: A roadmap’ (22). The 
Roadmap is accompanied by four other main 
initiatives: a proposal to establish a European 
Monetary Fund (EMF), anchored within the EU’s 
legal framework (23); a proposal to integrate 
the substance of the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance into the Union 
legal framework (24); a Communication on new 
budgetary instruments for a stable euro area within 
the Union framework (25); and a Communication (26) 
spelling out the possible functions of a European 
Minister of Economy and Finance.  
Strengthening the EU’s social dimension
While the design and implementation of social 
policy remains principally a responsibility of 
national governments, the EU plays an important 
role in supporting and complementing 
their efforts. 
On 17 November 2017, at the Social Summit for 
Fair Jobs and Growth in Gothenburg, the Council 
and the European Commission jointly signed the 
European Pillar of Social Rights (27) (see Figure 0.3). 
The Pillar establishes a set of 20 principles and 
Equal opportunities 
and access to the
labour market
Fair working conditions Social protection and
inclusion
Figure 0.3: Categories of the European Pillar of Social Rights
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rights, which are to serve as a reference framework 
for employment and social policy at the national 
and European levels. These are structured around 
three categories: equal opportunities and access 
to the labour market, fair working conditions, 
social protection and inclusion.
The 2018 Annual Growth Survey (28) puts the 
Pillar at the forefront by prioritising reforms that 
aim to help the labour force acquire skills, promote 
equal opportunities in the labour market and fair 
working conditions, increase labour productivity 
to support wage growth, and promote adequate 
and sustainable social protection systems.
In addition to proposing the European Pillar of 
Social Rights, the Commission has put forward a 
number of legislative and non-legislative initiatives 
related to work-life balance, working conditions, 
access to social protection and working time.
White Paper on the future of Europe and 
follow-up Reflection Papers
At the Rome Summit on 1 March 2017 the 
Commission presented a White Paper (29) setting 
out a broader vision for the EU’s future. The paper 
outlines the main demographic, economic and 
political challenges the EU will face in the future 
and presents five scenarios of the potential state of 
the Union in 2025 (see Figure 0.4):
• Scenario 1: Carrying On — The EU-27 focuses 
on delivering its positive reform agenda.
• Scenario 2: Nothing but the Single Market — 
The EU-27 is gradually re-centred on the single 
market.
(28) European Commission, Annual Growth Survey 2018, COM(2017) 690 final, Brussels, 2017.
(29) European Commission, White Paper on the future of Europe — Reflections and scenarios for the EU27 by 2015, COM(2017) 2025, Brussels, 2017.
(30) United Nations, Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development, A/RES/70/1, 25 September 2015.
• Scenario 3: Those Who Want More, Do More — 
The EU-27 allows willing Member States to do 
more together in specific areas. 
• Scenario 4: Doing Less, More Efficiently — 
The EU-27 focuses on delivering more and 
faster in selected policy areas, while doing less 
elsewhere. 
• Scenario 5: Doing Much More Together — 
Member States decide to do much more 
together across all policy areas.
The White Paper has been supplemented by five 
reflection papers on specific issues important 
for the future of the EU: the social dimension of 
Europe, harnessing globalisation, the deepening 
of the economic and monetary union, the 
future of European defence and the future of 
EU finances. A sixth reflection paper ‘Towards a 
sustainable Europe by 2030’ was announced in the 
Commission Work Programme for 2018.
The 2030 Agenda for sustainable 
development
In a global context, the Europe 2020 strategy plays 
an important role in addressing the internationally 
adopted 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development and thus putting the European 
Union on the right track to achieving a sustainable 
future.
The 2030 Agenda was formally adopted by 
world leaders at the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Summit in September 2015. The 
document, titled ‘Transforming our world: the 
2030 agenda for sustainable development’ (30), 
Carrying on
Nothing but the 
single market
Those who want 
more do more
Doing less
more efficiently 
Doing much
more together
Figure 0.4: Scenarios of the potential state of the EU in 2025
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consists of a declaration, a set of 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) (see Figure 0.5) and 
169 related targets, a section on the means of 
implementation and on the follow-up and review 
of the 2030 Agenda.
In November 2016, the European Commission 
released the Communication ‘Next steps for a 
sustainable European future: European action 
for sustainability’ (31) which was accompanied 
(31) European Commission, Next steps for a sustainable European future: European action for sustainability, COM(2016) 739, Brussels, 2016.
(32) Eurostat, Sustainable development in the European Union — Monitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an EU context, Luxembourg, 
Publications Office of the European Union, 2017.
by a first statistical publication ‘Sustainable 
development at a glance’ by Eurostat. A year 
later, Eurostat published the first edition of the 
annual EU SDG monitoring report ‘Sustainable 
development in the European Union — 
Monitoring report on progress towards the 
SDGs in an EU context’ (32), which is based on 
the EU SDG indicator set and includes more 
background information.
Figure 0.5: The Sustainable Development Goals
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1.1 Employment — why does it matter?
(1) European Commission, Europe 2020 — A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final, Brussels, 2010, p. 5, 7, 17. 
European Commission, An Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European contribution towards full employment, COM(2010) 682 final, Strasbourg, 
2010, p. 2.
Employment and other labour market-related 
issues are at the heart of the social and political 
debate in the EU. Paid employment is crucial 
for ensuring sufficient living standards and 
it provides the necessary base for people to 
achieve their personal goals and aspirations. 
Moreover, employment contributes to 
economic performance, quality of life and social 
inclusion, making it one of the cornerstones of 
socioeconomic development and well-being. 
The EU’s labour force is shrinking as a result of 
demographic changes that have led to a greater 
share of older people than younger people in 
the population. Because of these changes, a 
smaller number of workers are now supporting a 
growing number of dependent people, putting 
the sustainability of Europe’s social model, welfare 
systems, economic growth and public finances 
at risk. At the same time, global challenges are 
intensifying and competition from developed and 
emerging economies such as China and India is 
increasing (1). 
To face the challenges of an ageing population 
and rising global competition, the EU needs 
to make full use of its labour potential. The 
Europe 2020 strategy, through its ‘inclusive 
growth’ priority, places a strong emphasis on 
job creation. One of its five headline targets 
addresses employment, with the aim of raising 
the employment rate of 20 to 64 year olds to 75 % 
by 2020. 
The EU’s employment target is closely interlinked 
with the other strategy goals on research and 
development (R&D) (see the chapter on ‘R&D 
and innovation’, page 49), education (see 
the chapter on ‘Education’, page 87) and 
poverty and social exclusion (see the chapter on 
‘Poverty and social exclusion’, page 103). Higher 
educational levels increase employability and 
higher employment rates can in turn contribute 
to economic performance and poverty alleviation, 
thus addressing the strategy’s inclusive growth 
objective. Moreover, boosting R&D capacity and 
innovation could improve competitiveness and 
thus contribute to job creation.
Overall, the EU labour market has consistently 
shown positive dynamics, with substantial 
progress towards the Europe 2020 strategy’s 
employment rate target. At the same time, long-
term changes in the demographic structure 
of the EU population and rapid technological 
change add to the need to reform labour markets. 
Taking into account the decline in the working-
age population (aged 20 to 64) accompanied 
by a rising old-age dependency ratio, higher 
employment rates, especially for women, older 
workers and young people remain among the 
priorities of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
Europe 2020 strategy target on 
employment
The Europe 2020 strategy sets out a 
target of ‘increasing the employment 
rate of the population aged 20 to 64 to 
at least 75 %’ by 2020 (a).
(a) European Commission, Taking stock of the Europe 2020 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, 
COM(2014) 130 final, 2014.
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Europe 2020 headline indicator
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What is meant by ‘activity’, ‘employment’, 
‘unemployment’ and ‘labour force’? 
People are classified as employed, unemployed 
and economically inactive according to 
the definitions of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) (2). At the EU level, the two 
main sources for this data are the EU Labour 
Force Survey (EU LFS) (3) and National Accounts 
(including GDP) (4). 
The EU LFS is a large sample survey of private 
households, excluding the population living in 
institutional households (such as workers’ homes 
or prisons). The survey classifies respondents 
as employed, unemployed or economically 
inactive based on information collected through 
the survey questionnaire, relating mainly to their 
activity during a reference week. The EU LFS data 
refer to the resident population, meaning the results 
relate to the country of residence of people in 
employment, rather than to their country of work (5).
Labour force refers to the economically 
active population. This is the total number of 
employed and unemployed people. Persons in 
employment are those who during the reference 
week did any work for pay or profit, or were not 
working but had a job from which they were 
temporarily absent. The term ‘work’ is defined as 
any work for pay or profit during the reference 
week, even for as little as one hour. Pay includes 
cash payments or payment in kind (payment in 
goods or services rather than money), regardless 
of whether or not payment was received in the 
week the work was done. Anyone who receives 
a wage for on-the-job training that involves the 
production of goods or services is counted as 
being in employment. Self-employed and family 
workers are also included. 
(2) For more information see the ILO website: http://www.ilo.org/global/lang--en/index.htm 
(3) For more information on the EU LFS, see: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/microdata/european-union-labour-force-survey 
(4) For more information see: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts 
(5) This difference may be significant in countries with large cross-border flows.
(6) João Medeiros and Paul Minty, Analytical support in the setting of EU employment rate targets for 2020, Working Paper 1/2012, European 
Commission (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion), Brussels, 2012 (p. 58).
(7) European Commission, Age and Employment, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2011 (p.  50).
(8) João Medeiros & Paul Minty, Analytical support in the setting of EU employment rate targets for 2020, Working Paper 1/2012, European 
Commission (Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion), Brussels, 2012 (p. 12).
(9) European Commission, The 2012 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the EU27 Member States (2010–2060), 2012 (p.  99).
Employment rates represent the share of 
employed persons in the total population in the 
same age group; they are typically published for 
the age group 15 to 64 years. The earliest age that 
a person can leave full-time compulsory education 
in the EU is 15 (6) and in many Member States 
this is also the minimum employment age (7). 
However, in a majority of Member States it is rare 
to attain secondary education while working (even 
part-time). Therefore, most 15 to 19 year olds who 
are still in education or training are not seeking 
employment. Students that attain higher levels of 
education tend to enter the labour market later. 
This is in line with the strategy’s headline targets 
on education that promote further education (see 
the chapter on ‘Education’, page 87). As a result, 
the lower age limit of the Europe 2020 strategy’s 
employment target has been raised to 20 years (8). 
The upper age limit for the employment rate is 
usually set to 64 years, taking into account statutory 
retirement ages across Europe (9). 
People are considered to be unemployed if they 
were: 
1. Without work during the reference week, 
meaning they neither had a job nor were 
at work (for one hour or more) in paid 
employment or self-employment. 
2. Available to start work, meaning they were 
available for paid employment or self-
employment before the end of the two weeks 
following the reference week. 
3. Actively seeking work, meaning they had 
taken concrete steps in the four-week period 
ending with the reference week to seek paid 
employment or self-employment or who 
found a job starting within three months. 
The unemployment rate is the number of 
unemployed persons as a percentage of the 
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labour force. To take into account people who 
would like to (or have to) work after the age of 64 
but are unable to find a job, the upper age limit 
for the unemployment rate is usually set to 74. As 
a result, the observed age group for unemployed 
persons usually is 15 to 74 years.
The youth unemployment rate is the 
unemployment rate of people aged 15 to 24. 
In contrast, the youth unemployment ratio is 
the percentage of unemployed young people 
compared to the total population of that age 
group (not only the active, but also the inactive 
such as students). 
The economically active population is the 
sum of employed and unemployed persons. In 
contrast, inactive persons are those who, during 
the reference week, were neither employed nor 
unemployed. The activity rate is the share of the 
population that is economically active.  
1.2 EU employment on the rise again — signs 
of gradual recovery
In 2017 the overall 
employment rate in the 
EU reached 72.2 %. As 
a result the distance 
to the Europe 2020 
employment target of 
75 % narrowed to 2.8 
percentage points. If 
the employment rate keeps increasing at 
the pace recorded since 2013, it would be 
broadly within reach of the Europe 2020 
target.
In 2017, nine Member States — Ireland, 
the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Estonia, 
Germany, Sweden, Latvia, Malta and Croatia 
— had already met their respective national 
employment targets. 
Employment rates across the EU tend to 
show a north–south divide on a country 
level, with some of the best performing 
countries such as Germany, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom showing high variability in 
regional employment rates. 
In northern and western European countries 
employment rates tend to be higher in rural 
areas, whereas in most Baltic, central or 
eastern Member States cities exhibit higher 
employment rates. 
In 2017, employment rates of younger and 
older people continued to be lower than for 
the total employment rate in the EU. 
Considerably lower employment rates are 
observed for women than men. The gender 
employment gap is the widest for three age 
groups: 30 to 34, 35 to 39 and 60 to 64. 
People with low educational attainment 
form one of the most disadvantaged 
groups in the labour market, exhibiting low 
employment rates. 
Persons with non-EU citizenship show much 
lower employment rates compared to EU 
citizens. 
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In 2017, the EU labour market continued to exhibit 
marked signs of improvement, spurred by the 
buoyancy of the economy, strong global outlook 
and accommodative macroeconomic policies (10). 
On the back of the strongest economic growth 
in a decade (2.5 %), employment expanded at a 
solid pace and in both 2016 and 2017 showed the 
highest growth rates since 2008 (1.4 %). 
The Europe 2020 strategy monitors its 
employment target through the headline indicator 
‘Employment rate — age group 20 to 64’, 
which shows the share of employed 20 to 64 
year olds in the total EU population (11). In 2017, 
217 million people (72.2 % of the EU population) 
were employed — almost three million (or 
1.1 percentage points) more than in 2016. As 
shown in Figure 1.1, this is the highest share that 
has been observed since 2002. Nevertheless, there 
(10) European Commission, Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe — Annual review 2017, 2017.
(11) The age brackets for this headline indicator are narrower than for Eurostat descriptive statistics based on the Labour Force Survey, where 
employment covers people aged 15 years and older and unemployment includes people aged 15–74. In this report, people below the 
age of 20 are excluded because many of them are still in education or training and are not actively seeking employment (only 20.4 % of 
this age group were part of the labour force in 2017, Eurostat online data code lfsa_pganws). The upper age limit is set to 64 years to take 
account of statutory retirement ages across Europe. You can see more information about the reason for choosing the age group 20–64 
in the section ‘What is meant by ‘activity’, ‘employment’, ‘unemployment’ and ‘labour force’?’, page 26.
(12) Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_pganws).
is still a 2.8 percentage point gap that needs to 
be closed to reach the Europe 2020 employment 
target of 75 % by 2020. 
In 2017, 5.8 % of the population aged 20 to 64 were 
unemployed while the remaining 22.0 % were 
inactive (12). 
1.2.1 North–south divide in employment 
rates across the EU 
In 2017, employment rates among Member 
States ranged from 57.8 % in Greece to 81.8 % in 
Sweden (see Figure 1.2). Northern and central 
European countries recorded the highest rates; 
nine countries even exceeded the 75 % EU 
employment target. With employment rates 
below 70 %, Mediterranean countries, along with 
Romania and Belgium, represented the lower end 
2020 target
75 
% of the 
population 
aged 20 to 64 
to be employed 
by 2020
EUROPE 2020
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Figure 1.1: Employment rate of the age group 20 to 64, EU-28, 2002–2017
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Figure 1.2: Employment rate age group 20 to 64, by country, 2008 and 2017
(%)
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Figure 1.3: Employment rate, age group 15 to 64, 2008 and 2017
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Map 1.1: Employment rate age group 20 to 64, by NUTS 2 regions, 2017
(% of population aged 20 to 64)
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Map 1.2: Change in employment rate age group 20 to 64, by NUTS 2 regions, 2008–2017
(percentage points difference between 2017 and 2008, persons aged 20 to 64)
Administrative Boundaries: © EuroGeographics © UN-FAO © Turkstat
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of the distribution. Employment rates in the EFTA 
countries Iceland, Switzerland and Norway were 
higher than in the majority of Member States.
Between 2008 and 2017, the employment rate rose 
in most EU countries, with the strongest growth 
recorded in Malta (12.2  percentage points) and 
Hungary (11.8 percentage points). In 10 Member 
States (Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Denmark, Finland, 
Croatia, Netherlands, Latvia, Italy and Ireland) the 
employment rates were still below 2008 levels, 
however, all these countries (13) were back on a 
‘growth path’ by 2017. 
To reflect different national circumstances, the 
general EU target has been translated into national 
targets. These range from 62.9 % for Croatia to 
80.0 % for Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
In 2017, nine Member States had already met their 
national employment targets. Of the remaining 
Member States, nine were less than 2 percentage 
points below their national targets, led by Poland 
which was just 0.1 percentage points from its 
target. Greece and Spain were the most distant, 
at 12.2 and 8.5 percentage points below their 
national targets, respectively. 
Compared with non-EU G20 economies, the EU 
employment rate — here referring to the age 
group 15 to 64 — was higher than in most of 
these countries in 2017 (see Figure 1.3). Only Japan 
and Australia showed much higher rates of above 
70 %. In contrast, Saudi Arabia, India and South 
Africa reported particularly low employment rates 
of 52.5 %, 52.0 % and 40.4 %, respectively.
1.2.2 Highest employment rates recorded 
in regions in north-western and central 
Europe 
The differences in employment rates across 
Member States, shown in Figure 1.2, are also 
reflected in the cross-country regional distribution 
of employment rates (at NUTS 2 level). Map 1.1 
shows that the highest employment rates in 
Europe were mainly recorded in north-western 
and central regions, particularly in Germany, 
(13) Except for Denmark, where a break in time series in 2016 could have influenced a lower employment rate in 2017 compared to 2016. 
(14) Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfst_r_ergau).
Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Austria and the Czech Republic. In 2017, the Finnish 
region ‘Åland’ had the highest employment 
rate in the EU, at 88.2 %, followed by ‘Berkshire, 
Buckinghamshire and Oxfordshire’ (United 
Kingdom), at 85.2 %, and ‘Stockholm’ (Sweden), at 
84.2 %. At the other end of the scale, the lowest 
rates were observed around the Mediterranean, 
in particular in southern Italy, Spain and Greece, 
as well as in the French overseas regions and the 
outlying Spanish autonomous cities (Ceuta and 
Melilla). In 2017, the Italian regions Sicilia, Calabria, 
Campania and Puglia, and the French region 
Mayotte had the lowest employment rates in the 
EU, with less than 50 %. 
Map 1.2 shows the change in regional 
employment rates since 2008. Among the 275 
NUTS 2 regions for which data are available, 
one-third (91 regions) experienced a fall in their 
employment rates over the observed period. 
Among the hardest hit were several regions in 
Greece, with reductions of 8 percentage points 
or more. In contrast, employment rates increased 
in 182 regions from 2008 to 2017. Growth rates of 
5 percentage points or more were observed in 
56 of these regions, 19 of which were in Germany, 
nine in Poland and the UK, and seven in the Czech 
Republic and Hungary. Increases of more than 
10 percentage points were recorded for regions 
in Hungary (Észak-Alföld, Észak-Magyarország, 
Dél-Alföld, Dél-Dunántúl, Közép-Dunántúl), Malta, 
France (Corse), Germany (Berlin) and Romania 
(Nord-Est). 
1.2.3 Most western and northern Member 
States report highest employment rates in 
rural areas
Employment rates vary not only between regions, 
but also by degree of urbanisation. While the 
impact of population density was not obvious at 
the EU level in 2017, with cities, towns and suburbs 
recording an employment rate of 72.0 % and 
rural areas 72.6 % (14), patterns were discernible at 
the country level. In most western and northern 
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European countries (such as Belgium, Austria and 
Germany), employment rates tended to be higher 
in rural areas. In contrast, most Baltic and central or 
eastern Member States (such as Bulgaria, Croatia 
and Slovakia) exhibit higher employment rates in 
cities. Southern European countries do not share a 
common pattern in terms of employment rates by 
degree of urbanisation. 
1.2.4 Younger and older people tend to 
have lower employment rates
In 2017, the employment rate of people aged 
30 to 54 was notably higher than for the 
overall working-age population aged 20 to 64 
(see Figure 1.4). In contrast, considerably lower 
employment rates were observed for young 
people aged 20 to 29. This may not only reflect 
the overall lower activity rates of younger people 
but may also be due to the generally less secure 
position of young people in the labour market, 
which makes youth employment more sensitive 
to the macro-economic fluctuations than adult 
employment. 
The lowest employment rate among the working-
age population was reported for the group aged 
55 to 64 years. However, the employment rate 
in this group has risen more or less continuously 
(15) European Commission, Employment and Social Developments in Europe, Annual Review, 2017, p. 34.
(16) Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsi_dwl_a).
since 2002, reaching 57.1 % in 2017. Growth 
has been more pronounced for older women 
(22.0  percentage points) than for older men 
(15.6 percentage points) since 2002. Overall, the 
increase in the employment rate of older workers 
is one of the main drivers of the total rise in 
employment across the EU. These increases can 
be linked to structural factors such as cohorts 
with better educational attainment, especially 
women, moving up the age pyramid as well as 
recent pension reforms, such as increases in the 
pensionable age, the age for early retirement and 
the length of pension contribution (15). This has 
led to longer working lives for both women and 
men. The duration of working life is measured as 
the number of years a person aged 15 is expected 
to be active in the labour market. In recent years 
this has risen in the EU by 2.7 years, from 32.9 years 
in 2002 to 35.6 years in 2016. The rise was higher 
for women (3.6 years) than for men (1.9 years). 
However, in 2016 men could still expect to stay 
in work much longer (38.1 years) than women 
(33.1 years) (16). 
Interestingly, for half of the Member States, and 
most notably for Spain, Italy, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Netherlands and Portugal, the rise in the 
employment rate for older people (aged 55 to 64) 
Figure 1.4: Employment rate, by age group, EU-28, 2002–2017
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between 2006 and 2017 coincided with a fall in 
the employment rate for younger people (aged 20 
to 24) (17). 
1.2.5 Women still have lower employment 
rates but the gender employment gap is 
shrinking 
Despite women becoming increasingly well 
qualified and even out-performing men in terms 
of educational attainment (see also the ‘Poverty 
and social exclusion’ chapter, page 103), the 
activity and employment rates of women remain 
lower than those for men. However, as shown in 
Figure 1.5, the gender employment gap — the 
difference in employment rates between men 
and women — has been decreasing for all age 
groups. Overall, for the age group 20 to 64, the 
gap fell from 17.3 percentage points in 2002 
to 11.5 percentage points in 2017. A number of 
structural factors influencing the participation 
of women in the labour market may account for 
why they have been catching up with men. These 
include changes in social values and attitudes, 
policies enabling women to reconcile paid work 
with household responsibilities such as child 
care provision, flexible working hours, reduction 
(17) Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_ergan).
(18) European Commission, Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2015, 2016, p. 22. 
(19) Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_igar).
(20) European Commission, Women in the labour market, European Semester Thematic Factsheet 2017, 2017, p. 4. 
in financial disincentives for women, improved 
mechanisms to encourage fathers’ parental 
engagement, and pension reforms (18). European 
employment policies promoting new forms of 
flexibility and security are addressing the specific 
situation of women to help raise their employment 
rates in line with the headline target. 
In 2017, the gender employment gap for 25 to 49 
year olds was at 12.0 percentage points, which is 
5.2 percentage points less than in 2002. The bigger 
gap for this age group in comparison to the age 
group 20 to 24 is not surprising, given this is the 
age when women are more likely than men to be 
economically inactive due to caring responsibilities 
for children. In 2017, family and caring 
responsibilities were the main reasons for inactivity 
among 51.8 % of women in this age group, in 
comparison to 8.2 % of men (19). In addition to 
caring responsibilities, women can face strong 
financial disincentives in tax-benefit systems 
when re-entering the labour market or wanting 
to work more (20). Time out of the labour force 
for these reasons might also affect employment 
opportunities in later years because finding a job 
becomes more difficult the longer a person is not 
employed. This might partially explain why the 
Figure 1.5: Gender employment gap, by age group, EU-28, 2002–2017
(Difference between employment rates of men and women, in percentage points)
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gender employment gap is smaller for 20 to 24 
years old, at 5.5 percentage points in 2017. Higher 
gender gaps in (short-term) employment rates in 
older age cohorts may be explained by a cohort 
effect (women who had not participated in the 
labour force when they were younger moving up 
the age pyramid) or reflect the lack of care facilities 
for grandchildren or dependent parents. 
1.2.6 Higher education levels increase 
employability 
Educational attainment levels are among the 
main factors that influence employment rates. 
Employment rates are higher for more well-
educated people (see Figure 1.6). In 2017, the 
employment rate among tertiary education 
graduates (84.0 %) was much higher than the 
EU average total (72.2 %). In contrast, just slightly 
more than half of those with at most primary or 
lower secondary education were employed. The 
employment rate for people with upper secondary 
or post-secondary non-tertiary education was 
in between these levels and slightly above the 
overall EU average employment rate. 
These findings underline the importance 
of education for employability. Increasing 
(21) Eurostat, Population projections data, EUROPOP2015 main scenario. 
(22) Source: Eurostat (online data code: proj_15npms).
(23) European Commission, Employment and Social Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2017, 2017, p. 83.
educational attainment and equipping people 
with skills for the knowledge society are, therefore, 
a major focus of European employment policies 
addressing Europe 2020 headline targets on 
employment and education (see ‘Education’ 
chapter, page 87). 
1.2.7 Employment rates among non-EU 
migrants are considerably low 
Economic migration is becoming increasingly 
important for the EU’s ability to deal with a 
shrinking labour force and expected skills 
shortages. According to current population 
projections (21), without net migration the working-
age population aged 20 to 64 would shrink by 9 % 
by 2030 and by 28 % by 2060 compared with 2015 
levels. As shown further below, the working-age 
population is expected to decline even with net 
migration into the EU, but at slower rates of – 4 % 
by 2030 and – 13 % by 2060 (22).
Country of origin can impact the labour market 
performance of individuals. Migrant workers from 
countries outside the EU tend to occupy low-
skilled and insecure jobs with temporary contracts 
and poorer working conditions (23). Migrants are 
also among the first to lose their jobs during 
Figure 1.6: Employment rate age group 20 to 64, by educational attainment level, 2005–2017
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economic setbacks. Much lower employment 
rates are consequently reported for this group 
than for EU citizens (see Figure 1.7). In 2017, the 
employment rate of non-EU nationals aged 20 
to 64 was 14.8 percentage points below the total 
employment rate. Additionally, their employment 
rate has so far not recovered from the setback 
caused by the economic crisis, with the 2017 
rate being still considerably lower than the levels 
recorded in 2008. 
1.3 Labour market prospects of younger 
people are improving in the EU
1.3.1 Youth unemployment is falling, 
although younger people are still at 
a higher risk of unemployment than 
people of other age groups
As Figure 1.8 shows, young people generally 
face a higher risk of being unemployed: in 2017, 
the unemployment rate of 15 to 24 year olds 
was more than double the rate for the entire 
population, at 16.8 %, compared with 7.6 % in 
total. However, because many young people 
at this age are full-time students and are not 
working or looking for a job, in absolute terms 
the number of unemployed people was small 
at just 3.8 million in 2017. Over the past few 
years, though, this age group has experienced 
a marked improvement in their labour market 
prospects. In 2017, the youth unemployment 
Younger people in the EU 
who are active in the labour 
market are at higher risk of 
being unemployed, with 
an unemployment rate 
twice as high as the total 
unemployment rate in 
2017. However, in absolute numbers, this 
group is not necessarily large since many 
young people are still in education and not 
looking for a job.  
In 2017, 14.3 % of 18 to 24 year olds were 
neither in employment nor in education 
(NEET), exposing themselves to the risk of 
labour market exclusion and dependence 
on social security.
Figure 1.7: Employment rate age group 20 to 64, by citizenship, EU-28, 2006–2017
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ratio was much lower (7.0 %) than the youth 
unemployment rate (16.8 %); it experienced a 
decline of 3.0 percentage points since 2013 (24), 
while the youth unemployment rate declined 
by 6.9 percentage points over the same 
period (25). In general, over the past 15 years, 
the youth unemployment rate has followed a 
similar pattern to the total unemployment rate, 
although young people aged 15 to 24 were more 
strongly affected by the economic fluctuations, 
as Figure 1.8 shows.
It should be kept in mind that the unemployment 
rate does not include people who became 
discouraged and stopped looking for work. 
Nevertheless, this group still represents a 
potential additional pool of workers. In 2017, 
8.1 million people or 2.1 % of the total EU 
population were available and would have liked 
to work but were not seeking employment (26). 
Moreover, underemployed part-time workers 
could also add to the labour force: in 2017, nine 
million people (or 2.4 % of the total population) 
(24) Source: Eurostat (online data code: tespm080).
(25) The youth unemployment rate may be high even if the number of unemployed persons is limited. This may be the case when the young 
labour force (i.e. the rate’s denominator) is relatively small. For more information, see: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/
index.php/Youth_unemployment
(26) Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsi_sup_a).
(27) Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsi_sup_a). 
(28) Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_urgaed).
who were working part-time also wished to work 
additional hours and were available to do so (27). 
Similarly to employment, a clear link exists 
between unemployment and education, with 
more highly educated people experiencing 
lower unemployment rates. In 2017, only 4.5 % 
of economically active people with tertiary 
education were unemployed compared to 14.8 % 
of economically active people with at most lower 
secondary education (28). This pattern was also 
visible among younger people, with the risk of 
unemployment particularly high for those who 
had only completed lower secondary education 
(early leavers from education and training; see 
chapter ‘Education’, page 87).
1.3.2 The share of young people neither 
in employment nor in education and 
training has been decreasing since 2013
The indicator monitoring young people neither 
in employment nor in education and training 
Figure 1.8: Unemployment rate by age group, EU-28, 2002–2017
(%)
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Note: Break in time series in 2005; the total unemployment rate is given for the age group 15–74, see section ‘What is meant by ‘activity’, 
‘employment’, ‘unemployment’ and ‘labour force’?’, see page 26, for more information on the choice of this age group. 
Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_urgaed)
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(NEET) covers people aged 18 to 24 years. 
Low educational attainment is one of the key 
determinants of young people entering the 
NEET category. Other important factors include 
having a disability or coming from a migrant 
background (29). 
Being in the NEET category for a considerable 
period of time may put young people in a very 
difficult situation in the labour market. Over the 
long term, they might fail to gain new skills and 
face erosion of their existing skills, which in turn 
might lead to a higher risk of labour market and 
social exclusion. Such challenges as labour market 
segmentation and variability in the performance 
of education and training systems, the availability 
of quality work experience, and the effectiveness 
(29) Eurofound, Young people not in employment, education or training: Characteristics, costs and policy responses in Europe, Publications Office of 
the European Union, Luxembourg, 2012, p. 2. 
(30) European Commission, Youth Employment, European thematic factsheet, 2017, p. 7. 
of tailored support provided to young people by 
public employment services, are among the main 
reasons why young people experience difficulties 
in the transition from education to work (30). 
In 2017, 14.3 % of 18 to 24 year olds were neither 
in employment nor in education, exposing 
themselves to the risk of labour market exclusion 
and dependence on social security (see Figure 1.9). 
This was an improvement since 2012 when the 
NEET rate for this age group peaked at 17.2 %, 
but was still slightly higher than the 2008 low 
of 14.0 %. In 2017, the NEET rate was higher for 
women (14.7 %) than for men (13.9 %). However, 
while women in the NEET category tended to 
be economically inactive, men were mostly 
unemployed.
Figure 1.9: Young people neither in employment nor in education and training, EU-28, 2002–2017
(% of population aged 18 to 24)
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Note: Breaks in time series in 2003 and 2006.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: edat_lfse_20)
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1.4 The relative size of the EU’s working age 
population is shrinking due to ageing
(31) European Commission, Demography report — 2015 edition, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015 (p. 43).
Employment rates are the result of the interplay 
between the supply of and demand for workers in 
the labour market. Labour supply is characterised 
by the number of working-age people available 
to the labour market (largely determined by 
demographic structure) and the skills they 
offer (approximated by their education and 
training attainment). Despite their importance 
to labour supply, the demographic structure 
of the economically active population and its 
skills composition are hard to influence in the 
short term. 
The EU is confronted with a growing but 
ageing population, driven by fertility rates and 
a continuous rise in life expectancy. This trend, 
which is already apparent in many Member 
States, will lead to a higher share of older people 
and a lower share of people aged 20 to 64 in 
the total population in the coming decades 
(see Figure 1.10). According to the European 
Commission Demography report 2015 (31), these 
trends mean the EU labour force is shrinking in 
relative terms, which may lead to future labour 
shortages. This is a threat to the welfare of all 
Figure 1.10: Population age structure, by major age groups, EU-28, 2002, 2017, 2020, 2030, 2040
(%)
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Source: Eurostat (online data codes: demo_pjan and proj_15npms)
Despite steady population 
growth in recent decades, 
the EU’s sub-replacement 
fertility rates and 
rising life expectancy 
are contributing to a 
shrinking working-age 
population and an increasing old-age 
dependency ratio. While in 2017 there 
were 305.3 million people of working age 
(20 to 64), the most recent population 
projections by Eurostat estimate it will 
decline in absolute terms by 1.1 million 
people by 2020. 
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generations unless the following conditions are 
met. First, the impact of a shrinking working-age 
population is cushioned by efforts to help a higher 
percentage of potential workers into employment 
and to extend the length of working lives. Second, 
population growth is sustained by increasing net 
immigration and fertility rates. Third, productivity 
is increased through sustained investment (32).
Between 2002 and 2017 the number of older 
people aged 65 and above increased by 26.9 %. 
The rise was particularly steep for the group 
aged 80 or over (by 58.1 %). At the same time, the 
working age population aged 20 to 64 grew only 
slightly, by 2.7 % over the same period. In contrast, 
the number of 0 to 19 year olds fell by 5.7 %. 
The most recent population projections (33) foresee 
a continuation of these trends, with further growth 
in the number of older people accompanied by a 
shrinkage of the share of the 20 to 64 age group: 
from 59.7 % in 2017 to 56.0 % in 2030 and 53.2 % in 
2040 (see Figure 1.10). This amounts to a decrease 
of more than 12 million people by 2030 and more 
than 24 million by 2040 in this age group. At the 
same time, the number of older people aged 65 
or over will grow by 25.8 million by 2030, meaning 
(32) European Commission, Employment and Social Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2017, 2017, p. 13.
(33) Eurostat, Population projections data, EUROPOP2015 main scenario. 
(34) European Commission, The 2018 Ageing Report, Underlying Assumptions & Projection Methodologies, 2017, p. 3.
that in 2030 almost every fourth person in the EU 
will be 65 or above. 
One of the important factors contributing to the 
EU demographic structure is the ageing of the 
‘baby-boomers’ who were born between 1946 
and 1964 and are now entering their 60s. The 
baby-boom generation resulted from high fertility 
rates in several European countries over a 20- to 
30-year period to the mid-1960s. They continue 
to comprise a significant part of the working 
population, but the first of this large group are 
now reaching retirement age. 
Increasing life expectancy and shrinking annual 
net migration inflows are also likely to influence 
the EU’s demographic structure. Projections 
show that life expectancy of the EU population 
at birth is likely to increase by 7.8 years for males 
and 6.6 years for females by 2070 in comparison 
to 2016 (34). Net migration flows are projected to 
halve by 2070 compared with 2016. 
Recently, as a result of the demographic changes, 
the old-age dependency ratio increased from 
26.4 % in 2002 to 32.6 % in 2017. This ratio shows 
the share of the population aged 65 and above 
compared with the population of 20 to 64 year 
Figure 1.11: Old-age dependency ratio, EU-28, 2002–2080
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Source: Eurostat (online data codes: demo_pjan and proj_15npms)
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olds. This means that while there were 3.8 people 
of working age for every dependent person over 
65 in the EU in 2002, this number had fallen to 3.1 
people by 2017. By 2030, the old-age dependency 
ratio is projected to reach 42.7 %, meaning 
there will be only 2.3 people of working age for 
every dependent person over 65. As shown in 
Figure 1.11, the EU’s old-age dependency ratio 
is projected to increase until 2060 and then to 
stabilise at slightly above 55 %, which corresponds 
to about 1.7 people of working age for every 
person over 65. 
1.5 Job creation and decent work
Following the recovery 
in GDP and employment 
growth, the share of newly 
employed people (those 
whose job started within 
the last 12 months) is at its 
highest level since 2009.
Between 2008 and 2017, employment 
grew fastest in the professional, 
scientific and technical activities and the 
administrative sector, while it declined the 
most in the construction, agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors. Men were the most 
affected by this decline. 
In the EU, young people are at higher risk 
of being in involuntary part-time and 
fixed-term employment than other age 
groups, with 13.9 % of 15 to 24 year olds 
involuntarily employed on time-limited 
contracts and 8.0 % involuntarily in part-
time work in 2017. 
Figure 1.12: GDP growth, employment growth and newly employed persons, EU-28, 2003–2017
(%) 
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employment).
Source: Eurostat (online data codes: nama_10_gdp, lfsa_pganws and lfsa_enewasn)
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Employment (and unemployment) rates are 
closely linked to the business cycle. Usually this is 
expressed in terms of growth in gross domestic 
product (GDP), which can be seen as a measure 
of an economy’s dynamism and its capacity to 
create jobs. Figure 1.12 illustrates this relationship, 
showing similar patterns for GDP growth, 
employment growth and the share of newly 
employed people in total employment (35). 
As Figure 1.12 shows, GDP growth has brought 
about a job-rich recovery over the past four 
years, with annual employment growth rates 
between 1.1 % and 1.4 % for 2014 to 2017. However, 
GDP growth is not necessarily associated with 
employment growth. In 2010 and 2011, GDP also 
grew, while employment stagnated. The pattern of 
‘jobless growth’ stems from the fact that GDP grew 
mostly because of an increase in productivity and 
hours worked, leaving little room for employment 
growth (36). 
The link between GDP growth and employment 
growth is also reflected in the share of newly 
employed people in total employment. This 
dropped considerably in 2009, following the 
contractions in GDP and employment in the 
same year. In 2017, following the recovery in GDP 
and employment growth, the share of newly 
(35) People who started their job within the past 12 months.
(36) European Commission, Employment and Social Developments in Europe 2012, 2013. 
employed people was at its highest level since 
2009, at 14.2 %. 
1.5.1 Professional, administrative, 
scientific and technical sectors show the 
strongest signs of jobs recovery 
Jobs growth is unevenly distributed across 
economic sectors and strongly dependent 
on general economic conditions as well as 
developments within these sectors. Overall, total 
employment across all EU economic sectors rose 
slightly between 2008 and 2017 (see Figure 1.13). 
Employment in the professional, scientific and 
technical activities sector grew the fastest over 
this period (by 21.5 %, which equals to 2.2 million 
people), followed by traditional service sectors 
(by 18.3 % or 1.4 million people in administrative 
and support service activities and by 17.4 % or 
1.5 million people in accommodation and food 
service activities). 
However, the construction, agriculture and 
manufacturing sectors, which were also heavily 
affected by the economic crisis, showed the 
strongest declines between 2008 and 2017. These 
three sectors accounted for 96 % of the jobs lost 
during the economic crisis and the subsequent 
Figure 1.13: Employment growth by economic sector, age group 20-64, EU-28, 2008–2017
(%)
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Note: Sectors depicted in the figure are those whose share in the total employment is close to or more than 4 %.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_egan2).
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recovery (from 2008 to 2016) (37). Because these 
sectors are male-dominated, men have been 
affected more strongly by their decline than 
woman. For instance, the number of women 
employed in construction fell by 10.1 % (1.7 million 
people) between 2008 and 2017, while for men 
this decline was almost twice as strong, at 18.0 % 
(2.9 million people). 
1.5.2 Involuntary non-standard work 
contracts most widespread among young 
people 
In 2017, 13.4 % of employees aged 20 to 64 in the 
EU were working on a fixed-term contract. Total 
temporary employment has been relatively stable 
around 13 % over the past decade, with a slight 
upward tendency. It was most widespread among 
young people, with 44.0 % of 15 to 24 year olds 
working on a time-limited contract. Temporary 
employment was much lower among 25 to 49 
year olds (13.3 %) and for older people aged 50 to 
64 (7.0 %) (38). 
The significant over-representation of young 
people in temporary work reflects not only 
changes in labour market demand, but also 
structural features of educational systems. In many 
(37) European Commission, Employment and Social Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2017, 2017, p. 27.
(38) Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_etgar).
(39) European Commission, Youth Employment, European thematic factsheet, 2017, p. 8. 
(40) European Commission and EU Council, Joint Employment Report 2018, 2018, p. 49. 
Member States, for instance, temporary contracts 
for youth are associated with participation in 
education and training or a probationary period. In 
such cases, these contracts can potentially act as a 
stepping stone and support successful school-to-
work transitions (39). 
However, for many people having a fixed-term 
contract rather than a permanent one is not 
always a personal choice. In this respect, data on 
involuntary temporary employment provides 
a better insight into the excessive use of fixed-
term contracts. In 2017, 7.7 % of employees aged 
20 to 64 year olds were involuntarily working on 
temporary contracts (see Figure 1.14). Again, the 
share was much higher for young people aged 
15 to 24, at 13.9 %. With some fluctuations, the 
overall trend since 2006 indicates growing use 
of involuntary fixed-term contracts. Although 
fixed-term contracts could create additional 
opportunities and reduce youth unemployment, 
there is also the risk that temporary work may 
represent ‘dead ends’ rather than ‘stepping stones’ 
for young people towards permanent jobs (40). 
The situation is quite similar when looking at part-
time versus full-time contracts. In 2017, 18.7 % of all 
employed people aged 20 to 64 in the EU worked 
Figure 1.14: Involuntary temporary employees by age group, EU-28, 2006–2017 
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Source: Eurostat (online data codes: lfsa_etgar)
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on a part-time contract (41). More than a quarter 
(27.1 %) were in involuntary part-time employment, 
meaning they were underemployed. The share 
of involuntary part-time employed in total 
employment rose from 4.4 % in 2008 to 5.1 % in 
2017. As with involuntary temporary employment, 
young people are affected the most (see 
Figure 1.15). For all age groups the share of women 
in involuntary part-time employment exceeded 
that of men. The gender gap is widening with age, 
from 3.2 percentage points for 15 to 24 year olds to 
4.9 percentage points for the 50 to 64 age group. 
While part-time work can provide flexibility and 
better reconciliation between work and private 
life, and also be a valuable option for individuals 
who wish to be active in the labour market but 
cannot for health or disability reasons work full-
time, it is also associated with low pay and might 
(41) Source: Eurostat (online data code: lfsa_epgaed).
(42) European Commission, Employment and Social Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2017, 2017, pp. 76–77. 
(43) European Commission, Employment and Social Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2017, 2017, p. 78.
(44) European Commission, Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2017, 2017, pp. 78–79. 
lead to poverty and social exclusion (42). In 2017, 
more than one in three younger workers and 
one in four prime-age and older workers worked 
part time not by choice but because they could 
not find full-time employment, and the share of 
involuntary part-time work has increased over 
the past decade. The economic crisis was partly 
responsible for this underemployment but it also 
continues a trend that preceded the crisis, which 
suggests it is likely to be a structural feature of 
the labour market (43). In recent decades, there 
has been an increase in non-standard labour 
relationships in the EU, indicating a growing 
distance of firms from long-term commitments 
to workers, caused by socio-economic 
transformations, such as the transition towards a 
service economy, technological developments 
and pressures from cost-saving strategies spurred 
by firms’ internationalisation (44). 
Figure 1.15: Involuntary part-time employment by age group, EU-28, 2006–2017 
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1.6 Skills mismatches in the labour market
(45) European Commission, An Agenda for new skills and jobs: A European contribution towards full employment, COM(2010) 682 final, Strasbourg, 
2010.
A well-functioning labour market depends 
largely on matching the labour force’s skills and 
qualifications to those demanded by employers. 
Although some skills mismatch is inevitable, 
high and persistent mismatches can be costly 
for employers, workers and society at large. 
Technological and demographic changes remain 
a challenge in the EU and might contribute 
to skills mismatches in the future. Matching 
educational outcomes and labour market needs 
is a key component of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
In particular, the impact of the economic crisis has 
increased the need to better understand where 
future skills shortages are likely to lie in the EU (45). 
1.6.1 Changes in labour force skills 
outpacing changes in employment trends 
According to estimates from the European Centre 
for the Development of Vocational Training 
Recent Cedefop 
projections show 
that in the EU the 
distribution of skills 
in the labour force 
largely matches 
the qualification 
requirements of 
the labour market. However, labour supply 
exceeds the demand for all qualifications 
types. 
In 2017, 17.8 million people with tertiary 
education in the EU worked in occupations 
below their qualification level. 
Data on job vacancies point to a possible 
deterioration in the job-matching 
process between 2010 and 2014, when 
unemployment rose while job vacancies 
remained stable or increased. However, 
between 2014 and 2017, the labour market 
expanded with unemployment rates falling 
and vacancy rates rising. 
Figure 1.16: Labour force and employment trends by qualification, EU-28, 2008, 2017, 2020 and 
2025
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Cedefop (46), the distribution of skills in the 
labour force largely matched the qualification 
requirements of the labour market in 2017. 
However, labour supply exceeded demand for 
all qualification types, with the difference being 
particularly high for the low- and medium-level 
qualifications. The demand for a skilled labour 
force is likely to continue to grow; the most recent 
forecasts from Cedefop indicate that between 
2017 and 2025 more than 13 million jobs requiring 
high educational attainment will be created, while 
low-qualified jobs will decline by almost 6 million 
(see Figure 1.16). 
Overall, the Cedefop forecasts show a parallel rise 
in skills from both the demand and the supply 
side until 2025, however, skills supply is expected 
to grow slightly faster than skills demand. For 
instance, the share of the labour force holding 
only primary or lower secondary education is 
expected to decrease from 20.2 % in 2017 to 
16.8 % in 2025, whereas the share of positions for 
people with low-level qualifications are projected 
to fall from 18.4 % to 15.4 %. However, this parallel 
development does not prevent potential skills 
(46) The Cedefop skills forecasts are available at http://www.cedefop.europa.eu/en/events-and-projects/projects/forecasting-skill-demand-
and-supply/data-visualisations 
(47) Cedefop, Insights into skill shortages and skill mismatch: Learning from Cedefop’s European skills and jobs survey, 2018, p. 67. 
(48) Cedefop, Matching skills and jobs in Europe, Insights from Cedefop’s European skills and jobs survey, 2015, p. 2.  
(49) See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/skills/background/experimental-statistics 
mismatches, such as over-qualification (see the 
next section). 
1.6.2 Over-qualification rates increased in 
the EU between 2002 and 2017, and the 
gender gap widened
Skills mismatch is most commonly seen as the 
inability of employers to fill vacancies despite 
high unemployment. This can hamper economic 
productivity and individual potential, especially 
when more highly educated people are trapped in 
jobs without opportunities to continually develop 
and use their skills (47). According to the Cedefop 
survey results, in 2014 about 25 % of highly 
qualified first job entrants were overqualified for 
their position (48). 
As no commonly agreed indicators to measure 
skills mismatches within the European Statistical 
System (ESS) exist, Eurostat has developed 
some experimental statistics to foster the policy 
debate on this issue. The over-qualification rate 
refers to ‘vertical’ skills mismatches, looking into 
discrepancies between educational attainment 
levels and occupations (49). Figure 1.17 shows 
Figure 1.17: Over-qualification rate, EU-28, 2002–2017
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the trends in the over-qualification rate in the 
EU from 2002 to 2017. Over-qualification refers 
to the situation where a person has a level of 
skill or education higher than is required for his 
or her job. Here, this is measured as the share of 
graduates in tertiary education in employment 
whose occupations do not require this level of 
education, over the total employment of tertiary 
graduates (50). 
The share of people with tertiary education 
working in such occupations has increased almost 
steadily in the EU since 2002, reaching a share 
of 22.7 % of the total employment of tertiary 
graduates in 2017. This is equal to 17.8 million 
people in the EU. In 2017, women with tertiary 
education were more likely to be overqualified 
than men, with 24.0 % and 21.3 % respectively. 
There are many reasons why people may have to 
take on a job below their qualification level. Young 
workers are at higher risk of being overqualified 
for their jobs because they are more likely to 
have had a higher education than prime-age and 
older workers (51). Women also tend to be more 
(50) According to the ILO’s International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO), the following occupations do not require tertiary 
education: clerical support workers, service and sales workers, skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers, craft and related trades 
workers, plant and machine operators, assemblers and elementary occupations. See International Labour Organisation, International 
Standard Classification of Occupations. 
(51) European Commission, Employment and Social Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2017, 2017, p. 75.
(52) European Commission, Employment and Social Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2017, 2017, p. 75.
overqualified than men. This might be because 
women in general have higher qualification 
levels (see the chapter on ‘Education’, page 87). 
Another reason may be that they are more likely to 
take on childcare responsibilities and so are more 
willing to accept jobs that do not match their 
education but allow for a more flexible work-care 
balance. Women also face ‘glass ceiling’ effects, 
as they continue to be less likely to be promoted 
even though they are more likely to be highly 
educated (52). 
1.6.3 Signs of economic expansion with 
increasing job vacancies and decreasing 
unemployment 
Job vacancy statistics provide an insight into the 
demand side of the labour market, in particular the 
unmet labour demand. A job vacancy is defined 
as a paid post that is newly created, unoccupied or 
about to become vacant. The employer must be 
taking active steps and be prepared to take further 
steps to find a suitable candidate from outside the 
enterprise. The employer must also intend to fill 
Figure 1.18: Beveridge curve, EU-28, 2006–2017
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the position either immediately or within a specific 
time period. A vacant post that is only open to 
internal candidates is not treated as a ‘job vacancy’. 
Quarterly job vacancy statistics are used 
for business cycle analysis and for assessing 
mismatches in labour markets. Of particular 
interest is the relationship between vacancies and 
unemployment. The so-called Beveridge curve 
reflects their negative correlation (see Figure 1.18). 
During economic contractions there are few 
vacancies and high unemployment, while during 
expansions there are more vacancies and the 
unemployment rate is low. 
Structural changes in the economy can cause the 
Beveridge curve to shift. During times of uneven 
growth across regions or industries — when 
labour supply and demand are not matched 
efficiently — vacancy and unemployment rates 
can rise at the same time. Conversely, they can 
both decrease when the matching-efficiency of 
the labour market improves. This could be, for 
example, due to a better flow of job vacancy 
information thanks to the internet. Empirical 
analysis of the curve can be challenging because 
(53) Post-crisis movements in the euro-area Beveridge curve were the result of a mix of temporary, demand-related and structural factors. 
The outward shift of the Beveridge curve since 2008 observed at the aggregate level was to some extent linked to worsened labour 
market matching, with however major differences across countries (Labour market and wage development 2014).
(54) European Commission, Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe, Annual Review 2017, 2017.
both movements along the curve and shifts 
can take place at the same time with different 
intensities. 
Figure 1.18 shows three phases in the 
development of job vacancies and unemployment 
in the EU since 2008. From 2008 to 2010 a 
movement along the Beveridge curve confirmed 
the contraction of the EU economy, with falling 
vacancies and rising unemployment levels. 
In the following years, the movements of the 
Beveridge curve itself pointed to a deterioration 
in the matching process of labour demand and 
supply. Since the end of 2013, a movement along 
the curve has been visible again, mirroring the 
economic expansion with growing job vacancies 
and falling unemployment levels (53). In 2017, 
especially in the second semester, vacancies 
jumped abruptly and by more than the decline 
in unemployment, hinting at the possibility that 
skill mismatches are further constraining an 
improvement the unemployment rate. This would 
imply that the jobless rate is approaching its 
structural rate, which is the rate that could not be 
further reduced by economic growth alone (54).
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2.1 R&D and innovation — why do they matter?
(1) European Commission, Open innovation, open science, open to the world — a vision for Europe, Brussels 2016.
(2) Set in current prices.
(3) Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 of the European Parliament and the Council of 25 June 2015 on the European Fund for Strategic Investments, 
the European Investment Advisory Hub and the European Investment Project Portal and amending Regulations (EU) No 1291/2013 
and (EU) No 1316/2013 — the European Fund for Strategic Investments.
R&D and innovation are key policy components 
of the Europe 2020 strategy. Innovative 
products and services not only contribute to 
the strategy’s smart growth goal but also to 
its inclusiveness and sustainability objectives. 
Introducing new ideas to the market promotes 
industrial competitiveness, job creation, labour 
productivity growth and a more efficient use of 
resources.
R&D and innovation contribute to a well-
functioning knowledge-based economy. Most 
importantly, they are central to providing the 
scientific and technical solutions needed to 
meet global societal challenges such as climate 
change and clean energy, security, and active 
and healthy ageing. The three main goals 
for EU research and innovation policy can be 
summarised as Open Innovation, Open Science 
and Open to the World (1).
The development of new technologies alone 
will not be enough to solve many of the ‘grand’ 
societal challenges. Fundamental transformations 
in businesses and manufacturing processes, 
provision of services, the way society organises 
itself and other non-technological innovations 
will be equally important.
The challenges facing society also threaten the 
well-being of the population and can have dire 
social, economic and environmental implications 
inside and outside the EU. Research and 
innovation can not only help to address these 
challenges, but also to exploit the new market 
opportunities they offer. 
A number of important EU policy strategies 
and initiatives address such win-win situations. 
Horizon 2020 — the EU’s research and innovation 
programme for the period 2014 to 2020 — is 
helping to bring ideas from the lab to the market 
by providing nearly EUR 75 billion (2) of funding 
for research projects aimed at tackling societal 
challenges, generating excellence in science and 
fostering industrial leadership (3). The Investment 
Plan for Europe through the European Fund 
for Strategic Investments invests heavily in 
innovation-related projects and small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
The importance of R&D and innovation for 
fulfilling the Europe 2020 strategy’s ambitions 
is evident in their close interlinkages with the 
strategy’s other objectives. The R&D target 
is closely related to the strategy’s tertiary 
educational attainment and employment 
targets (see the chapters on ‘Employment’,  
page 23, and ‘Education’, page 87). 
Public investment in R&D generates the 
knowledge base and talent that higher 
educational organisations and innovative 
companies need. Higher public investment in 
R&D also leverages private investment in research 
and innovation, providing new jobs in business 
and academia and ultimately increasing demand 
for scientists and researchers in the labour 
market. R&D investment spurs innovation, which 
Europe 2020 strategy  
target on R&D
The Europe 2020 strategy sets the 
target of ‘improving the conditions 
for innovation, research and 
development’ (a), in particular with the 
aim of ‘increasing combined public and 
private investment in R&D to 3 % of GDP’ 
by 2020 (b).
(a) European Council conclusions 17 June 2010, EUCO 13/10, 
Brussels, 2010.
(b) European Commission, Taking stock of the Europe 2020 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, 
COM(2014) 130 final, Brussels, 2014 (p. 12).
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contributes to industrial competitiveness and job 
creation.
The Europe 2020 target on R&D is also linked 
to the strategy’s climate change and energy 
targets (see the chapter on ‘Climate change 
(4) ‘Research and experimental development (R&D) comprises creative work undertaken on a systematic basis to increase the stock of 
knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications’ (Frascati 
Manual, 2002 edition, p. 63).
(5) European Commission, Science, Research and Innovation Performance of the EU, 2018, p. 10.
(6) Data refer to China excluding Hong Kong.
and energy’, page 65). In particular, the 
transition to a green and low-carbon economy 
and adaptation to climate change will require 
significant innovation, from small incremental 
changes to major technological breakthroughs. 
2.2 Resources allocated to research and 
development in the EU
The headline indicator ‘gross domestic 
expenditure on R&D’, also referred to as R&D 
intensity, shows the proportion of gross domestic 
product (GDP) dedicated to research and 
development (4). 
For three consecutive years R&D expenditure in 
the EU has stagnated around 2.03 % of GDP, further 
decreasing the chances that the EU will reach its 
3 % target. At the global level, the EU accounts 
for one-fifth of the world’s R&D investment (5). 
Nevertheless, the EU’s R&D intensity is still lagging 
behind other advanced economies, such as the 
United States, Japan and South Korea, with only 
the best performing Member States surpassing 
the United States (see Figure 2.2). The EU’s relative 
position in the global R&D landscape has also 
weakened because of the rapid rise of R&D 
expenditure in China. In 2015, China (6) overtook 
the EU by spending 2.07 % of its GDP on R&D.
2.2.1 R&D spending up in two-thirds of 
Member States since 2008
Considerable differences across countries underlie 
the overall EU trend, with R&D intensity ranging 
from 0.44 % to 3.25 % in 2016 (see Figure 2.2). 
Differences in R&D investment, in particular 
After a period of slow but rising growth, 
gross domestic expenditure on R&D as a 
percentage of GDP (‘R&D intensity’) in the 
EU stagnated at around 2.03 % between 
2014 and 2016. As a result, the 3 % target is 
still some distance away.
The business enterprise sector continues 
to be the biggest investor in R&D in the 
EU, accounting for 64.9 % of total R&D 
expenditure in 2016. It has also recorded 
the highest increase since 2004. Although 
the higher education sector (for example, 
universities) and government sectors have 
lower R&D shares and have been growing at 
a slower pace, they also play an important 
role in the long-
term stability of R&D 
expenditure.
R&D expenditure is 
highest in northern 
and western European 
countries, which are also 
characterised by predominantly business-
financed R&D.
Regions with the highest R&D intensity in 
the EU are found in Germany, Austria, the 
United Kingdom, Belgium, France and the 
Nordic countries. The Braunschweig region 
in Germany recorded the highest R&D 
intensity in the EU in 2015 at 9.5 %.
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Figure 2.1: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, EU-28, 2002–2016
(% of GDP)
Europe 2020 headline indicator 
Note: Data for 2002 are estimates, 2016 data are provisional.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: t2020_20)
Figure 2.2: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, by country, 2008 and 2016
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business R&D spending, between countries 
generally reflect differences in their industrial 
structures, knowledge intensity of sectors and 
research capabilities (7). 
R&D intensity increased in most Member States 
between 2008 and 2016. It is to be noted that 
Finland was a leader in R&D intensity in 2008, but 
its spending contracted to below 3.00 % of GDP 
in 2016. The negative trends experienced in both 
Finland and Sweden could be partly attributed to 
difficulties in their information and communication 
technology (ICT) sectors (8). 
2.2.2 Almost two-thirds of R&D spending 
took place in the business sector
R&D activities are performed by four main 
institutional sectors: business enterprise, 
government, higher education and the private 
non-profit sector. Figure 2.3 illustrates the 
distribution of R&D expenditure between 
these four sectors in 2016. The business 
enterprise sector, which accounted for 64.9 % of 
(7) Reinstaller, A., Unterlass, F., Comparing business R&D across countries over time: a decomposition exercise using data for the EU27, Appl. Econ, 
2012, Lett.19, 1143–1148.
(8) European Commission, Science, Research and Innovation Performance of the EU, Brussels, 2016, p. 34.
(9) The market does not provide sufficient incentives for this type of research due to the non-appropriable, public 
good, intangible character of knowledge and the risky nature of research. For more information see: OECD.
STI policy profiles. Public research policy: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/sti_outlook-2012-en.
pdf?expires=1525260329&id=id&accname=ocid177428&checksum=7D7699964A9ED3C86FBFB2BBFE638E0E 
(10) OECD, Public investment in R&D in reaction to economic crises — A longitudinal study for OECD countries, 2016.
total R&D expenditure in the EU (EUR 196.6 billion), 
continues to be the biggest investor in R&D. 
Although it contributes a more modest share of 
11.2 % (EUR 33.9 billion), the government sector 
also plays an important role, especially in terms 
of the long-term stability of R&D expenditure. 
This includes performing ‘far from the market’ 
research (9) and research that is of social or 
environmental importance (for example, health, 
quality of life, environment and defence). It 
also establishes the basis for R&D activities 
and compensates for reduced business R&D 
expenditure during economic downturns to help 
avoid a decline in the build-up of capital stocks 
and harm to long-term productivity growth (10). 
Between 2004 and 2016, R&D expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP increased for the two major 
R&D sectors: business enterprise and higher 
education (see Figure 2.4). 
Considering the sectoral distribution of R&D 
spending, it is not surprising that annual trends 
Figure 2.3: R&D expenditure, by sectors of performance, EU-28, 2016 
(%) 
Business enterprise sector 
Higher education sector 
Government sector 
Private non-profit sector
0.9 %
23.0 %
11.2 %
64.9 %
Note: Provisional data.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: rd_e_gerdtot)
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in gross domestic expenditure on R&D follow 
the R&D expenditure patterns of the business 
enterprise sector. Business R&D expenditure 
typically reflects the cyclical behaviour of growth 
in gross domestic product (GDP). Indeed, the 
most significant drop in gross business R&D 
spending coincided with the slump in GDP 
growth in 2009, whereas it increased considerably 
in 2006 and 2011, during or after economic 
upturns. In comparison, public sector R&D 
expenditure (higher education and government) 
has been less cyclical and has grown more slowly 
over the same period. 
Increasingly, governments complement direct R&D 
funding with indirect support in the form of tax 
incentives to promote business R&D and stimulate 
innovation and economic growth. According to 
2015 OECD data, the amounts disbursed through 
tax incentives exceeded direct government 
funding for business R&D in 11 Member States (11). 
These amounts of foregone State revenues are not 
included in the Government Budget Allocations 
to Research and Development (GBARD), and 
therefore, for these countries, the latter indicator 
understates public investments in R&D. This is 
especially the case with Ireland, France, Belgium, 
(11) OECD, Measuring Tax Support for R&D and Innovation.
(12) European Commission, Science, Research and Innovation Performance of the EU, Brussels 2018 (see Figure I.3-A.17 on p. 96).
(13) European Commission, R&D tax incentives: How to make them most effective?, Brussels 2017,  p. 4.
Portugal and the Netherlands, where foregone 
tax revenue considerably exceeded public R&D 
funding allocated to companies in 2015 (12). 
Currently in the EU only Germany, Estonia and 
Finland do not have any tax policy aimed at 
stimulating business R&D (13).
Figure 2.5 illustrates country differences in gross 
domestic expenditure on R&D by sector of 
performance. The business enterprise sector 
remains the biggest spender on R&D in the most 
research-intensive countries. However, in the least 
research-intensive countries, such as the Baltic 
countries and some southern and eastern Member 
States, the public sector tends to account for the 
most R&D expenditure. Although the public R&D 
system drives the generation of knowledge and 
talent needed by innovative enterprises, it is only 
through business investment that the full impacts 
of R&D can be realised. Business R&D integrates 
and transforms available knowledge into 
commercially viable technologies and innovation 
such as greener products, processes and services 
that enable higher labour productivity, industrial 
competitiveness, resource efficiency and reduced 
environmental impacts.
Figure 2.4: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, by sectors of performance, EU-28, 2004–2016 
(% of GDP)
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Government sector (1) 
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(1) 2016 data are provisional. 
(2) 2004–2015 data are estimates.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: rd_e_gerdtot)
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Map 2.1: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, by NUTS 2 regions, 2015
(% of GDP)
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Map 2.2: Change in gross domestic expenditure on R&D, by NUTS 2 regions, 2007–2015
(percentage points difference between 2015 and 2007, % of GDP)
Administrative Boundaries: © EuroGeographics © UN-FAO © Turkstat
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2.2.3 R&D intensity concentrated in a 
limited number of regions in Germany, 
Austria, the United Kingdom, Belgium, 
France and the Nordic countries
When looking at the regional distribution of 
R&D intensity, there are 31 NUTS 2 regions that 
reported R&D intensity above 3.0 % in 2015 (see 
Map 2.1). These regions are located mostly in 
Germany (11 regions), Austria and the United 
Kingdom (five regions each), Sweden (four regions), 
Belgium (three regions), Denmark, France and 
Finland (one region each). Some research-intensive 
‘clusters’ also become apparent: in particular, a band 
of research-intensive regions running from Finland 
through southern Sweden into Denmark and 
another band from the United Kingdom, through 
Belgium into southern Germany and Austria. This 
geographical concentration of R&D activities is a 
common phenomenon. R&D clusters often develop 
around academic institutions or specific high-
technology industrial activities and knowledge-
based services, where they could benefit from a 
favourable environment and knowledge sharing. 
Due to clusters many regions attract new start-
ups and highly qualified personnel and develop a 
competitive advantage in specialised activities. 
Three regions in the EU appear to have particularly 
high R&D intensities. In 2015, the German 
Braunschweig region spent 9.5 % of its GDP on R&D, 
almost five times higher than the EU average. In 
Belgian’s Brabant Wallon province and in Germany’s 
Stuttgart region, R&D spending peaked at 6.54 % 
and 6.24 % of GDP, respectively. In the case of 
Figure 2.5: Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, by sectors of performance, by country, 2016
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Germany, this could be mainly attributed to the 
automobile industry concentrated in those regions, 
and in the case of Belgium to the pharmaceutical 
industry.
Capital regions recorded the highest levels of R&D 
intensity in 10 multi-regional Member States. In 
addition, in 19 countries, the capital region’s R&D 
intensity exceeded the national average but was 
not necessarily the highest in the country. Only 
Belgium and the Netherlands went against this 
trend, with capital regions’ R&D intensity below 
the national average. In Belgium this might be 
explained by the relatively narrow administrative 
borders, and in Netherlands by the large rural 
(14) Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), Insights into Skill Shortages and Skill Mismatch, 2018, p. 5.
areas, which are part of the capital region. Regional 
disparities in R&D intensity within countries, 
measured as the difference in R&D intensity 
between the best and worst performing regions, 
were largest in countries with a high number of 
regions (Spain and France), and smallest in countries 
with fewer regions (Ireland, Slovenia and Slovakia).
Changes in R&D intensity over time are presented 
in Map 2.2. Of the 269 regions for which data 
are available, 54 experienced a decline in R&D 
intensity over the considered time frame. In the 
remaining regions, the increase in R&D intensity 
ranged between 0.01 percentage points and 3.14 
percentage points (Braunschweig). 
2.3 Fostering talents, knowledge and skills for 
innovation
Knowledge and skills are crucial for gaining 
new scientific and technological expertise and 
for building an economy’s capacity to absorb 
and use this knowledge. R&D expenditure is a 
vital enabling factor for human capital because 
it supports knowledge creation and skills 
development. Highly skilled human resources 
in turn are necessary for the EU’s research and 
innovation capacity and competitiveness. The 
advent of technological advances, such as 
machine learning, big data analytics, the internet 
of things and advanced robotics, together with 
restructuring in global value chains, are expected 
to change the world of work as we know it. To 
meet this demand for a highly qualified workforce 
and avoid a potential skills gap, the EU would 
need a high number of tertiary graduates (also 
see the chapters on ‘Employment’, page 23, 
and ‘Education’, page 87). The European 
skills forecasting model of the Centre for the 
Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), for 
instance, projects that by 2025 about 48 % of all 
job opportunities in Europe will need to be filled 
by individuals with tertiary-level qualifications (14).
The EU increased its output of tertiary 
graduates in science and technology by 
59 % between 2003 and 2015. Despite 
this progress, women still remain 
underrepresented in this field of study.
More than one-third of the EU labour force is 
employed in knowledge-intensive activities 
and this share has increased from 34.2 % in 
2008 to 36.1 % in 2017. 
Since 2002, the share of 
R&D personnel in the 
labour force has been 
slowly but continuously 
increasing, reaching 1.2 % 
of the active population in 
2016. The business sector 
employs more than half of 
this workforce.
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2.3.1 The number of science and 
technology graduates in the EU 
is increasing, but women remain 
underrepresented
A well-functioning research and innovation 
system is important for promoting excellence in 
education and skills development and ensuring a 
sufficient supply of graduates and postgraduates 
in science, technology, engineering and 
mathematics. Increasing the number of science 
graduates and jobs in knowledge-intensive 
activities would help to create a solid base for the 
EU knowledge economy and contribute to Europe 
2020’s objectives by fostering the EU’s innovation 
capacity, economic strength and employment.
The number of EU students per 1 000 inhabitants 
aged 20 to 29 that graduate from tertiary 
education in science and technology grew 
by 59 % between 2003 and 2015. Despite the 
growth of female tertiary graduates in science 
and technology over the same period (by 70 %), 
women still remain underrepresented in these 
fields. In 2015, their number was only around half 
that of male graduates. The share of women in 
science and technology fields declines further at 
the postgraduate level and even more so after 
(15) ISCED 1997 classifications used.
(16) European Commission, She Figures 2015, p. 5.
they transition to the workplace: in 2012 women 
accounted for 47 % of PhD graduates (ISCED 6: 
post-graduate programmes above master’s 
level (15)), but made up only 33 % of researchers 
and 21 % of top-level researchers (grade A) (see 
‘She Figures’, 2015, p. 5–6). Among other factors, 
occupational segregation — understood as 
under or overrepresentation of a given group in 
occupations or sectors — might be explained by 
differences in the educational pathways of women 
and men. For instance, according to the latest ‘She 
Figures’ publication by the European Commission, 
men are more than two times more likely than 
women to choose a degree in engineering, 
manufacturing and construction, while women 
are twice as likely to pursue an education 
degree (16).  
2.3.2 Knowledge-intensive activities 
employ more than one-third of the EU 
labour force 
Turning knowledge into economic and societal 
innovation drives productivity, supports long-
term growth and generates high-quality jobs. 
Innovation can also shift a country’s economic 
structure towards more knowledge-intensive 
Figure 2.6: Tertiary graduates in science and technology, EU-28, 2003–2015
(graduates per 1 000 inhabitants aged 20 to 29 years)
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Note: Break in time series in 2013 due to switch from ISCED 1997 to ISCED 2011; 2011 data refer to EU-27; 2015 data are estimates. 
Source: Eurostat (online data codes: tps00188 and educ_uoe_grad04)
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activities with higher added value (17). This 
structural change has important implications 
for employment as it helps to accommodate 
and stimulate the development of a highly 
skilled labour force. Therefore, the indicator on 
employment in knowledge-intensive activities 
as a percentage of total employment shows how 
the supply of highly skilled labour feeds into a 
country’s economic structure.
(17) Knowledge-intensive activities are defined based on the level of tertiary educated people within sectors. An activity is classified as 
knowledge-intensive if more than 33 % of people employed in that activity are tertiary educated (according to ISCED97, levels 5 and 6).
Employment in knowledge-intensive activities 
accounts for more than one-third of total 
employment in the EU. Between 2008 and 
2017 this share increased slightly, from 34.2 % to 
36.1 %. Of all women employed in the EU, 44.4 % 
were working in knowledge-intensive activities 
compared to only 28.9 % of men. While half of all 
men employed in knowledge-intensive activities 
Figure 2.7: Employment in knowledge-intensive activities, EU-28, 2008–2017 
(% of total employment)
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Source: Eurostat (online data code: htec_kia_emp2)
Figure 2.8: R&D personnel, by sectors of performance, EU-28, 2016 
(%)
Business enterprise sector (1) 
Higher education sector (1) 
Government sector (1) 
Private non-prot sector (2)
0.9 %
12.7 %
31.6 %
54.9 %
Notes: Data are provisional.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: rd_p_persocc)
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were working in the business sector, this was the 
case for only 30.6 % of women. 
At the EU level, R&D personnel — researchers 
and other staff employed directly in R&D — 
accounted for 1.2 % of the labour force in 
2016 (18), most of them in the business enterprise 
sector. Like the evolution of R&D intensity, 
(18) 2016 data is provisional. Source: Eurostat (online data code: rd_p_perslf).
(19) European Commission, Science, Research and Innovation Performance of the EU, 2018, p. 10. 
(20) Source: Eurostat (online data code: sdg_09_40)
(21) Eurostat, Sustainable Development in the European Union — Monitoring report on progress towards the SDGs in an EU context, Luxembourg, 
2017, p. 181.
(22) The European Innovation Scoreboard analyses the innovation system of EU Member States through a set of 27 indicators broken 
down into eight dimensions looking at human resources, research systems, finance and support, firm investments, linkages and 
entrepreneurship, intellectual assets, innovators and economic effects. (See European Commission, European Innovation Scoreboard 2018, 
2018 Brussels).
the share of R&D personnel in the labour 
force increased marginally between 2002 and 
2016 (0.28 percentage points). This was mainly 
driven by the business enterprise sector, where the 
share of R&D personnel grew by 0.18 percentage 
points. With more than 1.8 million researchers, 
the EU has the world’s most researchers, ahead of 
China and the United States (19).
2.4 Turning knowledge assets into innovation 
A dynamic business environment is essential for 
the promotion and diffusion of innovation. The 
challenge is to make use of R&D by fostering 
entrepreneurship and creativity to trigger 
innovation and economic competitiveness. 
Therefore, measures targeting knowledge 
diffusion and absorption of ideas and innovations, 
for example, through the creation of technology 
markets and licensing schemes, are just as 
important as investment in knowledge generation. 
The higher the uptake and use of ideas from R&D, 
the more likely innovative players are to invest in 
future knowledge generation through increased 
private R&D expenditure. Innovators also help 
to create a more dynamic innovation system. In 
many cases they contribute to the structural and 
technological changes needed to adapt to new 
circumstances and challenges. An example is the 
depletion of fossil fuels and the resulting transition 
towards more renewable energy sources.
Progress in achieving knowledge diffusion and 
absorption can be measured through data on 
the number of innovative companies, patent 
applications and exports of high-tech products, 
among others. Other attempts to measure 
innovation include composite indices such as the 
European Innovation Scoreboard and the  
Eco-Innovation Index. 
Patents provide a valuable measure of how 
research is being exploited and the inventiveness 
of countries, regions and enterprises. In 2014, 
the total number of patent applications to the 
European Patent Office (EPO) was 10 % higher 
compared to the level in 2002. Patent applications 
had been steadily increasing until 2007 but have 
since stabilised at around 57 000 per year (20). 
Further information on patent applications in 
the EU can be found in the Eurostat publication 
‘Sustainable Development in the European Union 
— Monitoring report on progress towards the 
SDGs in an EU context’ (21).
The European Innovation Scoreboard is a policy 
instrument used by the European Commission 
to compare Member States’ research and 
innovation performance (22). The Eco-Innovation 
The total value of high-
tech exports to outside 
the EU increased by 
almost 66 % in nominal 
terms between 2008 
and 2017. This growth 
was mainly driven by 
exports in the pharmacy 
and aerospace sectors.
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Scoreboard (23) is a policy tool that helps measure 
eco-innovation performance and assess whether 
the EU and its Member States are moving towards 
smart and sustainable growth, as requested by 
the Europe 2020 strategy (24). Eco-innovation is 
any innovation that reduces the use of natural 
resources and decreases the release of harmful 
substances across a product’s whole life cycle, 
bringing both economic and environmental 
benefits. Environmental benefits include lower 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, reduced waste 
generation and improved resource productivity, in 
particular better material and energy efficiency (25).
2.4.1 Almost half of EU enterprises carry 
out innovation activities
Almost half (49.1 %) of EU enterprises reported 
innovation activity between 2012 and 2014. 
The share has remained relatively stable since 
the previous biennial Community Innovation 
(23) Eco-Innovation Scoreboard (Eco-IS) on the DG Environment website: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecoap/scoreboard_en  
(24) The Eco-IS shows how well individual countries perform in different dimensions of eco-innovation compared with the EU average. It 
is based on 16 indicators grouped in to five thematic areas: eco-innovation inputs, eco-innovation activities, eco-innovation outputs, 
resource efficiency and socio-economic outcomes. In the index, Member States are ranked in relation to the EU average of 100.
(25) Eco-innovation Observatory, Introducing eco-innovation: from incremental changes to systemic transformations, 2011.
(26) The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) is a survey of innovation activities of enterprises in EU Member States. The survey collects 
information about product and process innovation as well as organisational and marketing innovation and other key variables. Most 
questions cover new or significantly improved goods or services or the implementation of new or significantly improved processes, 
logistics or distribution methods. It produces a broad set of indicators on innovation activities, innovation expenditure, public funding, 
sources of information for innovation, innovation co-operation, organisational and marketing innovation and on strategies and obstacles 
for reaching the enterprises’ goals. For further information, see Statistics Explained article on innovation statistics available on the 
Eurostat website: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Innovation_statistics 
(27) Source: Eurostat (online data code: inn_cis9_type).
Survey (CIS) in 2012 (48.9 %) (26) (see Figure 2.9). The 
share of innovative enterprises is broadly linked 
with GDP per capita levels. Germany had by far 
the highest share of innovative enterprises 
at 67.0 %; but other countries with high GDP per 
capita and productivity levels such as France and 
the Benelux and northern European countries also 
seemed to provide a favourable environment for 
innovative business activities, with 55 % or more 
of enterprises reporting innovation activities (27). 
These countries also share a high proportion of 
medium-high- and high-tech manufacturing 
companies or a high proportion of knowledge-
intensive services (for example, ICT and finance). 
The share of innovative enterprises therefore 
seems to be also linked to economic structures. 
Innovative companies can be distinguished by the 
type of innovation they pursue. Figure 2.9 shows 
how different business strategies lead to different 
innovation types such as product, process, 
Figure 2.9: Enterprises by type of innovation, EU-28, 2014
(% of the total number of enterprises)
49.1
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Process 
innovative 
enterprises
Marketing 
innovative 
enterprises
Product 
innovative 
enterprises
Organisation 
innovative 
enterprises
Innovative 
enterprises
27.3
23.9 22.8 21.6
Source: Eurostat (online data code: inn_cis9_type)
2 R&D and innovation
  Smarter, greener, more inclusive?64
organisational or marketing innovation. More 
than a quarter (27.3 %) of EU enterprises reported 
an organisational innovation that involved 
implementing a new method in the enterprise’s 
business practices, workplace organisation or 
external relations. 
Complex innovations with the highest potential 
for boosting productivity and growth often 
depend on the ability to draw on diverse sources 
of information and knowledge, or to collaborate 
on the development of an innovation. Innovation 
co-operation, which measures among other 
things the flow of knowledge between public 
research institutions and enterprises and between 
enterprises and other enterprises, provides an 
important indication of enterprises’ innovation 
activity. A third (33.1 %) of EU enterprises that 
conducted product and process innovation 
activities were also engaged in innovation co-
operation arrangements from 2012 to 2014. 
2.4.2 High-tech exports to non-EU 
countries have increased significantly 
since 2007
Beyond turning research results into tangible 
applications, innovative businesses compete 
(28) Eurostat, Statistics Explained. Production and international trade in high-tech products, Data extracted in June 2018. 
(29) Ibid.
globally to sell their high-tech products on the 
world market. The volume of high-tech trade 
provides an indication of EU enterprises’ ability 
to commercialise their R&D and innovation 
outputs globally. It also reflects how specialised 
a country is in producing medium- and high-
tech products that result from innovation and 
contribute to its balance of trade and international 
competitiveness. The creation, exploitation 
and commercialisation of high-tech products is 
associated with high value added for the economy 
and knowledge-intensive and remunerative jobs. 
Between 2008 and 2017 the total value of high-
tech exports to outside the EU grew by almost 
66 % in nominal terms, from EUR 202 billion to 
EUR 335 billion. In 2017, this represented 18 % of 
all extra-EU exports (28). The main drivers behind 
the development of EU’s high-tech exports 
since 2008 were the pharmacy and aerospace 
sectors, which increased by 196 % and 107 %, 
respectively. In terms of destination, the United 
States was the main importer of EU high-tech 
products in 2017 (EUR 84 billion), followed by 
China (EUR 39 billion) (29). 
Figure 2.10: High-tech trade exports outside of EU-28, by high-tech group of products, EU-28, 
2007–2017
(EUR million)
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3.1 Climate change and energy —  
why do they matter?
(1) United Nations, Paris Agreement, 2015. 
(2) EEA, Annual European Union greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2016 and inventory report 2018, EEA report No 05/2018, Copenhagen, 2018, p. 63.
Unchecked climate change threatens to erode 
the foundations on which modern society is 
built by changing weather patterns, redrawing 
coastlines and degrading natural ecosystems. 
To avoid dangerous levels of global warming, 
the international community, including the 
EU, has committed to limiting the rise in mean 
global temperature to well below 2 °C above 
pre-industrial levels and seeks to further limit the 
increase to 1.5 °C. These objectives were enshrined 
in the Paris Agreement (1) signed at the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) 21st Conference of the Parties 
(COP) in 2015.
In response to the international goal, the EU has 
pledged to drastically reduce its greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions. The Europe 2020 strategy 
reinforces this commitment, aiming to turn the 
EU into a ‘low-carbon’ economy. The European 
Council has reconfirmed the EU objectives to 
reduce emissions by 80–95 % by 2050 compared 
with 1990, in the context of similar reductions 
to be taken by developed countries as a group. 
Emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) are the most 
prevalent and accounted for about 81 % of the 
EU’s GHG emissions in 2016 (not counting land use, 
land use change and forestry) (2).
Europe 2020 strategy targets on climate change and energy 
Also known as the ‘20-20-20’ targets, 
the Europe 2020 strategy’s three climate 
and energy targets are interrelated and 
mutually support one another (a): 
• A 20 % reduction in GHG emissions 
compared with 1990 levels; 
• A 20 % share of renewable energy in 
gross final energy consumption; and 
• A 20 % cut in energy consumption 
compared to a 2020 business-as-usual 
projection. 
In 2014, the European Council agreed on a 
post-2020 climate and energy framework. 
The 2030 Climate and Energy Policy 
Framework (b) includes three targets for 
2030: at least a 40 % cut in GHG emissions 
(from 1990 levels), at least 32 % share 
for renewable energy and at least a 
32.5 % improvement in energy efficiency 
(compared to a projected business-as-usual 
scenario for 2030). In June 2018, an inter-
institutional political agreement increased 
the ambition of the latter two targets for 
renewable energy and energy efficiency to 
the values stated above (c).
With the Clean Energy for All Europeans (d) 
legislative package of November 2016, 
the European Commission tabled a 
comprehensive set of legislative proposals 
and measures to further develop climate 
and energy policy after 2020.
(a) European Commission, Taking stock of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2014) 130 final, 
Brussels, 2014.
(b) European Council, European Council (23 and 24 October 2014) — Conclusions, EUCO 169/14, Brussels, 2014.
(c) European Council, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the promotion of the use of energy from 
renewable sources — Analysis of the final compromise text with a view to agreement, Brussels, 2018.
(d) European Commission, Clean energy for all Europeans, COM(2016) 860 final, Brussels, 2016.
3Climate change and energy
Smarter, greener, more inclusive?  67
Europe 2020 headline indicators
 
77.6
 
Greenhouse gas
emissons
 
– 13 index points
 
in 2016
 
since 2008
 
Index 1990 = 100
 
Contextual indicators
 
2020 target: 80
 
Climate change and energy 
in the EU 
2 541
 
... in ESD sectors (¹)
 
– 8.9 %
 
in 2016
 
since 2008
 
1 543
 
Primary energy
consumption
 
– 8.9 %
 
in 2016
 
since 2008
 
Mtoe
 
1 108
 
Final energy
consumption
 
– 6.1 %
 
in 2016
 
since 2008
 
Mtoe
 
17.0 %
 
Share of renewable
energy
 
+ 5.9 pp
 
in 2016
 
since 2008
 
in gross final
energy
consumption
 
2020 target: 1 483 Mtoe
 
2020 target: 1 086 Mtoe
 
2020 target: 20 %
 
29.6 %
 
... in electricity consumption
 
+ 12.6 pp
 
in 2016
 
since 2008
 
40.2 %
 
Energy imports into the EU
 
– 4.6 pp
 
in 2016
 
since 2008
 
of imports in 
 solid fuels consumption
 3 201
 
CO₂ emissons in the EU
 
– 15.5 %
 
in 2015
 
since 2008
 
Mt of CO₂ equivalent
from fuel combustion
 
1.00
 
Global temperature 
 
+ 40.8 %
 
in 2017
 
since 2008
 
temperature increase,
compared with 1850–
1899 average
 
277
 
... by sector
 
– 12.9 %
 
in 2016
 
since 2008
 
Mtoe in the industry sector
 
7.1 %
 
... in fuel consumption
of transport
 
+ 3.2 pp
 
in 2016
 
since 2008
 
(¹) 2016 data are provisional.
 
Source: Eurostat (online data codes: t2020_30, env_air_gge, t2020_35, t2020_31, nrg_107a, t2020_33, t2020_34, nrg_100a, sdg_07_50, nrg_122a, nrg_123a, nrg_124a
and International Energy Agency)
 
2020 target: 10 %
 
1 195
 
... of fuel combustion in
energy industries 
 
– 22.8 %
 
in 2016
 
since 2008
 
Mt of CO₂
equivalent
 
32 294
 
Global CO₂ emissons
 
+ 10.7 %
 
in 2015
 
since 2008
 
Mt of CO₂
equivalent from
fuel combustion
 
Mt of CO₂
equivalent
 
367
 – 2.7 % since 2008 
Mtoe in the transport sector
 
285
 – 5.6 % since 2008 
Mtoe in the residential sector
 
53.6 %
 
Energy dependence
 
– 0.9 pp
 
in 2016
 
since 2008
 
of imports in total
energy consumption
 
86.7 %
 + 2.1 pp since 2008 
of imports in 
 petroleum consumption
 
70.2 %
 + 8.5 pp since 2008 
of imports in 
 gas consumption
 
CO₂
 
(¹) data are provisional.
Source: Eurostat (o line data codes: t2020_30, env_air_gge, t2020_35, t2020_31, nrg_107a, t2020_33, t2020_34, nrg_100a, sdg_07_50, 
nrg_122a, nrg_123a, nrg_124a and International Energy Agency)
3 Climate change and energy
  Smarter, greener, more inclusive?68
The low-carbon transition is not only a strategy to 
prevent climate change. Climate and energy policies 
also contribute to the Europe 2020 strategy’s core 
objective of  enabling sustainable growth. For one, 
promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency 
— two key levers for reducing emissions — fosters 
innovation and creates jobs. The EU’s ‘20-20-20’ 
targets are thus interlinked with other Europe 
2020 goals, in particular those for research and 
development (R&D) and employment. Moreover, 
climate mitigation has further environmental and 
health benefits, such as reducing local air pollution 
and alleviating the health risks it poses.
Creating demand for green products while 
boosting innovation and export strength 
in the growing global market will be key to 
mastering new technologies such as smart 
grids, energy storage and electric vehicles. At 
the same time, improved energy efficiency will 
bolster the competitiveness of EU businesses 
by lowering production costs. Renewables and 
(3) European Commission, Climate Action: Benefits of climate action, 2018 (accessed 1 June 2018).
(4) European Commission, A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, COM(2015) 80 final, 
Brussels, 2015.
(5) European Commission, Clean energy for all Europeans, COM(2016) 860 final, Brussels, 2016.
(6) Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC.
(7) Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020.
energy efficiency measures also reduce energy 
dependence and have the potential to save the EU 
between EUR 175 and 320 billion in energy import 
costs per year over the next 40 years (3). 
The EU’s Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy 
Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change 
Policy (4), introduced in 2015, complements existing 
climate change and energy policies covering the 
period up to 2020 and will guide the development 
of policies for the following decade up to 2030 and 
beyond. To implement the strategy, the European 
Commission has presented a range of initiatives, 
including the Accelerating Europe’s transition 
to a low-carbon economy Package in July 2016, 
the Clean Energy for all Europeans Package (5) in 
November 2016 and the Clean Mobility Package in 
November 2017. The package encompasses a set of 
legislative proposals and facilitating measures. Many 
of these have been agreed and others are currently 
being discussed in the European Council and in the 
European Parliament.
3.2 The EU is on track to achieving its GHG 
emission reduction target for 2020
Reducing GHG emissions is a central objective of 
the Europe 2020 strategy. The EU as a whole aims 
to reduce emissions by 20 % compared with 1990 
levels (including international aviation and indirect 
CO2 emissions). The main policy instruments to 
achieve this target are the EU Emissions Trading 
System (EU ETS) (6) and the Effort Sharing Decision 
(ESD) (7). The EU ETS sets a single EU-wide cap for 
In 2016, EU GHG emissions, including 
emissions from international aviation and 
indirect CO2 emissions, were down by 
22.4 % compared with 1990 levels. The EU 
is thus expected to exceed its Europe 2020 
target of reducing GHG emissions by 20 % 
by 2020. 
All main sectors, except fuel 
combustion in transport 
and international aviation, 
contributed to the reductions 
between 1990 and 2016. In 
2016, transport emissions rose for the third 
consecutive year, coinciding with a return of 
stronger economic growth. 
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more than 11 000 power stations and industrial 
plants, as well as the emissions from flights within 
the European Economic Area. It allows these 
economic actors to trade emission allowances 
among themselves. The cap shrinks each year 
to reach an emissions reduction of 21 % by 2020 
compared with 2005. 
The ESD sets a binding GHG emissions target for 
each Member State for sectors not included in 
the EU ETS. Member States’ targets for the ESD 
sectors (such as transport, buildings, agriculture 
and waste) vary from a 20 % reduction to a 
20 % increase in emissions by 2020, reflecting 
differences in relative wealth. Less wealthy 
economies are allowed to increase their emissions 
to accommodate higher economic growth. 
However, as their targets still limit emissions 
compared with business-as-usual scenarios 
projected at the time of decision-making, 
all Member States are committed to making 
reductions. By 2020, the legislation requires that 
the national targets will collectively deliver a 
reduction of at least 10 % in total EU emissions 
from the non-EU ETS sectors compared with 2005 
levels. 
Together, the EU ETS and the ESD will reduce 
overall emissions to 14 % below 2005 levels by 
2020. This translates to a 20 % cut below 1990 
levels. In addition to these two overarching 
instruments, the EU has implemented an array 
of policy tools to address emissions from certain 
sectors and activities. 
By 2016, the EU as a whole had cut anthropogenic 
GHG emissions by 22.4 % compared to 1990 
levels (see Figure 3.1). A large portion of this 
reduction occurred during the 1990s. Between 
1990 and 1994 a significant drop of 6.8 % 
occurred, mostly due to structural shifts in the 
economy, modernisation in the industry sector 
and a shift from coal to gas. Despite rising energy 
consumption, the period between 1998 and 
2007 saw emissions stabilise at around 92–94 % 
of 1990 levels. This was the result of reductions in 
landfilling and improved waste management, a 
decline in livestock numbers, a decrease in the use 
EUROPE 2020
H E A D L I N E
I N D I C AT O R
Note : Total emissions, including international aviation and indirect CO2, but excluding emissions from land use, land 
use change and forestry (LULUCF)
Source: European Environment Agency, Eurostat (online data code: t2020_30)
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Figure 3.1: Greenhouse gas emissions, EU-28, 1990–2016
(index 1990 = 100)
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of nitrogenous fertiliser and a gradual shift from 
more carbon-intensive fuels to renewable energy 
and natural gas (8). 
By far, the sharpest single-year decline in GHG 
emissions since the early 1990s occurred between 
2008 and 2009 (– 7.2 %). During this time the 
economic crisis reduced industrial production, 
transport volumes and energy demand. The 
following years saw slow recovery in many parts of 
Europe. 
The further decline in GHG emissions observed 
between 2010 and 2014 can be attributed to 
three main factors: improvement in the energy 
intensity of the EU economy, rapid development 
of renewable energy sources and the aftermath 
of the economic slowdown (9). The subsequent 
slight increase in emissions between 2014 and 
2015 was due primarily to particularly harsh winter 
conditions and a corresponding increase in heat 
demand. The most recent emission reduction 
(8) EEA, Annual European Union greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2016 and inventory report 2018, EEA Report No 5/2018, 2018.
(9) EEA, Trends and drivers in greenhouse gas emissions in the EU in 2016, EEA Briefing No 5/2018, Copenhagen 2018.
(10) Ibid.
(11) Eurostat, Using official statistics to calculate greenhouse gas emissions, Luxembourg, 2010, p. 28.
by 0.4 percentage points (or 19.7 million tonnes 
of CO2 equivalent) between 2015 and 2016 was 
accompanied by a 2.0 % increase in GDP. This slight 
decrease was due primarily to fuel switching from 
coal to gas in the power sector in select countries 
and was offset to some extent by an increase in 
emissions from road transport, both passenger 
and freight (10).
Dividing emission figures by the total population 
provides a way of comparing countries’ GHG 
emissions on a more equal footing. Figure 3.2 
shows Member States’ overall per capita 
GHG emissions for the years 2005 and 2016. 
Luxembourg continued to emit the most 
per capita in the EU in 2016. This can be 
partly attributed to a considerable number of 
commuters from neighbouring countries fuelling 
their cars on Luxembourgish territory, as well as 
road freight transit and fuel tourism (11). In contrast, 
per capita emissions were lowest in some eastern 
Figure 3.2: Greenhouse gas emissions per capita, by country, 2005 and 2016
(tonnes of CO2 equivalent)
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and southern European countries as well as in 
Sweden. 
Between 2005 and 2016, Luxembourg showed the 
highest reduction in per capita emissions. United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, Denmark and Belgium 
also showed large cuts. In contrast, per capita 
emissions rose in four Member States over the 
same period (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland) 
and remained constant in Bulgaria.
Looking towards 2020, GHG emission 
projections (12) based on Member States’ existing 
policy measures suggest the EU is on track to 
surpass its 2020 target. However, according to 
Member States’ projections, summarised and 
gap-filled by the European Environment Agency 
(EEA), existing and planned measures are not 
enough to put the EU on track to meet its target 
for the next decade to reduce GHG emissions by 
40 % by 2030 (see Figure 3.3) (13). For this reason, 
the EU is introducing new mitigation policies for 
the period after 2020, including reforms to the 
EU ETS, a new Effort Sharing Regulation, which 
sets binding annual greenhouse gas emission 
targets for Member States for the period 2021 to 
2030 and a new Governance Regulation adopted 
(12) EEA, Total greenhouse gas emission trends and projections, 2017.
(13) European Council, European Council (23 and 24 October 2014) — Conclusions, EUCO 169/14, Brussels, 2014.
as the main instrument to achieve the objectives 
set forth by the Energy Union Strategy. Moreover, 
new regulation will implement the EU’s Paris 
Agreement commitment on emissions from land 
use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). 
3.2.1 All sectors except transport have 
lowered emissions since 1990 
Figure 3.4 shows to what extent each sector has 
contributed to the EU’s total GHG emissions. All 
sectors except fuel combustion in transport and 
international aviation contributed to the overall 
GHG emission reductions from 1990 to 2016. 
In absolute terms, energy industries made 
the largest emissions cut with a reduction 
of 483 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent over 
the period (29 %). Nevertheless, energy is still 
the sector responsible for the largest share of 
total emissions (26.9 % in 2016). The second 
largest absolute reduction was achieved in the 
manufacturing industries and construction and 
amounted to 367 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent, 
which translates to a 44 % decline between 1990 
and 2015. 
Figure 3.3: Greenhouse gas emissions and projections, 1990–2050
(million tonnes of CO2 equivalent)
EU historic emissions (until 2016)
Projections (with existing measures)
Projections (with additional measures)
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Note: Total EU GHG emissions include those from international aviation and exclude those from land-use, land-use change and forestry 
(LULUCF).
Source: European Environment Agency
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By contrast, transport emissions were 18 % higher 
in 2016 than in 1990. Moreover, fuel combustion 
in transport accounted for 21.0 % of total EU 
emissions in 2016, making it the second largest 
source after the energy industries. However, 
transport emissions were even higher in 2007, 
where they peaked at 993 million tonnes of CO2 
equivalent before falling by 10.7 % by 2013 to reach 
their lowest point in 16 years. However, in 2016 
transport emissions rose for the third consecutive 
year to 5.1 % above 2013 levels, coinciding with a 
return of stronger economic growth and low oil 
prices. Finally, emissions from international aviation 
more than doubled between 1990 and 2016, 
increasing from 69 to 148 million tonnes of CO2 
equivalent. 
3.2.2 GHG emissions under the in Effort 
Sharing Decision (ESD) have fallen since 
2005
Figure 3.5 shows Member States’ Effort Sharing 
Decision (ESD) emissions (total emissions excluding 
(14) EEA, Total greenhouse gas emission trends and projections, 2017.
(15) European Commission, Two years after Paris — Progress towards meeting the EU’s climate commitments, COM(2017) 646 final, Brussels, 2017.
(16) EEA, Annual European Union greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2015 and inventory report 2017, EEA report No 06/2017, Copenhagen, 2017.
those covered by the EU ETS) between 2005 and 
2016, as well as their 2020 ESD targets. Twenty-two 
countries have reduced their emissions compared 
to the 2005 base-year and 18 are on track to reach 
their 2020 national targets (14). Emissions increased 
in six countries. Malta has not met its annual ESD 
targets for each of the three years 2013 to 2015 
and has relied on flexibility mechanisms to comply 
with its legal obligations. Preliminary figures show 
that Malta, Belgium, Finland and Ireland may not 
meet their ESD targets for 2016 (15). 
The overall positive trend in ESD emissions in the 
EU can be linked mainly to the building sector 
and energy efficiency improvements as well as a 
less carbon-intensive fuel mix for space heating. 
Furthermore, despite harsher winters in recent 
years, overall milder winter temperatures over the 
past decade and a half are partly responsible for 
falling heating demand compared to the 1990s. 
Temporary reductions in transport emissions as a 
result of the economic slowdown between 2007 
and 2013 also contributed to the decrease (16). 
Figure 3.4: Greenhouse gas emissions by sector, EU-28, 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2016
(million tonnes of CO2 equivalent)
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Figure 3.5: Greenhouse gas emissions in Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) sectors, by country, 2016
(% change since ESD base year)
Change until 2016 Europe 2020 targets
– 30
– 20
– 10
0
10
20
30
M
al
ta
Bu
lg
ar
ia
Es
to
ni
a
Po
la
nd
La
tv
ia
Cy
p
ru
s
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Ro
m
an
ia
Ir
el
an
d
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
ub
lic
G
er
m
an
y
Sl
ov
en
ia
Be
lg
iu
m
Fi
nl
an
d
Fr
an
ce
A
us
tr
ia
H
un
ga
ry
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Lu
xe
m
b
ou
rg
Sp
ai
n
Po
rt
ug
al
It
al
y
C
ro
at
ia
D
en
m
ar
k
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
Sw
ed
en
G
re
ec
e
EU
-2
8
Note: Total emissions, excluding emissions covered by the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS); data are provisional.
Source: European Environment Agency, Eurostat (online data code: t2020_35)
Figure 3.6: Global CO2 emissions from fuel combustion, 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2015
(million tonnes of CO2)
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3.2.3 Global CO2 emissions from 
fuel combustion and mean surface 
temperature continue to rise 
Despite progress in the EU, global CO2 emissions 
from fuel combustion rose by 57.5 % between 
1990 and 2015, as shown in Figure 3.6. Most of 
the increase took place in emerging economies. 
Emissions growth, both in relative and absolute 
terms, was strongest in China. Between 1990 and 
2015, China’s annual CO2 emissions more than 
tripled and the country overtook the United States 
to become the world’s largest emitter. At the 
same time, China’s per capita emissions from fuel 
combustion reached 6.6 tonnes of CO2, outpacing 
the EU level of 6.3 tonnes (17). 
Although less important in absolute terms, 
emissions in the rest of Asia and the rest of the 
world also grew significantly in relative terms 
between 1990 and 2015 (221.4 % and 76.2 % 
respectively). As a result of these trends, the 
EU’s share in global CO2 emissions has shrunk 
considerably, from almost a fifth in 1990 to just 
under a tenth in 2015. 
(17) IEA, CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion, 2017.
While worldwide emissions grew considerably 
between 1990 and 2015, emissions intensity of GDP 
(measured as CO2 emissions from fuel combustion 
per unit of GDP) has decreased by 31 % globally in 
the same timeframe. As with absolute emissions, 
the emissions intensity of GDP varies country-to-
country but has decreased in all but three of the 
countries analysed here (Brazil, Indonesia and Saudi 
Arabia). The largest decrease was in China, which 
dropped by 57 % from 1.15 kilograms (kg) of CO2 to 
0.49 kg per unit of GDP. However, as indicated by 
the considerable rise in China’s overall emissions, 
this reduction is primarily due to unprecedented 
economic growth over the past few decades and 
cannot be explained by a shift towards a low-
carbon economy. In the EU, emissions intensity 
of GDP almost halved, by 47 %, between 1990 
and 2015, while in the US it dropped by 43 %, in 
Australia by 33 % and in Canada by 26 %. 
In 2015, CO2 emissions from fuel combustion per 
capita varied widely across the globe. On average, 
an Australian emits almost ten times as much 
as an Indian citizen. Even within the group of 
industrialised countries, emission levels per person 
Figure 3.7: CO2 emissions from fuel combustion per unit of GDP, by country, 1990 and 2015 
(kg of CO₂ per USD (2005 prices))
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vary widely. The US average is, for example, more 
than twice as high as the EU average. However, 
between 1990 and 2015, per capita emissions 
between industrialised and other countries 
appeared to be converging. While per capita 
emissions have decreased in the EU (– 25.5 %) 
and the US (– 19.1 %), emission levels per person 
have increased in emerging economies, with the 
biggest rises taking place in China (+ 256.5 %) and 
South Korea (+ 114.2 %). Over the same time frame, 
the global average per capita emissions increased 
by 13.4 %, reaching 4.4 tonnes of CO2 in 2015. 
Rising emissions have dramatically increased 
CO2 levels in the atmosphere. Although there 
is a time lag between CO2 emitted and the 
corresponding increase in average global surface 
temperature, recordings already show a clear 
Figure 3.8: CO2 emissions from fuel combustion per capita, by country, 1990 and 2015
(tonnes of CO₂ per capita)
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Figure 3.9: Global and European annual mean temperature deviations, 1850–2017
(temperature deviation in °C, compared with 1850–1899 average)
Global (smoothed HadCRUT4 data) European (smoothed HadCRUT4 data)
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Source: European Environment Agency (online data code: sdg_13_30)
3 Climate change and energy
  Smarter, greener, more inclusive?76
upward trend (see Figure 3.9). The first decade 
of the 21st century was on average 0.87 °C 
warmer than the first decade of the 20th century. 
Furthermore, at 1.0 °C above pre-industrial levels, 
2017 was the warmest year since records began 
in 1850. Current projections estimate that global 
mean temperatures could rise by as much as 2.6 °C 
to 4.8 °C compared with the reference period 
(1986–2005) by the late 21st century (2081–2100) if 
CO2 emissions remain at current levels (18).
Despite the EU’s shrinking share of global CO2 
emissions, recent findings on the increasingly 
severe impacts of climate change confirm 
its climate and energy goals continue to be 
important  (19). EU emission cuts alone cannot 
(18) EEA, SOER 2015 — The European environment: Increasingly severe consequences of climate change (GMT 9), 2015.
(19) Ibid.
(20) European Commission, Impact Assessment accompanying the Communication A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 
2020 up to 2030, SWD(2014)15. 
(21) EEA, Renewable energy in Europe 2017 update: recent growth and knock-on effects, EEA Report No 23/2017, Copenhagen, 2017. 
Updated and more accurate statistical information, as a result of revisions based on specialised surveys, have also contributed to this 
increase, in particular data revisions in the area of solid biomass (wood) consumption in households.
halt climate change, but the GHG reduction 
objectives for 2030 and 2050 are considered a 
fair contribution to the global mitigation efforts, 
consistent with the internationally agreed 
objective of keeping the temperature increase 
below 2 °C compared to pre-industrial levels (20). 
Moreover, if the EU can show that a low-carbon 
economy is feasible, and leads to increases in 
innovation and employment, it will serve as a role 
model for other regions. Continuous investment 
in advanced low-carbon technologies can also 
help the EU uphold technological leadership and 
secure export markets. A successful clean energy 
transition, discussed in the next section, will 
provide optimal conditions for sustainable jobs, 
growth and investment. 
3.3 Renewable energy on the rise
3.3.1 Renewable energy keeps growing 
steadily 
The Europe 2020 strategy’s second climate change 
and energy target foresees a 20 % increase in 
the share of renewable energy in gross final 
energy consumption by 2020. Gross final energy 
consumption comprises the energy supplied 
to final consumers for all energy uses and the 
consumption of electricity and heat by the 
energy sector for electricity and heat production, 
including losses of electricity and heat in 
distribution and transmission. 
Between 2004 and 2016, the share of 
renewable energy doubled, reaching 17.0 % of 
gross final energy consumption in 2016 (see 
Figure 3.10). The main drivers of this increase 
were rapid developments in technology, 
the implementation of support schemes for 
renewable energy technology and the falling 
costs of renewable energy systems (21). Over the 
past decade, there has been a steady growth in 
installed capacity for renewable electricity and 
heat generation, driven by policies such as feed-
in tariffs, grants, tax credits and, more recently, 
tenders. At the same time, the introduction of 
Renewable energy continues to be on the 
rise in the EU; in 2016 it provided 17.0 % of 
gross final energy consumption, up from 
9.0 % in 2005.
Solid, liquid and gaseous biofuels still 
provide the largest share of total renewable 
energy in the EU and are 
used heavily in heating 
as well as in electricity 
generation and transport. 
For transport, renewable 
energy provided 7.1 % of all 
energy used in 2016, up from 1.8 % in 2005. 
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Figure 3.10: Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption, EU-28, 2004–2016
(%)
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Figure 3.11: Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption, by country, 2004 and 
2016
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obligatory quotas has stimulated the use of 
renewable transport fuels (22). Furthermore, in 
the electricity sector, an upscaling of global 
production volumes and technological advances 
have led to substantial cost reductions. New 
photovoltaic power stations built in 2016 produce 
electricity for a third of the costs required in 2009. 
The offshore wind industry has achieved similar 
reductions, roughly halving costs per kilowatt-
hour between 2011 and 2016 (23). In short, 
electricity from wind turbines and large solar 
installations is becoming increasingly competitive 
with old and new fossil fuel plants.
Differences between Member States in their 
share of renewable energy, as shown in 
Figure  3.11, stem from variations in available 
natural resources, such as the potential for 
building hydropower plants and the availability 
of biomass, but also from the success of national 
climate and energy policies. Nevertheless, all 
EU countries increased the share of renewable 
energy in final energy consumption between 
2004 and 2016. Fifteen have more than doubled 
their share, albeit in many cases from a low 
(22) Ecofys, Renewable energy progress and biofuels sustainability, Utrecht, 2014.
(23) McCrone, Angus et al, Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2017, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, commissioned by 
UN Environment’s Economy Division in cooperation with Frankfurt School-UNEP Collaborating Centre for Climate & Sustainable Energy 
Finance and produced in collaboration with Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Frankfurt am Main, 2017.
(24) IEA, Headline Global Energy Data, 2017 edition.
starting point. In 2016, 11 countries already met 
their 2020 targets. 
Compared with other world regions, the EU’s 
use of renewable energy is relatively high. The 
continent of Africa, where the use of traditional 
biomass is still widespread, procured more than 
half of its total final energy consumption from 
renewable sources in 2015. Most emerging and 
industrialised countries, however, have lower 
shares. For example, China covered 6.1 % of its 
final energy consumption through renewable 
sources in 2015, followed by Mexico with 6.0 %, 
Australia (5.8 %), the United States (5.2 %) and 
Japan (1.3 %). In the Middle East, the share was as 
low as 0.2 %. In terms of primary energy supply, 
Canada had a relatively high share of renewable 
energy, amounting to 18.2 % in 2015 due to 
abundant hydropower resources (24).
3.3.2 Shares of renewable energy are 
growing across different sectors 
Renewable energies contribute both to electricity 
generation and energy consumption for 
heating and cooling as well as to the transport 
Figure 3.12: Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption, by sector, EU-28, 
2004–2016
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sector. As shown in Figure 3.12, renewables 
contributed almost a third of gross final electricity 
consumption in 2016, which is twice the share 
reported in 2004. Moreover, renewable energy 
provided almost one-fifth of Europe’s final 
energy consumption for heating and cooling 
in 2016, up from 10.3 % in 2004. The share of 
renewables in transport energy use has also 
increased since 2004, reaching 7.1 % in 2016. The 
break in the time series in 2011 can be explained 
by a change in the accounting methodology for 
liquid biofuels (25). 
A 2015 amendment to the Fuel Quality Directive 
and the Renewable Energy Directive (26) puts 
greater emphasis on production of advanced 
biofuels (biofuels stemming from the residual 
non-food parts of crops, as well as crops that 
are not used for food). Furthermore, it places 
limitations on the extent to which liquid biofuels 
produced from crops grown on agricultural land 
can contribute to renewable energy targets in 
transport. Alternative biofuels, mainly based 
on used cooking oil, contributed 23 % to all 
(25) The Renewable Energy Directive sets sustainability criteria for the production of liquid biofuels, which make up the largest share of 
renewables in transport. Since 2011 only those biofuels certified as sustainable according to the Directive are counted towards the share 
of renewables in transport and are therefore included in the indicator. Some Member States transposed the sustainability standards into 
national law earlier than others. This change in the accounting methodology explains the dip in the share of renewables in transport 
from 2010 to 2011.
(26) Directive (EU) 2015/1513 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 September 2015 amending Directive 98/70/EC relating to the 
quality of petrol and diesel fuels and amending Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources.
(27) European Commission, Renewable Energy Progress Report, COM(2017) 57 final, Brussels, 2017.
compliant biofuels used in the EU in 2015, up 
from 1 % in 2009 (27). 
3.3.3 Biofuels dominate renewable 
energy but wind and solar are expanding 
quickly 
Renewable energy can be generated from a 
range of sources, including hydro, wind, solar 
and geothermal power. In 2016, bioenergy 
(solid biofuels, renewable waste, biogas and 
bioliquids) remained by far the EU’s most 
important renewable energy source and 
contributed to all energy-use sectors (electricity 
generation, transport and heating and cooling), 
providing almost two-thirds of the total gross 
inland consumption of renewable energy (see 
Figure 3.13). Nevertheless, wind and solar energy 
have continued to grow the fastest in terms 
of relative shares. In 2016, the EU generated 
26.0 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) 
from wind energy — a more than five-fold 
increase compared with 2004. In the same 
year, solar energy (both photovoltaic and 
Figure 3.13: Gross inland consumption of renewable energy, by source, EU-28, 2004 and 2016
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thermal) contributed 13.4 Mtoe, more than 19 
times as much as in 2004. Overall, the ongoing 
decrease in shares of bioenergy relative to 
wind and solar photovoltaic is a function of 
rapid expansion in the latter two technologies 
(28) European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 2017 assessment of the progress made by 
Member States towards the national energy efficiency targets for 2020 and towards the implementation of the Energy Efficiency Directive as 
required by Article 24(3) of the Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU, COM(2017) 687 final, Brussels, 2017.
(29) Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy efficiency, Article 3.  
Directive 2013/12/ EU of 13 May 2013 adapting Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on energy efficiency, 
by reason of the accession of the Republic of Croatia.
(30) Directive 2013/12/ EU of 13 May 2013 adapting Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on energy efficiency, 
by reason of the accession of the Republic of Croatia.
than a reduction in consumption of the former. 
Similarly, the contribution of hydro power to 
gross inland consumption remained relatively 
constant between 2004 (28.3 Mtoe) and  
2016 (30.1 Mtoe).
3.4 The EU needs to further pursue energy 
efficiency improvements
Delivering the same service or product by using 
less energy is one of the most cost-effective ways 
of reducing GHG emissions and enhancing energy 
security. Building renovations as well as efficiency 
improvements in the transport sector offer the 
biggest potential for further reductions (28).
The Europe 2020 strategy has a target to increase 
energy efficiency by 20 %. In absolute terms this 
means that by 2020 EU energy consumption 
should not exceed 1 483 Mtoe of primary energy 
or 1 086 Mtoe of final energy (29). The EU efficiency 
target is measured as a 20 % saving compared 
with projected primary energy consumption 
(PEC) in 2020. Starting with 2005 as the base year, 
this business-as-usual projection (carried out in 
2007) estimated a PEC of 1 853 Mtoe in 2020. It 
assumed continuous economic growth and no 
additional energy-efficiency policies above and 
beyond those in place in 2005. The envisaged 
20 % saving amounts to an absolute reduction 
of 370 Mtoe, resulting in a target PEC of no more 
than 1  483 Mtoe for 2020 (30). Compared with the 
actual PEC in 2005, this is equivalent to a reduction 
of 13.4 %. 
PEC includes all gross inland energy consumption 
except energy carriers used for non-energy 
purposes, for example, petroleum or gas not 
used for combustion but for producing plastics. 
By contrast, final energy consumption (FEC) only 
comprises the energy consumed by end users (for 
The EU has made substantial 
progress towards its energy 
efficiency objective of 
20 % savings by 2020 — in 
2016, the EU consumed 
170.6 Mtoe (10 %) 
less primary energy than in 2005 and 
310.3 Mtoe (16.7 %) less than projections of 
2020 consumption made in 2007. 
To meet its target, the EU must reduce 
primary energy production by an additional 
3.9 % over the four years from 2016 to 
2020. Even though the 2020 target for 
final energy consumption was reached 
temporarily in 2015, a subsequent rise in 
consumption in 2016 means an additional 
2.0 % fall is required by 2020.
The EU still relies heavily on energy imports 
from non-EU countries, which provided 
53.6 % of all energy consumed in 2016. The 
main supplier of energy to the EU in 2016 
continued to be Russia, which supplied 
40.2 % of gas, 34.6 % of petroleum products 
and 30.2 % of solid fuels imports. 
3Climate change and energy
Smarter, greener, more inclusive?  81
example, households, industry and agriculture) 
for all energy uses, excluding energy used by the 
energy sector. The difference between primary 
and final energy consumption is equivalent 
to the energy losses occurring during energy 
transformation (particularly electricity generation), 
transmission and distribution. 
3.4.1 Energy consumption in the EU has 
been decreasing, but with a reversed 
trend in recent years 
As Figure 3.14 shows, PEC in the EU was following 
an intermittent but overall rising trend until 2006 
when it peaked at 1 722 Mtoe. After the onset 
of the economic crisis in 2008, it fell sharply and 
continued to fall over the next four years, reaching 
1 509 Mtoe in 2014 (with an exceptional increase 
in 2010). The downward trend was interrupted in 
2015, when PEC increased by 1.5 % compared to 
the previous year and by another 0.7 % in 2016 
(31) Based on Eurostat data on real GDP growth rate — volume (online data code: (tec00115), accessed 7 July 2017).
(32) EEA, Trends and projections in Europe 2017 — Tracking progress towards Europe’s climate and energy targets, EEA report No 17/2017, 
Copenhagen, 2017.
(33) European Commission, 2017 assessment of the progress made by Member States towards the national energy.
compared to 2015. Reductions in 2011 and 2012 
can be partly attributed to reduced economic 
output expressed by a 0.5 % contraction of real 
GDP in 2012. However, PEC continued to fall 
thereafter, despite a real GDP growth of 1.8 % 
in 2014 (31). Warmer years in 2013 and 2014, and 
improvements in energy efficiency due to new 
policies, are considered to have contributed 
to this decrease (32). The increases in 2015 and 
2016 reflect a return to more average heating 
demand compared to the exceptionally warm 
year 2014 (33). In 2016, the EU consumed 1.7 % less 
primary energy than it did in 1990 and 10.0 % less 
than in 2005. To achieve its 2020 efficiency target, 
the EU would need to reduce its primary energy 
consumption by another 3.9 % in the four years 
between 2016 and 2020. 
The trend in FEC has closely followed the trend 
in PEC, rising to 1 108 Mtoe in 2016, up from 
1 063 Mtoe in 2014. Notably, the EU had already 
reached its 2020 target for FEC in 2014, but the 
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increased consumption in subsequent years 
means an additional 2.0 % decrease is required by 
2020. In 2016, FEC was 7.1 % lower than 2005.
Globally, only one major economy has reduced 
PEC by more than the EU: Japan consumed 18.4 % 
less primary energy in 2016 than it did in 2005. The 
United States reduced its PEC by 6.9 % over the 
same period, whereas energy demand rose in all 
other large industrialised countries and regions. 
The highest increase over the past decade was 
observed in China, which increased its PEC by 
66.9 % followed by India (64.9 %), Turkey (59.8 %), 
the Middle East (55.6 %), Thailand (36.6 %) and 
Korea (35.2 %) (34). An increase in PEC can, however, 
occur despite energy efficiency improvements. In 
emerging economies, in particular, high economic 
growth and population drive demand for energy. 
3.4.2 Changes in energy consumption at 
Member State and sector level 
Figure 3.15 shows the change in PEC from 2005 
to 2016 in all Member States. Looking at the 2016 
(34) IEA, Headline Global Energy Data, 2017 edition. Figures for China, India, Thailand and the Middle East refer to 2015 data. Figures for the 
United States, Turkey, Japan and Korea refer to 2016 provisional data.
(35) European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 2017 assessment of the progress made 
by Member States towards the national energy efficiency targets for 2020 and towards the implementation of the Energy Efficiency 
Directive as required by Article 24(3) of the Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU, COM(2017) 687 final, Brussels, 2017.
data, 26 countries reduced PEC compared to 2005 
by values ranging from 0.9 % to 24.9 %. 
Between 1990 and 2016, economic sectors 
showed different final energy consumption trends 
(see Figures 3.16 and 3.17). Agriculture and forestry, 
as well as industry, reduced their final energy 
consumption by 24.9 % and 25.4 %, respectively, 
while the residential sector’s consumption 
increased just 3.9 %. By contrast, energy 
consumption in the services and transport sectors 
grew by 37.6 % and 29.2 %, respectively, over the 
same time period. Notably, energy consumption in 
all sectors grew by varying amounts in 2016, which 
again may reflect a return to more typical winter 
temperatures (35). In the shorter term, between 
2008 and 2016, FEC reduced by 13.1 % in the 
industry sector, 2.6 % in the transport sector and 
5.7 % in the residential sector. In contrast, energy 
consumption in the service sector remained 
constant over the same time period.
While these changes reflect sector-specific levels 
of energy-efficiency improvement, they also 
Figure 3.15: Change in primary energy consumption, by country, 2016
(Index 2005 = 100)
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relate to structural changes in the EU economy, 
particularly a shift away from an energy-intensive 
industry to a service-based economy. In the case 
of transport, a large share of efficiency gains has 
been outweighed by rising volumes of transport 
over the past few decades. In 2016, the majority 
of final energy was used in transport with a 33.2 % 
share, followed by industry (25.0 %) and the 
residential sector (25.7 %). The services sector was 
responsible for 13.5 % and agriculture and forestry 
for 2.2 % of final energy consumption. 
3.4.3 EU’s dependency on energy imports 
has been increasing
Energy-efficiency improvements can strengthen 
the EU’s competitiveness and lower its 
dependence on fossil fuel imports. The EU’s 
energy dependence — the share of total energy 
needs met by imports from non-EU countries 
— has increased significantly over the past 
decade, reaching 53.6 % in 2016 (see Figure  3.18). 
The increasing demand for fossil fuel imports is 
Figure 3.17: Final energy consumption, by sector, EU-28, 1990–2016
(index 1990 = 100)
Industry
Transport
Residential
Agriculture/Forestry
Services
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
20
16
20
15
20
14
20
13
20
12
20
11
20
10
20
09
20
08
20
07
20
06
20
05
20
04
20
03
20
02
20
01
20
00
19
99
19
98
19
97
19
96
19
95
19
94
19
93
19
92
19
91
19
90
Source: Eurostat (online data code: nrg_100a)
Figure 3.16: Final energy consumption, by sector, EU-28, 1990 and 2016
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driven by a decline in domestic oil, gas and coal 
production (36). By contrast, most renewable 
energy can be sourced domestically. At 74.3 %, 
in 2016, crude oil (without natural gas liquids, 
NGL) accounted for the largest share of total 
petroleum product imports, which have risen 
steadily from 75.7 % of total energy consumption 
in 2000 to 86.7 % in 2016. The imported share of 
solid fuels such as hard coal has gone up by 9.6 
(36) European Commission, In-depth study of European Energy Security. Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the European energy 
security strategy, SWD(2014) 330 final/3, Brussels 2014.
percentage points between 2000 and 2016, while 
the share of imports in total gas consumption 
has increased by 21.4 percentage points. Over the 
observed period, the fall in EU mining and drilling 
has overcompensated the increase in domestic 
renewable energy production. 
Figure 3.19 shows the chief suppliers of energy 
to the EU. The main import partner in 2016 
was Russia. It supplied 40.2 % of gas, 34.6 % of 
Figure 3.18: Energy dependence, EU-28, 1990–2016
(% of imports in total energy consumption)
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Figure 3.19: Energy imports from outside the EU, EU-28, 2016
(% of total extra-EU-28 imports)
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petroleum products and 30.2 % of solid fuels 
imports from non-EU suppliers. The second largest 
source of natural gas was other non-EU European 
countries, mainly Norway, with 25.1 %. Also 11.8 % 
of oil imports came from this region. The second 
largest source supplying oil to the EU after Russia 
was the Middle East, with 19.9 %, followed by 
Africa with 14.0 %. Regarding solid fuels, Central 
and South America were the second largest 
source after Russia with 23.5 %, followed by North 
America with 16.1 %. 
Dependence on imported energy exposes the 
European economy to significant costs and the 
risk of supply shortages, for example, due to 
geopolitical conflicts. The expansion of renewable 
energy sources and the improvement of energy 
efficiency reduce these risks. At the same time, 
they contribute to the Europe 2020 strategy’s 
employment objective (see the chapter on 
‘Employment’, page 23) by creating jobs and 
value added within EU borders. 
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4.1 Education and training — why do they 
matter?
(1) For further information on the impact of demographic ageing on the labour force, see the chapter on `Employment ,` page 23.
Education and training lie at the heart of the 
Europe 2020 strategy and are seen as key drivers 
for growth and jobs. The economic crisis along 
with an ageing population, through their impact 
on economies, labour markets and society, are 
two important challenges that are changing the 
context in which education systems operate (1). At 
the same time, education and training help boost 
productivity, innovation and competitiveness. 
Nowadays upper secondary education is 
considered the minimum desirable educational 
attainment level for EU citizens. Young people 
who leave education and training prematurely 
lack crucial skills and run the risk of facing serious, 
persistent problems in the labour market and 
experiencing poverty and social exclusion. Those 
early leavers from education and training who do 
enter the labour market are more likely to be in 
precarious, low-paid jobs and to draw on welfare 
and other social programmes. They are also less 
likely to be ‘active citizens’ or engage in adult 
learning. 
In addition, tertiary education, with its links to 
research and innovation, provides highly skilled 
human capital (see the chapter on ‘R&D and 
innovation’, page 49). A lack of these skills 
presents a severe obstacle to economic growth 
and employment in an era of rapid technological 
progress, intense global competition and labour 
market demand for ever-increasing levels of skill. 
The Europe 2020 strategy, through its ‘smart 
growth’ priority, aims to tackle early school leaving 
and to raise tertiary education levels. 
ET 2020 — the EU’s Strategic Framework 
for Education and Training 2020 
The two Europe 2020 education targets also 
feature as EU benchmarks under the Strategic 
Framework for Education and Training 2020 (ET 
2020). ET 2020 aims to foster European  co-
operation in education and training, providing 
common strategic objectives for the EU and 
its Member States up to 2020. ET 2020 covers 
the areas of adult participation in learning and 
mobility; quality and efficiency of education 
and training; equity, social cohesion and active 
citizenship; and creativity, innovation and 
entrepreneurship at all levels of education and 
training. To support the achievement of these 
objectives ET 2020 sets EU-wide benchmarks. 
In addition to the two Europe 2020 targets for 
education, there are another five benchmarks: 
• Early education and care: At least 95 % of 
children between the age of four years and the 
age of starting compulsory primary education 
should participate in early childhood education. 
• Underachievement in basic skills: The share 
of low-achieving 15 year olds in reading, 
mathematics and science should be less 
than 15 %. 
• Employment rate of recent graduates: The 
share of graduates (20 to 34 year olds) having 
left education and training in the past one to 
three years who are employed and not in any 
further education and training should be at 
least 82 %. 
Europe 2020 strategy target on 
education 
The Europe 2020 strategy sets out a 
target of ‘reducing the school drop-out 
rate to less than 10 % and increasing 
the share of the population aged 30–34 
having completed tertiary education to  
at least 40 %’ by 2020 (a).
(a) European Commission, Taking stock of the Europe 2020 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, 
COM(2014) 130 final, Brussels, 2014.
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• Adult participation in learning: An average 
of at least 15 % of adults should participate in 
learning. 
• Learning mobility: On average in the EU, at 
least 20 % of graduates from higher education 
and at least 6 % of 18 to 34 year olds with an 
initial vocational qualification should have spent 
some time studying or training abroad. 
The EU’s educational targets are interlinked with 
the other Europe 2020 goals as higher educational 
attainment improves employability, which in turn 
reduces poverty. The tertiary education target is 
furthermore interrelated with the research and 
development (R&D) and innovation target as 
investment in the R&D sector is likely to raise the 
demand for highly skilled workers. 
4.2 Continuous decrease in early school leaving
The EU regards upper secondary education as the 
minimum desirable educational attainment level 
for EU citizens. The skills and competences gained 
at this level are considered essential for successful 
labour market entry and as the foundation for 
adult learning. Therefore, the headline indicator 
‘early leavers from education and training’ 
measures the share of the population aged 18 to 
24 with at most lower secondary education and 
who were not involved in further education or 
training during the four weeks preceding the 
survey. Figure 4.1 shows that the share of early 
leavers has fallen continuously from 17.0 % in 2002 
to 10.6 % in 2017, albeit more slowly in recent years. 
This trend mirrors reductions in almost all Member 
States for both men and women. 
Overall, in the EU more men leave education and 
training early than women. This gap, which was 
Early leaving from 
education and 
training has been 
falling continuously 
in the EU since 2002, 
for both men and 
women. The fall from 
17.0 % in 2002 to 10.6 % in 2017 represents 
steady progress towards the Europe 2020 
target of 10 %. 
Half of the Member States have already 
reached their national targets for the rate of 
early leavers from education and training. 
Southern European countries made 
particularly strong progress between 2008 
and 2017. 
Across the EU, rates of early leaving from 
education and training are generally higher 
for people who live in a country different 
from the one they were born in. 
Educational attainment strongly influences 
labour market participation. In 2017, about 
55.7 % of 18 to 24-year-old early leavers 
from education and training were either 
unemployed or inactive. 
Participation in early childhood education 
and care (ECEC) has grown more or less 
continuously in the EU since 2002. In 2016, 
95.5 % of children between the age of four 
and the starting age of compulsory primary 
education participated in ECEC, exceeding 
the ET 2020 benchmark of a participation 
rate of at least 95 %. 
In 2015, about one-fifth of 15 year olds 
showed insufficient abilities in reading, 
maths and science. This is a step backward 
compared to 2012. As a result, the EU as 
a whole is seriously lagging behind in all 
three domains when it comes to progress 
towards the ET 2020 benchmark of less than 
15 % of 15 year olds being low achievers. 
Low achievers are students who have failed 
to reach level 2 of the PISA test.
A
B C
4Education
Smarter, greener, more inclusive?  91
3.2 percentage points in 2017, has narrowed by 
1.3 percentage points since 2004. However, for 
the second time since 2010, the gap has widened 
compared to the previous year. The rate for 
women is already below the headline target, with 
only 8.9 % leaving early in 2017. 
At the country level, gender differences in 2017 
were particularly strong in Spain, Latvia, Estonia 
and Malta. Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Romania were the only Member States where men 
were more likely to stay longer in education and 
training than women. 
4.2.1 Substantial decreases in early 
leaving in southern European countries 
Reflecting different national circumstances, the 
overall EU target for early leavers from education 
and training has been transposed into national 
targets by all Member States except the United 
Kingdom. National targets range from 4 % for 
Croatia to 16 % for Italy. As shown in Figure 4.2, half 
of the Member States had already achieved their 
national targets in 2017. 
Rates of early leaving vary widely across Member 
States. In 2017, the lowest proportion of early 
leavers was observed in some southern and 
eastern European countries (Croatia, Slovenia, 
Poland and Lithuania) and Ireland, with rates of less 
than 6 %. At the same time, some other southern 
and eastern countries, such as Malta, Romania and 
Spain, reported the highest shares in the EU, of 
slightly above 18 %. 
Southern European countries also experienced 
strong falls in early leaving between 2008 and 
2017, especially Portugal (from 34.9 % to 12.6 %), 
Spain (from 31.7 % to 18.3 %) and Malta (from 
27.2 % to 18.6 %). A total of 18 Member States were 
already below the overall EU target of 10 % in 2017. 
Country of birth strongly influences the rate of 
early leaving across the EU (see Figure 4.3). People 
who live in a country different from the one 
where they were born are more likely to struggle 
to complete their education. Socioeconomic 
status underlies much of this difficulty, but issues 
associated with immigration such as language 
barriers and settling into a new environment are 
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Figure 4.2: Early leavers from education and training, by country, 2008 and 2017
(% of the population aged 18–24)
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Figure 4.3: Early leavers from education and training by broad group of country of birth, EU-28, 
2006–2017 
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also at play, according to the Migration Policy 
Institute (2). 
4.2.2 Early school leaving leads to severe 
problems in the labour market 
In general, low educational attainment — at most 
lower secondary education — influences other 
socioeconomic factors. The most important of 
these are employment, unemployment and the 
risk of poverty or social exclusion. Some of these 
relationships are also analysed in detail in other 
chapters (see the chapters on ‘Employment’,  
page 23 and ‘Poverty and social exclusion’,  
page 103). 
Early leavers from education and training face 
particularly severe problems in the labour market. 
As Figure 4.4 shows, 55.7 % of the early leavers, 
were either unemployed or inactive in 2017. The 
situation for early leavers has worsened over time: 
between 2008 and 2017, the share of 18 to 24 year 
old early leavers who were not employed but 
who wanted to work grew from 30.6 % to 34.9 %. 
However, this increase has not been continuous, 
with the situation actually improving in recent 
years with the share falling from 37.0 % in 2016 
to 34.9 % in 2017. For a further analysis on youth 
(2) Nouwen, Ward, Noel Clycq, and Daniela Ulicna, Reducing the risk that youth with a migrant background in Europe will leave school early, 
Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe and SIRIUS Policy Network on the education of children and youngsters with a migrant 
background, 2015.
(3) European Commission, Key Data on Early Childhood Education and Care in Europe, 2014. 
unemployment, see the chapter on ‘Employment’, 
page 23. 
4.2.3 Participation in early childhood 
education and care has grown 
continuously  
Early childhood education and care (ECEC) can 
bring wide-ranging social and economic benefits 
for individuals and for society as a whole. Quality 
education and care at this early stage provides an 
essential foundation for effective adult learning 
and future educational achievements. It also lays 
the foundations for later success in life in terms of 
well-being, employability and social integration. To 
realise these benefits, the EU aims to ensure that all 
young children can access and benefit from high-
quality education and care (3). 
Participation in ECEC is crucial for preparing 
children for formal education, especially those 
from disadvantaged backgrounds. The aim is to 
reduce the incidence of early school leaving and 
thereby address one of Europe 2020’s headline 
targets on education. Investment in pre-primary 
education also offers higher medium- and long-
term returns and is more likely to help children 
Figure 4.4: Early leavers from education and training, by labour status, EU-28, 2008 and 2017
(% of the early leavers aged 18–24) 
Employed
Not employed, would 
like to work (seeking 
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Note: Break in time series in 2014 (switch from ISCED 1997 to ISCED 2011).
Source: Eurostat (online data code: edat_lfse_14)
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from low socioeconomic status than investment at 
later educational stages. 
The Strategic Framework for Education and 
Training 2020 (ET 2020) (4) recognises ECEC’s 
potential for addressing social inclusion and 
economic challenges. It has set a benchmark 
to ensure that at least 95 % of children aged 
between four and the starting age of compulsory 
education participate in ECEC. As Figure 4.5 
shows, participation has been rising more or less 
continuously in the EU since 2002, reaching 95.5 % 
in 2016 and therefore exceeding the benchmark 
of 95 %. 
Participation rates for children under three years 
old are much lower. In 2016, 32.9 % of children 
up to three years were cared for by formal 
arrangements (1 to 29 hours per week: 15.0 %; 
more than 30 hours per week: 17.9 %). Compared 
to 2010, this is an increase of 4.9 percentage 
points (1 to 29 hours per week: 14.0 %; more 
than 30 hours per week: 14.0 %) (5). In 2002, the 
Barcelona European Council set objectives in this 
area: ‘Member States should remove disincentives 
to female labour force participation, taking into 
account the demand for childcare facilities and in 
(4) Council conclusions of 12 May 2009 on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training (‘ET 2020’) (2009/C 
119/02), Official Journal of the European Union, 28 May 2009.
(5) Data stem from the EU-SILC survey, data source: Eurostat (online data code: ilc_caindformal).
(6) European Commission, Barcelona objectives, 2013, p. 4.
line with national patterns of provision, to provide 
childcare by 2010 to at least 90 % of children 
between three years old and the mandatory 
school age and at least 33 % of children under 
three years of age’. This means the second 
objective had been almost reached by 2016 (6).
4.2.4 Acquisition of skills such as reading, 
maths and science has taken a step 
backwards 
Basic skills — whether the ability to read simple 
texts or perform easy calculations — provide the 
foundations for learning, gaining specialised skills 
and personal development. People also need 
these skills to fully participate in and contribute to 
society. The ET 2020 framework acknowledges the 
increasing importance of individual skills in the era 
of the knowledge-based economy. Therefore, one 
of the targets enshrined in the ET 2020 is to reduce 
the share of 15 year olds achieving low proficiency 
levels in reading, mathematics and science to less 
than 15 % by 2020. 
In 2015, about every fifth of 15-year-old EU 
citizens showed insufficient abilities in reading, 
mathematics and science as measured by the 
Figure 4.5: Participation in early childhood education, EU-28, 2002–2016
(% of the age group between 4 years old and the starting age of compulsory education)
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OECD’s PISA study (7). Test results were best for 
reading, with a 19.7 % share of low achievers, 
followed by science with 20.6 % and maths with 
22.2 % (see Figure 4.6). According to the European 
Commission’s PISA 2015 report (8), the EU as a 
whole is seriously lagging behind the 2020 target 
to have less than 15 % of low achievers in each of 
the three basic skill areas. The report also shows 
that progress has taken a step backwards, with the 
rate of low achievers increasing since the PISA 2012 
results by 4.0 percentage points in science, 1.9 
percentage points in reading and 0.1 percentage 
points in maths. 
In addition to basic skills in reading, maths and 
science, the ability of citizens to communicate in at 
least two languages besides their mother tongue 
(7) PISA is an international study that was launched by the OECD in 1997. It aims to evaluate education systems worldwide every three years 
by assessing the competencies of 15-year-old students in the key subjects: reading, mathematics and science. The data presented here 
refer to pupils showing skills below proficiency level 2 on the PISA scale. For further details see http://www.oecd.org/pisa/
(8) European Commission, PISA 2015: EU performance and initial conclusions regarding education policies in Europe, 2016, p. 3.
(9) Data source: Eurostat (online data code: educ_uoe_lang02). 
has been identified as a key priority in the ET 2020 
framework. Schools teach foreign languages in 
all Member States, making language learning a 
central element in every child’s school experience 
across Europe. On average, 15.5 % of pupils across 
the EU in primary education (ISCED level 1) were 
not engaged in foreign language learning at 
this level in 2015 (9). This is an improvement on 
2013, when this share stood at 18.3 %. Looking at 
students in lower secondary education (ISCED 
level 2), the share of pupils learning no foreign 
language dropped to 1.3 % across the EU in 
2015. A majority of students in lower secondary 
education (58.8 %) were learning two or more 
foreign languages in 2015 and a further 39.8 % 
were learning one foreign language. 
Figure 4.6: Underachievement in reading, maths and science, EU, 2000–2015
(% of 15-year-old pupils) 
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Note: Composition of EU aggregate differs for each year; 2015 data refer to EU-28.
Source: OECD/PISA and Eurostat (online data code: sdg_04_40) 
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4.3 Increasing attainment at tertiary level
(10) Educational attainment is defined according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Tertiary educational 
attainment refers to ISCED 2011 level 5–8 (for data as from 2014) and to ISCED 1997 level 5–6 (for data up to 2013).
4.3.1 The share of tertiary graduates keeps 
on growing 
The second Europe 2020 education target — 
raising the share of the population aged 30 to 
34 that have completed tertiary or equivalent 
education to at least 40 % — is monitored with 
the headline indicator on tertiary educational 
attainment of the same age group (10). 
Figure 4.7 shows a steady and considerable 
growth in the share of 30 to 34 year olds who 
have successfully completed a university degree 
or other tertiary-level education since 2002. The 
share of 39.9 % in 2017 implies a growth of 16.3 
percentage points since 2002, and means that 
Between 2002 and 
2017, the share of 
30 to 34 year olds 
having completed 
tertiary education 
grew continuously 
from 23.6 % to 
39.9 %. Growth was 
considerably faster for women, who in 
2017 were already clearly above the 
Europe 2020 target at 44.9 %. In contrast, 
among 30 to 34 year old men the share 
was 34.9 % in 2017. 
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Figure 4.7: Tertiary educational attainment, EU-28, 2002–2017 
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the Europe 2020 target has almost been achieved 
three years early. 
4.3.2 Tertiary education attainment rate is 
considerably higher for women 
Figure 4.8 shows a significantly widening gender 
gap among people with tertiary educational 
attainment across the EU. While in 2002 the share 
of tertiary graduates was almost similar for both 
sexes, the share of female graduates has grown at 
almost twice the rate, resulting in a gender gap of 
10 percentage points in 2017. In this year, women 
outnumbered men significantly in all Member 
States. In fact, the gender gap was more than 10 
percentage points in 21 countries, with Slovenia, 
Latvia and Lithuania showing the highest gaps 
of over 20 percentage points. Germany was the 
most ‘equal’ country with a gender gap of only 0.4 
percentage points in favour of women. 
4.3.3 All Member States have made 
significant progress in raising tertiary 
educational attainment 
The increase in tertiary educational attainment 
levels across the EU is mirrored across all Member 
States. This to some extent reflects countries’ 
(11) The Bologna process put in motion a series of reforms to make European higher education more compatible, comparable, competitive 
and attractive for students. Its main objectives were: the introduction of a three-cycle degree system (bachelor, master and doctorate); 
quality assurance; and recognition of qualifications and periods of study (source: Education and training statistics introduced). 
investment in higher education to meet the 
demand for a more skilled labour force (see 
chapter on ‘Employment’, page 23). Another 
factor is the shift to shorter degree programmes 
following the implementation of Bologna (11) 
process reforms in some countries. 
National targets for tertiary education range from 
26 % for Italy to 66 % for Luxembourg. Germany’s 
target is slightly different from the overall EU 
target because it includes post-secondary, non-
tertiary attainment (ISCED level 4). For France, the 
target definition refers to the 17- to 33-year age 
group while for Finland the target excludes former 
tertiary vocational education and training (VET). 
Figure 4.9 shows that in 2017, 15 countries had 
already achieved their national targets. Romania, 
Belgium and Hungary were close at less than two 
percentage points from their national targets 
while Luxembourg (13.3 percentage points), 
Ireland and Portugal (both 6.5 percentage points) 
were the most distant, respectively, below 
their targets. 
In 2017, levels of tertiary educational attainment 
varied by a factor of about 2.2 across Europe. 
Northern and central Europe had the highest 
percentage of tertiary graduates, with 19 
Figure 4.8: Tertiary educational attainment, by sex, EU-28, 2002–2017
(% of the population aged 30–34)
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Source: Eurostat (online data code: t2020_41) 
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Figure 4.9: Tertiary educational attainment, by country, 2008 and 2017
(% of the population aged 30 to 34) 
2008 2017 Europe 2020 target
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Figure 4.10: Tertiary educational attainment rate in a global perspective, age group 25–34, by 
country, 2008 and 2016
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countries exceeding the overall EU target of 40 %. 
The lowest levels could be observed in Italy and 
Romania, which were both around 27 %. 
At the same time, some eastern European 
countries experienced the strongest increases 
over the period 2008 to 2017. Changes were most 
pronounced in Slovakia and the Czech Republic 
where the shares almost doubled. 
(12) The data in Figure 4.11 refers to the 25–34 age group, because the OECD database does not include the 30–34 age group that is used for 
the Europe 2020 target.
Across other major world economies (12), tertiary 
attainment rates vary greatly, but all countries 
showed clear increases between 2008 and 
2016 (see Figure 4.10). Korea experienced the 
biggest rise, of 12.1 percentage points, reaching 
a tertiary educational attainment rate of 70 % for 
the age group 25 to 34 in 2016. At 38.1 %, the EU 
had a significantly lower rate than some other 
industrialised countries. 
4.4 The importance of education and adult 
learning for employability
4.4.1 People born outside the EU show 
higher prevalence of low education levels 
Educational attainment is the visible output of 
education systems. Achievement levels can have 
major implications for many issues affecting a 
person’s life. This is reflected in adult participation 
in learning as well as in other aspects presented 
in the chapters on ‘Employment’, page 23, and 
‘Poverty and social exclusion’, page 103. 
Figure 4.11 shows the educational attainment level 
of different population groups. The age group 25 
to 54 shows higher educational levels than the 
55 to 74 age group, which reflects the growing 
demand for a more highly skilled workforce in 
most parts of Europe over the past few decades. 
A more skilled workforce is expected to emerge 
as older generations leave the workforce and are 
replaced by younger, more highly educated ones. 
If labour markets do not provide adequate jobs 
this may result in higher levels of over-qualification 
and youth unemployment. For workers aged 
55 and older, lower educational attainment 
levels, especially among women, highlight the 
Educational attainment is the 
visible output of education 
systems. In general, younger 
people show higher educational 
levels than the older age group. 
Across all age groups, migrants 
born outside the EU (extra-EU 
migrants) have a much higher 
prevalence of low educational 
levels (ISCED 0–2) than people living in their 
country of birth or coming from another EU 
country (intra-EU migrants). 
Education and training plays an important 
role in improving employability. The 
employment rate of recent graduates (20 
to 34 year olds having left education and 
training in the past one to three years) has 
dropped considerably due to the economic 
and financial crisis. It fell from 82.1 % in 
2008 to 75.4 % in 2013. However, it has 
increased clearly since 2013, reaching 
80.2 % in 2017. 
The share of adults participating in learning 
does not seem to be increasing fast enough 
to meet the ET 2020 benchmark of raising 
participation to at least 15 % by 2020. In the 
last three years, the share increased only 
marginally from 10.7 % to 10.9 % in 2017.
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importance of adult learning as a way to increase 
their employability and to help meet the Europe 
2020 strategy’s employment target (see the 
chapter on ‘Employment’, page 23). 
Across all age groups, migrants born outside 
the EU (extra-EU migrants) have a much higher 
prevalence of low educational levels (ISCED 0–2) 
than people living in their country of birth or 
coming from another EU country (intra-EU 
migrants). The reverse pattern can be observed for 
the medium education levels (ISCED 3–4). This rate 
is significantly lower for people from outside the EU, 
especially in the 25 to 54 age group. Interestingly, 
the tertiary education rate for extra-EU migrants is 
similar to or higher than the rate for native people, 
while the tertiary education rate for intra-EU 
migrants is higher than for the native population. 
As shown in the chapter on ‘Employment’, 
the level of educational attainment is closely 
connected with the employment rate. People 
with higher educational levels are less affected 
by unemployment than people with lower 
educational levels. In 2017, 84.0 % of people with 
a tertiary education (ISCED 5–8) were employed, 
while this was only the case for 72.6 % of people 
with upper secondary and post-secondary non-
tertiary education (ISCED 3–4). The situation is 
(13) Data source: Eurostat (online data code: tepsr_wc120) For further information see section 1.2.6 of the chapter on `Employment .`
(14) Council conclusions of 12 May 2009 on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training (‘ET 2020’) (2009/C 
119/02), Official Journal of the European Union, 28 May 2009.
worse for people with less than primary, primary 
and lower secondary education (ISCED 0–2) with 
an employment rate of 54.9 % in 2017 (13).
4.4.2 The employment rate of recent 
graduates has been increasing 
The EU’s ET 2020 framework (14) acknowledges 
the important role of education and training in 
raising employability. As a consequence, the EU 
aims to ensure that at least 82 % of recent EU 
graduates (20 to 34 year olds) should have found 
employment no more than three years after 
leaving education and training. 
Figure 4.12 shows how severely the economic 
crisis has affected recent graduates. Between 2008 
and 2013, employment rates among 20 to 34 year 
olds who have attained at least upper secondary 
education (ISCED 3), who have successfully 
completed their highest educational attainment 
in the past one to three years, and were not in 
further education or training in the four weeks 
preceding the survey, fell by 6.7 percentage 
points. In comparison, the decline in the overall 
employment rate for 20 to 64 year olds was ‘only’ 
1.9 percentage points over the same period. 
However, 2013 marked a turnaround in this trend, 
with the share of employed recent graduates 
Figure 4.11: Population by educational attainment level, by age group and broad group of 
country of birth, EU-28, 2017
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increasing in the following four years, reaching 
80.2 % in 2017. 
4.4.3 Participation in adult learning 
remains at a distance to the ET 2020 
benchmark 
In addition to tertiary educational attainment, 
adult participation in learning is also crucial for 
providing Europe with a highly qualified labour 
force. Adult education and training covers the 
(15) Council Resolution on a renewed European agenda for adult learning (2011/C 372/01), Official Journal of the European Union, 20 
December 2011.
longest time span in the process of learning 
throughout a person’s life. After an initial phase of 
education and training, continuous, adult learning 
is necessary for improving and developing skills, 
adapting to technical developments, advancing 
careers or returning to the labour market (also see 
the chapter on ‘Employment’, page 23). In 2011, 
the European Council adopted a resolution on a 
renewed European agenda for adult learning (15). 
The EU’s ET 2020 framework also includes a 
benchmark that aims to raise the share of adults 
Figure 4.12: Employment rate of recent graduates, by sex, EU-28, 2006–2017
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Figure 4.13: Adult participation in learning, EU-28, 2002–2017
(% of population aged 25 to 64)
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participating in learning to at least 15 %. This 
benchmark refers to people aged 25 to 64 who 
stated they received education or training in the 
four weeks preceding the survey. 
After rapid growth between 2002 and 2005, the 
share of EU adults participating in learning slightly 
decreased and stagnated at around 9.5 % between 
2005 and 2012. Influenced by the methodological 
(16) INSEE, the French Statistical Office, has carried out an extensive revision of the questionnaire of the Labour Force Survey. The new 
questionnaire was used from 1 January 2013 onwards. It impacts significantly the level of various French LFS-indicators. 
change to the French Labour Force Survey (16), the 
share reached 10.7 % in 2013 and increased only 
slightly to 10.9 % in the following years. 
Women are more likely to participate in 
adult learning than men. In 2017, the share 
of adult women engaged in learning was 
nearly 2 percentage points higher than that of 
men (11.8 % compared with 10.0 %). 
4.5 Investment in future generations: the case 
of public expenditure on education
Public expenditure on education as a 
percentage of GDP is often considered an 
indicator of a government’s commitment to 
developing skills and competences. Generally, the 
public sector funds education either by directly 
bearing the current and capital expenses of 
educational institutions or by supporting students 
and their families with scholarships and public 
loans as well as by transferring public subsidies 
for educational activities to private firms or non-
profit organisations. Both types of transactions 
together are reported as total public expenditure 
on education. 
Figure 4.14 shows the total public expenditure 
on education for the EU as a share of GDP. In 
2014, public expenditure was highest for primary 
and lower secondary education (levels 1–2) with 
2.2 % of GDP. By contrast the smallest share of 
public expenditure on education went to early 
childhood education, with 0.6 % of GDP. The two 
remaining categories — upper secondary and 
post-secondary non-tertiary education (levels 3–4) 
and tertiary education (levels 5–8) — received 
a somewhat similar share of GDP, with 1.2 % and 
1.3 %, respectively. 
Figure 4.14: Total public expenditure on education by education level, EU-28, 2012–2014
(% of GDP)
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5.1 Poverty and social exclusion — why do 
they matter?
(1) OECD, Understanding the Socio-Economic Divide in Europe, Background Report, 2017. 
(2) European Commission, Investing in Children: breaking the cycle of disadvantage, Commission Recommendation of 20 February 2013, 2013.
Poverty and social exclusion harm lives and limit 
the opportunities for people to achieve their full 
potential by affecting their health and well-being 
and lowering educational outcomes. This, in 
turn, reduces their ability to lead a successful life 
and further increases the risk of poverty. Without 
effective educational, health, social, tax-benefit 
and employment systems, the risk of poverty is 
passed on from one generation to the next. This 
causes poverty to persist, creating more inequality 
that can lead to the long-term loss of economic 
productivity from whole groups of society (1) 
and hamper inclusive and sustainable economic 
growth. 
To prevent this downward spiral, the European 
Commission has made ‘inclusive growth’ one of 
the three priorities of the Europe 2020 strategy. It 
has set a target to lift at least 20 million people out 
of the risk of poverty or social exclusion by 2020. 
To further reinforce the social dimension of the EU, 
the European Pillar of Social Rights has been jointly 
signed by the European Parliament, the Council 
and the European Commission. 
To reach the Europe 2020 poverty goal, particular 
focus will need to be placed on groups that are 
at high risk of poverty or social exclusion. With 
the Social Investment Package, the European 
Commission has set forth an integrated policy 
framework aiming to reach out to various 
vulnerable target groups, for example, with 
a specific recommendation on Investing in 
children: breaking the cycle of disadvantage (2). 
Also, between 2014 and 2020, at least 20 % 
of the European Social Fund is earmarked for 
measures combating poverty and social exclusion. 
Further specific actions to reduce poverty or 
social exclusion among young people and the 
unemployed, particularly vulnerable groups, have 
been outlined in the Youth Guarantee Programme. 
Also, the European Commission’s recommendation 
on the Integration of Long-Term Unemployment 
in the Labour Market aims to simplify and improve 
access to support for people out of work for long 
periods. Finally, the Fund for European Aid to the 
Most Deprived (FEAD) supports EU countries’ 
actions in providing food, clothing and other 
essential goods as well as non-material social 
inclusion measures to the poorest in society.
Measures to reduce the amount of people living 
in dire conditions are often intertwined with 
measures that aim to achieve other Europe 2020 
strategy goals. For example, many initiatives 
that try to tackle poverty also aim to boost 
employment. Enhancing education and training, 
and reducing the number of people leaving 
school early, will not only help to lift the current 
generation out of poverty, but may also stop 
poverty being passed on to the next generation. 
By setting a poverty target, the EU has put social 
concerns on an equal footing with economic 
Europe 2020 strategy target 
on the risk of poverty or social 
exclusion
The Europe 2020 strategy has set the 
target of ‘lifting at least 20 million 
people out of the risk of poverty or 
social exclusion’ by 2020 compared to 
the year 2008 (a).
(a) Due to the structure of the survey on which most of 
the key social data is based (EU Statistics on Income 
and Living Conditions), a large part of the main social 
indicators available in 2010, when the Europe 2020 
strategy was adopted, referred to 2008 as the most 
recent year of data available. This is why 2008 data for 
the EU-27 are used as the baseline year for monitoring 
progress towards the Europe 2020 strategy’s poverty 
target. Since 116.1 million people were at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion in the EU-27 in 2008, the target value 
to be reached is 96.1 million by 2020.
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Source: Eurostat (online data codes: t2020_50, t2020_51, t2020_52, t2020_53, ilc_peps01, ilc_peps03, ilc_peps04, ilc_peps60, ilc_peps06 and 
ilc_peps13)
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objectives. However, to achieve the Europe 
2020 strategy target to reduce the number of 
people at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the 
strategy’s other priorities, such as providing better 
(3) This number refers to EU-27; see footnote 2 of Figure 5.1. 
opportunities for employment and education, 
must also be implemented successfully (see 
the chapters on ‘Employment’, page 23, and 
‘Education’, page 87. 
5.2 How do poverty and social exclusion affect 
Europe?
5.2.1 The rate of risk of poverty or social 
exclusion in the EU has returned to around 
the 2008 level, yet progress remains 
limited 
In 2016, 118.0 million people, or 23.5 % of the EU 
population, were at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion. This means roughly one in four people 
in the EU experienced at least one of the following 
three forms of poverty: monetary poverty, 
severe material deprivation, or are living in a 
household with very low work intensity. Since 
2012, the number of people at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion has fallen each year. However, the 
number is still higher than in 2008 (3), which is the 
reference year for the Europe 2020 target. 
The rate of risk of poverty or social exclusion in the 
EU over the past decade has been marked by two 
turning points: in 2009, after which the number 
of people at risk started to rise because of the 
delayed social effects of the economic crisis and 
in 2012, when this upward trend reversed. By 2016, 
the number of people at risk had fallen almost to 
its 2008 level (see Figure 5.1). 
Almost every fourth person in the EU is 
still at risk of poverty or social exclusion, 
experiencing at least one of its three forms. 
Monetary poverty is the most widespread 
form of poverty, affecting 17.3 % of the EU 
population in 2016. 7.5 % were affected 
by severe material deprivation, while very 
low work intensity concerned 10.5 % of the 
population aged 0 to 59. 
Of the three forms of poverty, material 
deprivation has shown the biggest 
change. While monetary poverty has been 
moderately but steadily increasing and 
very low work intensity has not changed 
drastically since 2010, material deprivation 
has been falling continuously. 
In 2016, the rate of risk of poverty after 
social transfers was 8.6 percentage points 
lower than before social 
transfers.
On average, monetary 
poverty is lower in the 
EU at 17.3 % than in 
most other advanced economies. In most 
non-European OECD countries, this value 
was roughly between 20 % and 25 %. 
The overall EU share of people aged 0 to 59 
living in households with very low work 
intensity has remained relatively stable at 
10.5 % since 2010. However, having a job 
is not always enough to avoid poverty: in 
2016, 7.8 % of the working EU population 
was at risk of poverty even though they 
were working full time. 
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2020 target
20 
million people 
to be lifted out 
of the risk of 
poverty or social 
exclusion by 
2020 compared 
with 2008 (2)
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Figure 5.1: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, EU-27 and EU-28, 2005–2016
(million people)
Europe 2020 headline indicator 
(¹) Data for 2005 and 2006 are estimates.
(²)  The overall EU target (referring to the EU-27 — the 27 EU countries before the accession of Croatia) is to lift at least 20 million 
people out of the risk of poverty or social exclusion by 2020. Due to the structure of the survey on which most of the key social 
data is based (EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions), a large part of the main social indicators available in 2010, when the 
Europe 2020 strategy was adopted, referred to 2008 as the most recent year of data available. This is the reason why monitoring of 
progress towards the Europe 2020 strategy’s poverty target takes 2008 as a baseline year.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: t2020_50)
EUROPE 2020
H E A D L I N E
I N D I C AT O R
Figure 5.2: Aggregation of sub-indicators of ‘people at risk of poverty or social exclusion’, EU-28, 
2016
(million people)
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Source: Eurostat (online data code: ilc_pees01)
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Poverty and social exclusion can manifest 
themselves in various forms: while household 
income has a big impact on living standards, other 
aspects, such as access to labour markets and 
material deprivation, also prevent full participation 
in society. This is reflected in the three sub-
indicators that compose the ‘at-risk-of-poverty or 
social exclusion rate’ indicator: monetary poverty, 
severe material deprivation and very low work 
intensity. Because these sub-indicators tend to 
overlap and people can be affected by two or 
even all three of these types of poverty, a person is 
counted only once in the headline indicator, even 
if he or she falls into more than one category (see 
Figure 5.2) (4).
As Figure 5.2 shows, monetary poverty was the 
most widespread form of poverty in 2016, with 
86.9 million people (17.3 % of the EU population) 
living at risk of poverty after social transfers. 
This was more than twice as many as those with 
very low work intensity (39.1 million people 
or 10.5 % of the EU population aged 0 to 59) 
and those suffering from severe material 
deprivation (37.8 million people or 7.5 % of the EU 
population). 
(4) The indicator ‘very low work intensity’ is limited to people aged 0 to 59. People over the age of 59 are considered at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion only if the criteria of one of the two dimensions ‘monetary poverty’ or ‘severe material deprivation’ are met. 
(5) The year of reference differs for the three sub-indicators. The risk of poverty after social transfers and whether or not someone lives in a 
household with very low work intensity are based on data from the previous year. The extent to which an individual is severely materially 
deprived is determined based on information from the year of the survey.
Over 37 million people, or nearly one-third (31.7 %) of 
all people at risk of poverty or social exclusion, were 
affected by more than one dimension of poverty 
over the same period. Another 8.4 million people, 
or one in 14 of those at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion (7.1 %), were affected by all three forms (5). 
As shown in Figure 5.3, the three forms of poverty 
followed different trends between 2005 and 2016. 
While monetary poverty has been increasing 
gradually since 2005, the number of people 
affected by low work intensity has remained 
more or less constant. Since 2012 there has been 
a sharp decline in material deprivation, which 
was not only strong enough to counteract the 
rise in monetary poverty, but also led to an 
overall drop in the poverty level (see Figure 5.1). 
This means the reduction in material deprivation 
has been the main driver behind the headline 
indicator’s improvement since 2012. As described 
later in the chapter, the decline in the amount of 
materially deprived people was mainly driven by 
improvements in a handful of countries. 
One possible reason for the divergence between 
monetary poverty and the two other forms of 
Figure 5.3: Sub-indicators of ‘people at risk of poverty or social exclusion’, EU-27 and EU-28, 
2005–2016
(million people)
Severely materially deprived 
people, EU-28
Severely materially deprived 
people, EU-27
People at risk of poverty 
after social transfers, EU-28
People at risk of poverty 
after social transfers, EU-27
People living in households with 
very low work intensity, EU-28
People living in households with 
very low work intensity, EU-2720
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50
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201620152014201320122011201020092008200720062005
79.5
52.3
39.5
81.0 82.0
86.9
41.6 41.7 39.1
37.834.7
39.0
Note: EU-27 data for 2005 and 2006 are estimates; EU-27 data for 2009 for ‘severe material deprivation’ are estimates.
Source: Eurostat (online data codes: t2020_51, t2020_52 and t2020_53)
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poverty is the different nature of the indicators. 
While monetary poverty is measured in relative 
terms, material deprivation and low work intensity 
are absolute measures. The relativity of monetary 
poverty means the at-risk rate may remain stable 
or even rise even though the average or median 
equivalised disposable income (6) increases. This 
is because the monetary poverty threshold is 
set at a specific percentage (60 %) of the median 
disposable income, which means that if the 
median income increases, the poverty threshold 
increases as well. If at the same time the inequality 
of the income distribution remains unchanged 
or even increases, the number of people below 
the poverty line does not decrease. Conversely, 
absolute poverty measures reflecting a person’s 
ability to afford basic goods are likely to improve 
during economic revivals when people are 
generally financially better off.
(6) The equivalised disposable income refers to the financial means a household has left for saving and spending. It is calculated by taking 
the entire income of a household and dividing it by the weighted household size, where each household member receives a weight 
depending on their age.
(7) European Commission (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs), Quarterly Report on the Euro Area. Institutional Paper 072, 
Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2018, p. 15. 
5.2.2 The number of people at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion has decreased 
in more than half of Member States 
Although on average 23.5 % of the EU population 
were at risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2016, 
the levels of individual countries varied widely, 
ranging from 13.3 % to 40.4 % (see Figure 5.4). 
A country’s socio-economic situation depends 
on many factors, but much of the current 
divergence in social outcomes are still a legacy of 
the economic and financial crisis, as seen in the 
European Commission’s February 2018 Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area (7). That is to say, Member 
States linking flexibility in working arrangements 
with effective active labour market policies and 
adequate social protection weathered the crisis 
more successfully (for more information, see 
the European Commission’s Annual Growth Survey 
Figure 5.4: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, by country, 2008 and 2016
(% of population)
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2018 (8) and its Joint Employment Report 2018 (9), 
and the chapter on ‘Employment’, page 23).
To meet the overall EU target on risk of poverty 
and social exclusion, Member States have set their 
own national targets in their National Reform 
Programmes (10). As noted in the European 
Council conclusions from 17 June 2010 (11), 
Member States are free to set their own targets 
based on the most appropriate indicators for 
their circumstances and priorities. In 23 countries 
the target is expressed as an absolute number 
of people to be lifted out of the risk of poverty 
or social exclusion or one or more of its sub-
indicators (12). Of these countries, the Czech 
Republic, Croatia, Poland and Romania had 
(8) European Commission, Annual Growth Survey 2017, 2016.
(9) European Commission, Joint Employment Report 2018. As adopted by the EPSCO Council on 15th March 2018, 2018.
(10) See https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-
prevention-correction/european-semester/european-semester-timeline/national-reform-programmes-and-stability-convergence-
programmes_en
(11) European Council, Conclusion from 17 June 2010, 2010.
(12) This corresponds to the base year also used for the overall EU target. Germany and Sweden use targets based on different forms of 
unemployment, Ireland defined a combined poverty target, the Netherlands aims to reduce the amount of jobless households, and the 
UK based its numerical targets on a nationally launched Child Poverty Act. European Commission, Social Europe — Aiming for inclusive 
growth. Annual report of the Social Protection Committee on the social situation in the European Union (2014), Publications Office of the 
European Union, Luxembourg, 2015, p. 162–461.
already reached their national poverty targets by 
2016. On the other hand, the number of people 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion has risen in 11 
Member States since 2008, pushing them further 
away from their national targets.
In 2016, 17.3 % of the EU population earned less 
than the poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % 
of the national median equivalised disposable 
income in the country in which they live. This 
represents a slight increase compared with 
2010, when 16.5 % fell below this threshold (see 
Figure 5.5). Most countries also experienced 
growth in the number of people below 
the monetary poverty line, regardless of whether 
they had low or high levels to begin with. 
Figure 5.5: People at risk of poverty after social transfers, by country, 2008 and 2016
(% of population)
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(²) Break in time series in 2016.
(³) Break in time series in 2015.
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Source: Eurostat (online data code: t2020_52)
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Figure 5.6: Poverty rate after taxes and transfers, poverty line 60 %, by country, 2008 and 2015
(%)
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Source: OECD and Eurostat (online data code: ilc_li02)
Compared with the main economies worldwide, 
the EU average share of people at risk of monetary 
poverty at 17.3 % is low, despite increases since 
2008. In most non-EU OECD countries, this value 
is roughly between 20 % and 25 % (13) (see Figure 
5.6). Commonwealth countries in the OECD 
outside the EU as well as Asian OECD countries 
including Russia are at the bottom end of this 
range, while monetary poverty is more prevalent 
in the Latin American OECD countries as well as 
the Unites States, Turkey and Israel. Conversely, 
the EFTA States and OECD Members Norway and 
Switzerland have poverty rates lower than the EU 
average but higher than the EU Member States 
with the lowest shares. 
To reduce the risk of poverty or social exclusion 
within their populations, governments provide 
social security in the form of social transfers, such 
as unemployment benefits or family-related 
benefits, among others. The effectiveness of 
monetary social provision can be evaluated by 
comparing the at-risk-of-poverty rate before and 
after social transfers (see Figure 5.7). In the EU, 
(13) These values are taken from the OECD dataset on Income Distribution and Poverty and correspond to the newest data available in 
this set (2014: New Zealand, Australia and Mexico, 2013: Brazil, 2012: Japan, 2011: Russia). All data is based on the OECD’s new income 
definition, which includes the value of goods produced for own consumption as a component of self-employed income, an element not 
considered in the SILC income definition.  
social transfers reduced the share of people at risk 
of poverty by 8.6 percentage points in 2016, from 
25.9 % to 17.3 %. However, the extent to which this 
was achieved at Member State level varied greatly. 
For example, the share of risk of poverty before 
social transfers was similar in Finland and Romania. 
While in Finland social transfers decreased the 
share of monetary poor to the second lowest 
value among all Member States, Romania 
accounted for the highest share of people living in 
monetary poverty after social transfers. 
Over time, the at-risk-of-poverty rates before 
and after social transfers have moved in different 
directions. The rate before social transfers was 
relatively stable in the EU between 2010 and 
2016, while the rate after social transfers increased 
slightly over the same time. This could mean 
that either the amounts of social transfers paid 
have fallen or they have become less effective 
over time. 
Differences in the effectiveness and efficiency 
of social protection expenditures depend on a 
variety of factors, such as the level of poverty and 
5 Poverty and social exclusion
  Smarter, greener, more inclusive?112
Figure 5.7: At-risk-of-poverty rate before and after social transfers, by country, 2016
(%)
Before social
transfers
After social
transfers
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Se
rb
ia
Tu
rk
ey
 (¹
)
Th
e 
Fo
rm
er
 Y
ug
os
la
v 
Re
pu
bl
ic
 o
f M
ac
ed
on
ia
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
N
or
w
ay
Ic
el
an
d
Ro
m
an
ia
Bu
lg
ar
ia
Sp
ai
n
Li
th
ua
ni
a
La
tv
ia
Es
to
ni
a
G
re
ec
e
Ita
ly
Cr
oa
tia
Po
rt
ug
al
Po
la
nd
Ire
la
nd
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g
G
er
m
an
y
M
al
ta
Sw
ed
en
Cy
pr
us
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
 
Be
lg
iu
m
H
un
ga
ry
Au
st
ria
Sl
ov
en
ia
Fr
an
ce
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
Sl
ov
ak
ia
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
EU
-2
8
(¹) 2015 data.
Source: Eurostat (online data codes: t2020_52 and tesov250)
inequality before social transfers and differences in 
the size and design of these expenditures (14). 
Material deprivation covers issues relating to 
economic strain, durables and housing, and 
dwelling environment. People living in severely 
materially deprived conditions are greatly 
constrained by a lack of resources. This means 
they live in households unable to afford four or 
more items out of a list of nine considered by most 
people to be desirable or even necessary for an 
adequate life (15).
In 2016, 37.8 million people in the EU were living 
in conditions severely constrained by a lack of 
resources. This was equal to 7.5 % of the total 
EU population. As Figure 5.8 shows, this value 
differed widely across the EU in 2016. According 
to the Annual Report of the Social Protection 
Committee (16), among other factors, differences in 
(14) For more information see: European Commission, European Semester Thematic Factsheet. Social Inclusion, 2016.
(15) These items are the following: to pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills; to keep their home adequately warm; to face unexpected 
expenses; to eat meat or proteins regularly; to go on holiday; a television set; a washing machine; a car; a telephone.
(16) European Commission, Review of the social protection performance monitor and developments in social protection policies. Annual report of 
the social protection committee, 2016. 
living standards and real disposable income play 
an important part. 
Overall, the share of the population affected 
by severe material deprivation decreased by 
0.9 percentage points or by 3.9 million people 
between 2010 and 2016. The improvement 
becomes especially apparent when comparing 
it to the year 2012, when the situation was 
particularly dire with almost 50 million people 
affected. 
Since 2008, the number of people living in severe 
material deprivation has fallen in almost two-
thirds of EU Member States. The most distinct 
improvements took place in a handful of countries, 
particularly Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. 
Because, as described earlier, falls in material 
deprivation have tended to drive improvements 
in the overall headline indicator, these countries 
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to a large extent are responsible for the decline 
in the share of people at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion in the EU.
In 2016, 10.5 % (or 39.1 million) of the EU 
population aged 0 to 59 were living in households 
with very low work intensity. This means the 
working-age members of a household worked no 
longer than 20 % of their potential working time 
during the previous year. Even though on average 
the share of the population aged 0 to 59 living 
in households with very low work intensity was 
only 1.3 percentage points higher in 2016 than it 
was in 2008, it has increased considerably in most 
Member States (see Figure 5.9). These increases 
were offset by improvements in only a handful of 
countries, mainly Poland, Hungary and Germany.
The three forms of poverty forming the headline 
indicator represent three related but distinct 
aspects of poverty. This means that whether 
(17) Slovakia, Hungary and Estonia also experienced a lower than average share of poverty in two dimensions of the headline indicator and 
an above average share in a third. 
these three sub-indicators correspond to each 
other or not depends on country-specific 
circumstances. Comparing the levels of the three 
different sub-indicators reveals the following 
pattern: in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia 
and Malta as well as in all western and northern 
EU Member States (except the Baltic countries) 
either all three poverty measures were below 
the EU-wide average or monetary poverty and 
material deprivation were low despite high shares 
of the population living in households with very 
low work intensity (17). Conversely, in many other 
EU Member States either all three sub-indicators 
revealed a share of poverty above the EU-wide 
average (Bulgaria, Italy, Croatia and Greece) or 
poverty levels were above average in two of the 
three sub-indicators. In this case, it was most 
common to have a low share of quasi-jobless 
households but proportionally many people 
suffering from material deprivation and monetary 
Figure 5.8: Severely materially deprived people, by country, 2008 and 2016
(% of population)
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poverty (this was the case in Latvia, Romania, 
Portugal and Lithuania) (18). This shows that the 
structure of poverty can differ across the Member 
States.
Poverty and social exclusion do not only 
affect those who are economically inactive 
or unemployed (for more information on 
employment indicators see the chapter on 
‘Employment’, page 23). In 2016, 7.8 % of the 
working EU population were at risk of poverty 
(18) Spain and Cyprus also experienced a proportionally high share of poverty in two of the three dimensions of the headline indicator and a 
comparably low share in a third dimension. 
(19) Source: Eurostat (online data code: ilc_iw07).
(20) European Institute for Gender Equality, Poverty, gender and intersecting inequalities in the EU: Report, Publications Office of the European 
Union, Luxembourg, 2016, p. 52.
despite working full time (the so-called working 
poor) (19). With the exception of those aged 
between 18 and 24, men are more often among 
the working poor than women. This is because 
women are more often secondary earners, 
meaning the household income does not 
depend solely on them, and working poverty 
is determined by household income (for more 
insights, see the report on Poverty, gender and 
intersecting inequalities in the EU (20)).
Figure 5.9: People living in households with very low work intensity, by country, 2008 and 2016
(% of population aged 0 to 59)
2008 2016
0
5
10
15
20
25
Se
rb
ia
 (⁵
)
Th
e 
Fo
rm
er
 Y
ug
os
la
v 
Re
p
ub
lic
 o
f M
ac
ed
on
ia
 (³
)
Tu
rk
ey
 (⁴
)
N
or
w
ay
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
 (²
)
Ic
el
an
d
Ir
el
an
d
G
re
ec
e
Sp
ai
n
Be
lg
iu
m
C
ro
at
ia
 (³
)
It
al
y
Bu
lg
ar
ia
 (²
)
Fi
nl
an
d
U
ni
te
d 
Ki
ng
do
m
 (²
)
D
en
m
ar
k
Cy
p
ru
s
Li
th
ua
ni
a
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
 (²
)
G
er
m
an
y
Po
rt
ug
al
Sw
ed
en
 (²
)
Fr
an
ce
H
un
ga
ry
Ro
m
an
ia
A
us
tr
ia
Sl
ov
en
ia
M
al
ta
La
tv
ia
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
ub
lic
Lu
xe
m
b
ou
rg
 (²
)
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Po
la
nd
Es
to
ni
a 
(²
)
EU
-2
8 
(¹)
(¹) 2008 data refer to EU-27 (instead of EU-28).
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(⁵) No data for 2008.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: t2020_51)
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5.3 Which groups are at greater risk of poverty 
or social exclusion?
The share of women at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion was 1.9 percentage points 
higher than the corresponding share of men 
in 2016. 
People with activity limitations had a higher 
rate of risk of poverty or social exclusion, at 
29.9 %, than the general population.
30.6 % of young people aged 18 to 24 and 
26.4 % of those aged less than 18 were at 
risk of poverty or social exclusion in 2016. 
At 18.2 %, this rate was considerably lower 
among the elderly aged 65 or over. 
Unemployed people had a higher rate 
of risk of poverty or social exclusion, at 
66.9 % in 2016, compared to the rest of the 
population.  
Almost 50 % of all single parents were at risk 
of poverty or social inclusion in 2016. This 
was double the average and higher than for 
any other household type analysed. 
34.8 % of adults with at most 
lower secondary educational 
attainment were at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion 
in 2016. 
63.7 % of children of parents 
with at most pre-primary and 
lower secondary education 
were at risk. 
In 2016, 39.2 % of adults born in a country 
outside the EU and 24.5 % of those born in a 
different EU country than the reporting one 
were at risk of poverty or social exclusion. 
In comparison, for native residents, only 
21.6 % of the population were at risk. 
EU residents in rural areas had on average 
a slightly higher rate of risk of poverty or 
social exclusion than those living in urban 
areas (25.5 % compared with 23.6 %) in 
2016. 
Identifying groups with a heightened risk of 
poverty or social exclusion, and determining the 
reasons behind this vulnerability, is the key to 
creating sound policies to fight poverty. Compared 
with the EU average, some population groups are 
at a higher risk of poverty or social exclusion. The 
most affected are women, children, young people, 
people with disabilities, the unemployed, single-
parent households and those living alone, people 
with lower educational attainment, people born 
in a different country than the one they reside in, 
people out of work, and, in a majority of Member 
States, those living in rural areas. 
5.3.1 Women and young people are 
particularly vulnerable to poverty and 
social exclusion 
People’s roles and responsibilities within families 
and in the workplace change throughout their 
lives and can also be influenced by gender. Thus, 
it is necessary to consider the breakdown of the 
headline indicator by age and sex for a complete 
picture of the structure of risk of poverty or social 
exclusion. 
In 2016 women had a higher rate of risk of 
poverty or social exclusion than men (the rate 
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for women was 24.4 % compared with 22.5 % for 
men). Because the definition of households in 
the context of the SILC survey implies an equal 
sharing of resources between all members of 
the household, it is likely that the main drivers 
behind the gender gap are higher risk of poverty 
rates among single female households, mainly 
those with dependent children (21). In a workshop 
on the main causes of female poverty (22), 
the European Parliament’s Directorate General 
for Internal Policies pointed out that one reason 
for this persisting gender gap is that single-
parent households (23), which tend to be far 
more often headed by women, are more likely 
to have very low work intensities compared with 
other households with children. A comparison 
of Member States’ performance in the European 
Semester Thematic Factsheet (24) shows two policy 
measures that could ease this problem: child and 
family-support benefits and access to affordable, 
high-quality childcare. 
Overall, between 2008 and 2016 the share of 
both men and women at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion followed a similar path as the headline 
indicator depicted in Figure 5.1. Even so, compared 
to 2008, the rate decreased a bit more for women 
(21) Given that the data does not reveal systematic differences in the risk of poverty or social exclusion between single female and single 
male households without dependent children, the gender gap is expected to be caused by single households with dependent children.
(22) Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Workshop on main causes of female poverty, 2015, p. 22.
(23) Eurostat, People on the EU  — statistics on household and family structures, Statistics Explained.
(24) European Commission, European Semester Thematic Factsheet. Social Inclusion, 2016, p. 7,8.
(25) European Commission, The 2015 Pension Adequacy Report: current and future income adequacy in old age in the EU. Volume 1, 2015.
than for men, slightly reducing the gender poverty 
gap. Most progress in reducing the gender gap 
was made in the years 2012 to 2015 and not in the 
most recent year considered.  
The long-term effects of reduced work intensity 
among women (both single and married) become 
especially apparent in old age. Although women 
had higher rates of risk of poverty or social 
exclusion than men in all age groups in 2016, the 
largest differences could be seen in the oldest 
group (65 or over), displaying a gender gap of 
5.6 percentage points. One explanation for the 
gender poverty gap among elderly EU residents is 
that on average women receive a lower pension 
income than men. As shown in the European 
Commission’s Pension Adequacy Report (25), this 
is mainly due to childcare-related gaps in their 
employment history and patterns of employment 
with low pension coverage. 
For both men and women, young people below 
the age of 24 had the highest rates of risk of 
poverty or social exclusion (30.6 % for 18 to 24 year 
olds and 26.4 % for people younger than 18. For 
more information on this group’s employment 
situation see the chapter on ‘Employment’,  
page 23). 
Figure 5.10: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, by sex and age group, EU-28, 2016 
(% of population)
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Source: Eurostat (online data code: ilc_peps01)
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5.3.2 People with disabilities have higher 
rates of risk of poverty or social exclusion
In 2016, about 30 % of the population aged 16 or 
more in the EU and with an activity limitation was 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion, compared to 
around 20 % of those with no disability. Despite 
large country differences, the rate of risk of poverty 
and social exclusion among people with activity 
limitations was higher compared to the overall 
population in all Member States. 
Across the EU, the share of people with activity 
limitation at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
followed a similar pattern as the overall indicator 
until around 2012. However, instead of decreasing 
after 2012, as was the case for the general 
population, the value for those with activity 
limitations remained stable. Some of the main 
challenges that people with disabilities face are 
limited access to quality education from an early 
age and impeded access to the labour market. 
The integration of people with disabilities into 
the labour market has proven especially difficult 
(26) European Commission, Progress Report on the implementation of the European Disability Strategy (2010–2020), Commission Staff Working 
Paper, 2017. 
(27) Eurostat (online data code: hlth_dpe030).
(28) Eurostat (online data code: hlth_dpe020).
(29) To assess the importance of social transfers, the analysis focuses on the sub-indicator ‘at risk of poverty’ without the dimensions of 
material deprivation and very low-work intensity. 
(30) Eurostat (online data code: ilc_peps02).
(31) The inactive population can include pre-school children, school children, students, pensioners and housewives or house-husbands, for 
example, provided that they are not working at all and are not available or looking for work either; some of these may be of working age.
in the wake of the financial crisis (for more 
Information see the Progress Report by the 
European Commission on its European Disability 
Strategy (26)).
The difference in risk of monetary poverty before 
and after social transfers reveals the decisive 
importance of social transfers to people with 
activity limitation. Before social transfers, 69.1 % (27) 
of people suffering from activity limitations 
were at risk of monetary poverty, but after social 
transfers this rate was reduced to 20.2 % (28) across 
the EU (29). 
5.3.3 Lack of work increases the risk of 
poverty or social exclusion 
At 66.9 %, two-thirds of unemployed people in 
the EU were at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
in 2016 (30). In the same year, 43.5 % of other 
economically inactive people (31) were also at risk. 
In comparison, the share of employed people 
at risk was just 12.4 %. This shows that poverty 
or social exclusion are more likely to affect 
Figure 5.11: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by level of activity limitation, EU-27 and 
EU-28, 2005–2016
(% of population aged 16 or over)
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unemployed people. This is linked to the fact that 
the share of people living in households with low 
job intensity is one of the component indicators of 
the risk of poverty or social exclusion indicator.
However, the rate of risk of poverty or social 
exclusion increased for all groups regardless of 
their employment status between 2010 and 2016, 
except for retirees, where it fell by 2.1 percentage 
points. It is interesting that in 2016 men had a 
higher rate of risk of poverty and social exclusion 
than women across all employment statuses, 
except for retirees. Among those, the share of 
women at risk of poverty or social exclusion was 
4.0 percentage points higher than that of men. 
This reflects an aspect discussed earlier in the 
chapter: one of the drivers behind the feminisation 
of poverty and social exclusion is the number of 
women at risk of poverty or social exclusion at 
retirement age. 
5.3.4 Single parents face the highest risk 
of poverty or social exclusion 
In 2016, 48.0 % of single people with one or more 
dependent children were at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion. This was just over twice the 
average rate and higher than for other household 
types. However, this group also experienced the 
largest decline in the percentage at risk since 2010 
when the rate was 52.2 % and well over double the 
average. 
Figure 5.12 shows that in general households 
with only one adult — both with children and 
without — and households with many children 
are at a higher risk of poverty or social exclusion. 
In single-adult households there is no partner 
to help cushion temporary disruptions such as 
unemployment or sickness. Also, many such 
households are made up of young unemployed 
Figure 5.12: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, by household type, EU-28, 2010 and 
2016
(% of population)
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Source: Eurostat (online data code: ilc_peps03)
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people or pensioners — often women — which 
have a higher-than-average risk of poverty or 
social exclusion (32). Single parents also face the 
challenge of being both the primary breadwinner 
and caregiver for the family. The group with the 
lowest risk of poverty rate in 2016 was that of 
households with two adults where at least one 
person was aged 65 years or over. 
5.3.5 People with low educational 
attainment are three times more likely 
to be at risk than those with tertiary 
education
In 2016, 34.8 % of people with at most lower 
secondary educational attainment were at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion (see Figure 5.13). In 
comparison, only 11.7 % with tertiary education 
were in the same situation. This shows that the 
least educated people were almost three times 
more likely to be at risk than those with the 
highest education levels (also see the chapter 
on ‘Education’, page 87). This is also reflected 
in the data on employment, which shows that 
the likelihood of being employed rises in line 
with educational level (see the chapter on 
‘Employment’, page 23, or the Education 
and Training Monitor 2017 of the European 
Commission (33) for more information). 
(32) European Centre, Poverty Across Europe: The latest evidence using the EU-SILC Survey, 2008.
(33) European Commission, Education and Training Monitor 2017, 2017, p. 72. 
Even though the risk of poverty or social exclusion 
increased the most for adults with the lowest 
educational attainment between 2010 and 2016, 
people with the highest education levels also 
experienced an increased risk. 
5.3.6 The risk of poverty or social 
exclusion due to low education is passed 
on to the next generation 
An important aspect to consider when analysing 
the overall number of people at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion is the transmission of disadvantage 
from one generation to the next. 
At 10.3 %, children of parents who obtained the 
highest educational degrees had about the same 
rate of risk of poverty or social exclusion as the 
overall population with the highest educational 
level in 2016 (see Figures 5.13 and 5.14). Contrarily, 
the situation was especially grim for children 
of parents with at most pre-primary and lower 
secondary education. The risk of poverty rate for 
people in this group was almost six times higher 
than for children of parents with first- or second-
stage tertiary education. Also, while around a 
third of the overall population with the lowest 
educational attainment was at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion in 2016, this rate was almost 
Figure 5.13: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion, by educational attainment level, EU-28, 
2010 and 2016
(% of population aged 18 and over)
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twice as high, at 63.7 %, for children of parents in 
this group. This implies that the risk of poverty 
or social exclusion particularly affects families 
where parents could not benefit from an extensive 
education. 
Moreover, between 2010 and 2016 the increase 
in the risk of poverty or social exclusion was 
particularly high for children of parents with the 
lowest educational attainment, while the increase 
was minimal for other children. Thus, education, 
which is a strong determinant of poverty or social 
exclusion for adults, also strongly influences 
whether children are at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion (for more information see the Education 
and Training Monitor 2017 of the European 
Commission (34)). 
The socio-economic environment in which 
children grow up does not only affect the 
standard of living in their youth. There is also a 
close link between the socio-economic status of 
adults and the status of their parents during their 
childhood. For instance, the ad hoc module on 
intergenerational transmission of disadvantage 
(34) European Commission, Education and Training Monitor 2017, 2017, p. 28. 
(35) Eurostat, Statistics in focus, Intergenerational transmission of disadvantage statistics, Statistics Explained, 2013.
(36) The data on intergenerational transmission of disadvantages will be updated in the EU-SILC ad hoc module 2019. 
(37) Parents ‘not at work’ include unemployed, in retirement or in early retirement or had given up business, fulfilling domestic tasks and care 
responsibilities, other inactive person, and those answering ‘don’t know’.
(38) Eurostat, Living conditions in Europe. Eurostat statistical books, 2014, p.101.
(39) European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 20 February 2013, Investing in children: breaking the cycle of disadvantage, Official 
Journal of the European Union, 2013.
statistics (35) carried out in the EU Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions (SILC) in 2011 (36) 
showed that 34.2 % of low-educated adults also 
had low-educated parents in their childhood. 
This can be explained by the parents’ inability to 
financially support their children’s studies and/
or to pass on a perception of the importance of 
education to their children. 
Education is not the only factor transmitted 
from generation to generation. In 2011, 68.9 % 
of adults with a low ability to make ends meet 
grew up in a household in the same situation. 
Moreover, among adults ‘not at work’, 28.6 % also 
grew up in a household with at least one parent 
not at work (37). Thus, children growing up in 
unfavourable conditions are less likely than their 
better-off peers to do well in school, enjoy good 
health and realise their full potential later in life (for 
more information see Eurostat’s statistical book 
on Living Conditions in Europe (38)). 
In a Commission Recommendation (39), the 
European Commission encouraged its Member 
States to take action to prevent disadvantages 
Figure 5.14: Children at risk of poverty or social exclusion by educational attainment level of 
their parents, EU-28, 2010 and 2016
(% of population aged less than 18 years)
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being transmitted across generations. Specifically, 
it advised them to guarantee that children grow 
up with sufficient resources, as well as ensure 
they have access to quality education, along with 
childcare services and health services, and to 
enforce children’s rights to access different pastime 
activities. 
5.3.7 People from outside the EU are 
generally worse off than people living in 
their home country 
In 2016, people living in the EU but born in a 
non-EU country had a 39.2 % at risk of poverty 
or social exclusion rate. The risk was lower for 
people born in an EU-country other than the one 
they were living in, at 24.5 %. Among the people 
whose country of residence corresponded to their 
country of birth, 21.6 % were at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion. Thus, people born outside the 
EU had a twice higher rate of risk of poverty or 
social exclusion compared with native residents. 
Compared to migration from a country from 
outside the EU, migration within the EU bears a far 
smaller risk of poverty or social exclusion. 
In the majority of Member States, the rate of risk of 
poverty or social exclusion was highest for people 
born outside the EU. The Czech Republic, Poland, 
Hungary and Latvia form the exceptions. However, 
at around 10 percentage points, the difference 
between groups with different migration status 
was comparably low in these four countries. In 
Member States where people born outside the 
EU were most at risk of suffering from poverty 
or social exclusion, this likelihood was up to 
36 percentage points higher than for those born 
within the reporting country. 
The ’poverty origin gap’ can arise due to a 
number factors, such as the level of education, 
labour market access and employment status of 
foreign citizens residing in a given Member State. 
Figure 5.15: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by broad group of country of birth, by 
country, 2016
(% of population aged 18 and over)
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Difficulties in labour market access among foreign 
citizens can be due to migration-specific work 
obstacles: problems with credential recognition, 
language and communication barriers, or 
discrimination on social and religious grounds (for 
more information, see the Eurostat article on 
First and second-generation immigrants — 
obstacles to work (40) and the Migrant integration 
statistics (41)). Furthermore, the socio-economic 
outcomes of the foreign-born population may 
also reflect the different reasons for migrating to a 
specific country. For instance, in many EU countries 
a large share of non-EU migrants did not come to 
their host country primarily for work, but rather for 
family reasons, or for humanitarian reasons (see 
Employment and Social Development in Europe 
2015 (42) and the International Migration Outlook 
2018 (43) by the OECD). 
(40) Eurostat, First and second-generation immigrants — obstacles to work, Statistics Explained, 2016.
(41) Eurostat, Migrant integration statistics — labour market indicators, Statistics Explained, 2017. 
(42) European Commission, Employment and Social Development in Europe 2015, 2016, p.14.
(43) OECD, International Migration Outlook 2018, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2018. 
Between 2010 and 2016 the risk of poverty or 
social exclusion increased for those living in a 
country other than their country of origin, both 
for those from outside the EU and those from 
inside the EU. However, for both groups, this share 
decreased compared to the years 2013 to 2015. 
5.3.8 People in rural areas have slightly 
higher rates of risk of poverty or social 
exclusion, but the rate has converged 
across different types of settlements
On average, EU residents in rural areas were 
slightly more likely to live at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion than those in urban areas (25.5 % 
in rural areas compared with 23.6 % in urban areas) 
in 2016 (see Figure 5.15). Those living in towns or 
suburbs were the least likely to be at risk (21.6 %). 
Figure 5.16: People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by degree of urbanisation, by country, 
2016
(% of population)
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Despite the overall EU averages showing higher 
rates of risk of poverty or social exclusion in rural 
areas, in some northern, central and western 
Member States, people residing in urban areas 
were more often affected than in rural areas. 
In a study report on poverty and social exclusion 
in rural areas (44), the European Commission 
identified four main categories of problems 
that characterise rural areas in the EU and 
determine the risk of poverty or social exclusion: 
demography (for example, the exodus of 
residents and the ageing population in rural 
(44) European Commission, Poverty and social exclusion in rural areas. Final study report, Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 2008.
(45) Eurostat, Urban Europe — statistics on cities, towns and suburbs — executive summary, 2016.
areas), remoteness (such as lack of infrastructure 
and basic services), education (for example, lack 
of preschools and difficulty in accessing primary 
and secondary schools) and labour markets (lower 
employment rates, persistent long-term 
unemployment and a greater number of seasonal 
workers). At the same time, even if urban areas are 
often characterised by high concentrations of 
economic activity, they are also characterised by 
a range of social inequalities, where especially 
the costs of living can contribute to the risks of 
poverty (45).

Country profiles
Country profiles
  Smarter, greener, more inclusive?126
Country profiles
(1) Please note that in a few cases, some countries have changed their national targets since 2008, therefore comparisons with earlier 
editions of this publication may be misleading.
This section provides an overview of each Member 
State’s situation in relation to the Europe 2020 
headline indicators and national targets. 
Member States define their national targets in their 
National Reform Programmes (NRPs), taking into 
account their current situation. These programmes 
outline the actions and measures they plan to 
undertake to meet their national targets. The 
European Commission assesses each NRP and 
provides country-specific recommendations 
to support the programmes. The full NRPs and 
country-specific recommendations can be 
downloaded from the European Commission’s 
European Semester website.
This chapter illustrates the current situation of 
each Member State with the help of radar charts. 
The charts show how far a country is from its 
national targets as a percentage of the targets 
by comparing the national target (red line), the 
country’s situation in 2008 (yellow line) and the 
most recent situation (blue line). The distance 
between the blue line and the red line for a 
particular indicator shows how far a country 
currently is from its national target. Data points on 
or outside the red line mean the country has met 
or exceeded this target, while those inside show 
it still has some way to go. Comparing a country’s 
most recent performance with the green line 
reveals whether it has moved closer to or further 
away from its targets since 2008 (1).
National targets that are not harmonised with 
the overall EU targets are not presented in the 
diagram. For example, this is the case with the 
poverty and social exclusion targets adopted by 
some countries. Regarding the indicator on energy 
efficiency, Member States have set indicative 
national targets based on different indicators 
(primary or final energy consumption, or primary 
or final energy savings, or energy intensity) in line 
with the Energy Efficiency Directive. These have 
been translated into absolute levels of primary 
energy consumption, expressed in million tonnes 
of oil equivalent (Mtoe).
2008
National target
Most recent data
Employment rate
R&D 
expenditure
Greenhouse gas
emissions
Share of renewable 
energy in gross final 
energy consumption 
Primary energy
consumption
Early leavers
from education
and training
People at risk
of poverty or
social exclusion
Tertiary educational
attainment
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Progress towards the national greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions targets is analysed based on 
emissions in sectors not covered by the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) and in relation 
to the base year defined in the Effort Sharing 
Decision (ESD) (2). For further details on the EU ETS 
and the ESD see the chapter on ‘Climate change 
and energy’ on page 65.
(2) The Effort Sharing Decision (406/2009/EC) originally defined 2005 as the base year for Member States’ GHG emissions reductions. 
However, due to recent recalculations with improved methodologies used at national level to measure the estimated emissions, 2005 
values of countries are not necessarily equal to the value of the ESD base year.
The national targets (as defined in the NRPs) and 
the latest available national data for the headline 
indicators are presented in a separate table. Data 
on Europe 2020 headline indicators, targets and 
related issues are disseminated by Eurostat on a 
dedicated section of its website. 
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Belgium
In 2017, Belgium surpassed its target on early 
leavers from education and training by 0.6 
percentage points. The country almost reached 
its tertiary educational attainment target, which 
foresees an increase in the share of population 
aged 30 to 34 with tertiary education to 47 %. 
The country has also increased its expenditure on 
R&D as a share of GDP, but in 2016 it was still 0.5 
percentage points from its 3 % national target. The 
share of renewable energy in gross final energy 
consumption in Belgium more than doubled 
between 2008 and 2016; however, the country 
remains 4.3 percentage points below its national 
target of 13 %. Although the country reduced its 
GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors between 2008 
and 2016, it is still 7.8 percentage points away 
from its national target. The lack of progress in 
primary energy consumption leaves the country 
more than five percentage points from its target. 
Similarly, lack of progress on the employment rate 
between 2008 and 2017 means the employment 
target is still 4.7 percentage points away. Between 
2008 and 2017, the number of people at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion increased by about 
4.6 %, moving the country further from its national 
2020 target. 
Figure 6.1: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.1: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 68.5 2017 73.2
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 2.49 (1) 2016 3
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 7.2 (1) 2016 – 15
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 8.7 2016 13
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 49.0 2016 43.7
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 8.9 (2) 2017 9.5
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 45.9 (2) 2017 47
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 2 296 2017 1 814
(1) Estimate/provisional data. 
(2) Break in time series in 2017.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Bulgaria
Bulgaria reduced its non-ETS GHG emissions 
between 2008 and 2016, staying within its 
national target to limit the rise in non-ETS sector 
GHG emissions to 20 % by 2020. In 2016, the 
country surpassed its renewable energy target 
and almost met its target on primary energy 
consumption. Although Bulgaria has moved 
towards its national targets on early school leavers 
and tertiary education, it was still further away 
from both indicators than the EU as a whole was 
to the respective EU target in 2016. Bulgaria’s 
employment rate deteriorated sharply between 
2008 and 2011; the subsequent increase up to 
2017 was not enough to reach the country’s 
76 % target. Despite a rise in R&D expenditure 
between 2008 and 2016, Bulgaria would need 
to double its expenditure in the coming years to 
reach its goal of 1.5 % of GDP. An increase in the 
number of people at risk of poverty after social 
transfers — used as a national target in the area 
of poverty reduction — has pushed the country 
further away from its poverty reduction target; in 
2017 the number was 17.6 % above the national 
2020 target. 
Figure 6.2: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.2: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 71.3 2017 76
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.78 2016 1.5
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) 12.8 (1) 2016 20
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 18.8 2016 16
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 17.6 2016 16.9
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 12.7 2017 11
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 32.8 2017 36
People at risk of poverty after social transfers (thousands) 1 665 2017 1 372 (2)
(1) Data are provisional. (2) National target differs from the overall EU target on ‘risk of poverty or social exclusion’ as it refers to the sub-
indicator ‘people at risk of poverty after social transfers’ only. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Country profiles
  Smarter, greener, more inclusive?130
Czech Republic
The Czech Republic reduced its non-ETS GHG 
emissions by 5.7 % between 1990 and 2016, thus 
remaining within the national GHG emissions 
target to limit increases to 9 % by 2020. In 2016, 
the country had already met its national target 
on renewable energy and the 6.3 % decrease in 
primary energy consumption in the period 2008 
to 2016 brought the Czech Republic very close 
to its national target. In 2017, the Czech Republic 
exceeded its national targets on employment 
and tertiary educational attainment by 3.5 and 
2.2 percentage points, respectively. The 
significant reduction in the number of people 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion between 
2008 and 2016 helped the country surpass its 
national target of lifting 100 000 people from risk 
of poverty or social exclusion compared to 2008 
levels with 22 000. The increase in the share of 
early school leavers from education and training 
between 2008 and 2017 widened the distance to 
the national target to 1.2 percentage points.
Figure 6.3: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.3: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 78.5 2017 75
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.68 (1) 2016 1 (²)
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 5.7 (1) 2016 9
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 14.9 2016 13
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 39.9 2016 39.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 6.7 2017 5.5
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 34.2 2017 32
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 1 375 2016 1 466
(1) Provisional data. (2) National target refers to public sector expenditure only. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Denmark
In 2017, Denmark exceeded its national targets 
on early school leavers and tertiary educational 
attainment, by 1.2 and 8.8 percentage points, 
respectively. With a 11.8 % reduction in primary 
energy consumption and a 13.6 percentage points 
increase in the share of renewable energy in gross 
final energy consumption between 2008 and 2016, 
Denmark also surpassed its targets on energy 
efficiency and renewable energy. In 2016 the 
country was also very close to meeting its non-ETS 
GHG emissions target and R&D expenditure target 
of 3 % of GDP. The country’s employment rate 
in 2017 was still below the 2008 level and some 
distance from the national target of 80 %. Despite a 
steady decrease since 2014, the number of people 
living in households with very low work intensity 
— used in Denmark as a national target in the 
area of poverty and social exclusion — increased 
by 17.9 % between 2008 and 2017, pushing the 
country further from its national target.
Figure 6.4: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.4: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 76.9 2017 80
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 2.87 (1) 2016 3
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 19.3 (1) 2016 – 20
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 32.2 2016 30
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 17.2 2016 17.4
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 8.8 2017 10
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 48.8 2017 40 (2)
People living in households with very low work intensity (thousands) 409 2017 325 (3)
(1) Estimated/provisional data. (2) National target: more than 40 %. (3) National target differs from the overall EU target on ‘risk of poverty or social 
exclusion’ as it refers to the sub-indicator ‘people living in households with very low work intensity’ only.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Germany
Long-term unemployment, used in Germany 
as a national target in the area of poverty and 
social exclusion, went down by 58.5 % between 
2008 and 2017. This allowed the country to 
significantly exceed its target of reducing long-
term unemployment by 20 % by 2020. Germany 
had already met its 77 % employment target in 
2013 and continued to increase its employment 
rate until 2017. In 2017, Germany also surpassed its 
national target on tertiary educational attainment 
by 7.0 percentage points, with 49.0 % of 30 to 34 
year olds having completed post-secondary level 
education or equivalent. Germany’s national target 
differs from that of other Member States because 
it includes post-secondary non-tertiary education 
(ISCED level 4) in addition to ISCED levels 5 to 8. 
In addition, Germany was only 0.1 percentage 
points away from meeting its target for early 
leavers from education and training in 2017. In 
2016, the country almost reached its national 
targets for R&D expenditure. Between 2008 and 
2016, Germany reduced the distance to its national 
targets on primary energy consumption and 
renewable energy by more than half. However, a 
gap of 8.3 percentage points to its target on GHG 
emissions in non-ETS sectors persisted in 2016. 
Figure 6.5: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.5: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 79.2 2017 77
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 2.94 (1) 2016 3
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 5.7 (1) 2016 – 14
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 14.8 2016 18
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 295.8 2016 276.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 10.1 2017 10 (2)
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 49.0 (3) 2017 42 (3)
Long-term unemployment (thousands) 675 2017 1 306 (4)
(1) Estimated/provisional data. (2) National target: less than 10 %. (3) Indicator and target refer to ISCED levels 4–8. (4) National target differs 
from the overall EU target on ‘risk of poverty or social exclusion’ as it refers to long-term unemployed people.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators and lfsa_ugad), DESTATIS
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Estonia
Estonia reduced its GHG emissions between 
2008 and 2016, remaining below its national 
target, which allows an increase of 11 % by 2020. 
In 2016, it surpassed its targets on renewable 
energy and primary energy consumption by 
3.8 percentage points and 0.4 Mtoe, respectively. 
In 2017, the country also exceeded its targets on 
tertiary education and employment by 8.4 and 
2.7 percentage points, respectively. Despite a 
sizeable reduction in the share of early school 
leavers since 2008, Estonia was 1.3 percentage 
points above its national target in 2017. Since 
2010 the share of the population living at risk 
of poverty after social transfers has increased 
gradually, pushing Estonia further from its 
national target to reduce monetary poverty to a 
rate of 15 %. Due to the lack of progress in gross 
expenditure on R&D, in 2016 the country was 
further from its national target of 3 % than any 
other Member State. 
Figure 6.6: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.6: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 78.7 2017 76
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.28 2016 3
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) 7.6 (1) 2016 11
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 28.8 2016 25
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 6.1 2016 6.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 10.8 2017 9.5
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 48.4 2017 40
People at risk of poverty after social transfers (% of population) 21.7 2016 15 (2)
(1) Estimated/provisional data. (2) National target differs from the overall EU target on ‘Risk of poverty or social exclusion’ as it refers to the 
sub-indicator ‘people at risk of poverty after social transfers’ only.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Ireland
Ireland surpassed its employment target by 
4.0 percentage points in 2017. The country 
also exceeded its target for early leavers 
from education and training, achieving a 
6.6 percentage point reduction between 2008 
and 2017. Although the share of tertiary graduates 
increased more or less steadily during the same 
period, Ireland has yet to meet its 60 % target 
— the second most ambitious target for this 
indicator among Member States. Ireland had 
already met its primary energy consumption 
target in 2011, but the slight increase in 
consumption in 2016 pushed the country just 
above its target again. Despite the gradual 
increase in the share of renewable energy in gross 
final energy consumption since 2008, a gap of 6.5 
percentage points still needs to be closed in the 
next four years for the country to reach its 16 % 
target. Ireland would need to more than triple its 
efforts to reduce its GHG emissions in non-ETS 
sectors compared to 1990 in order to meet its 
20 % reduction target. A fall in the country’s R&D 
expenditure in 2015 and 2016 pushed Ireland 
away from its 2 % target. 
Figure 6.7: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.7: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 73.0 2017 69 (1)
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.18 (2) 2016 2 (3)
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 5.4 (2) 2016 – 20
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 9.5 2016 16
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 14.6 2016 13.9
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 5.1 (4) 2017 8
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 53.5 (4) 2017 60
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 1 135 2016 : (5)
(1) National target: 69–71 %. (2) Estimated/provisional data. (3) National target: 2.5 % of GNP (approximately 2 % of GDP).  
(4) Break in time series. (5) National target: Reduce by a minimum of 200 000 the population in combined poverty (either consistent poverty, 
at-risk-of-poverty or basic deprivation).
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Greece
Partly as a result of the economic slowdown, 
Greece had reduced its GHG emissions in non-
ETS sectors by 25.7 % by 2016 compared to 1990 
levels, significantly exceeding its national target 
for a 4 % reduction by 2020. Greece had already 
met its target on primary energy consumption 
in 2013 and has stabilised its energy efficiency 
at almost the same level since then. Between 
2008 and 2016, Greece almost doubled its 
share of renewable energy in gross final energy 
consumption and increased its expenditure 
on R&D as a share of GDP, thus narrowing the 
distance to the respective national targets. In 
2017, the country surpassed its targets on tertiary 
education and early leavers from education 
and training, by 11.7 and 4.0 percentage points 
respectively. In contrast, in 2017 it was the EU 
country with the lowest employment rate and 
the greatest distance to its employment target. 
Moreover, the number of people living at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion increased by about 
743 000 between 2008 and 2016, increasing 
the distance from the national target to almost 
1.2 million people. 
Figure 6.8: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets
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Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.8: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 57.8 2017 70
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.01 2016 1.2
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 25.7 (1) 2016 – 4
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 15.2 2016 18
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 23.5 2016 24.7
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 6.0 2017 10 (2)
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 43.7 2017 32
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 3 789 2016 2 596
(1) Provisional/estimated data. (2) National target: less than 10 %.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Spain
Spain exceeded its national target on GHG 
emissions in non-ETS sectors by 6.2 percentage 
points in 2016. The country also surpassed its 
primary energy consumption target and closed 
the distance to its renewable energy target to 
2.7 percentage points. By reducing the school 
drop-out rate by 13.4 percentage points between 
2008 and 2017, Spain made substantial progress 
towards its 2020 national target. In contrast, in 
2017 the share of 30 to 34 years old with tertiary 
education was almost the same as in 2008, 
leaving a distance of 2.8 percentage points to the 
national target of 44 %. Since 2008, the number 
of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion has 
risen sharply. Despite improvements in 2015 and 
2016, Spain would need to lift some 3.4 million 
people out of risk of poverty to meet its 2020 
objective. Although the country’s employment 
rate has picked up since 2014, in 2017 it was still 
8.5 percentage points behind its national target — 
the second largest gap in the EU. R&D spending 
has also fallen, however, the country was closer to 
its national target than the EU as a whole was to 
the EU 2020 target in 2016.  
Figure 6.9: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
2008
National target
Most recent data
Share of renewable energy in 
gross final energy consumption  
Employment rate
R&D
expenditure 
Greenhouse
gas emissions
Share of renewable energy in 
gross final energy consumption  
Primary energy
consumption
Tertiary educational
attainment
People at risk of poverty
or social exclusion  
Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.9: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 65.5 2017 74
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.19 2016 2
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 16.2 (1) 2016 – 10
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 17.3 2016 20
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 117.2 2016 119.8
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 18.3 2017 15 (2)
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 41.2 2017 44
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 12 827 2016 9 386 (3)
(1) Provisional data. (2) National target refers to school drop-out rate.  
(3) National target: reduce the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by 1 400 000 to 1 500 000 people (compared to 2008).
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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France
In 2017, France met its Europe 2020 target for early 
leavers from education and training for the fourth 
consecutive year. Progress has also been achieved 
in tertiary educational attainment; however, the 
indicator used at the EU level cannot directly be 
compared to the French target value of 50 %, 
which refers to the population aged 17 to 33. By 
2016, the country had moved closer to its target 
on primary energy consumption. In terms of 
renewable energy, France was the Member State 
that was the second furthest from its national 
target (7.0 percentage points). Despite an overall 
reduction in GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors, 
by 2016 the country was still 3.6 percentage 
points away from its Europe 2020 goal. In 2017, 
France was also further from its employment 
target than the EU as a whole was from the EU 
target but slightly closer to its target on R&D 
expenditure (2016 data). Between 2008 and 2016, 
the number of people at risk of poverty or social 
exclusion increased by about 313 000, moving 
the country away from its 2020 goal to reduce the 
number of people at risk by 1.9 million (compared 
to 2007). 
Figure 6.10: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.10: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 70.6 2017 75
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 2.25 (¹) 2016 3
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 10.4 (1) 2016 – 14
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 16.0 2016 23
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 235.4 2016 219.9
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 8.9 2017 9.5
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 44.3 2017 50 (2)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 11 463 2016 9 482 (3)
(1) Provisional data. (2) National target differs from the overall EU target on ‘tertiary educational attainment’ as it refers to 17–33 year olds. 
(3) National target: reduce by 1 900 000 the population living in poverty or social exclusion by 2020 (compared with 2007).
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Croatia
Croatia not only had by far the lowest rate of early 
leavers from education and training across the EU 
in 2017, but it also exceeded its 2020 target by 0.9 
percentage points. The share of the population 
aged 30 to 34 with tertiary education increased 
by 10.2 percentage points in the period between 
2008 and 2017, substantially reducing the distance 
to the national 2020 target. A gradual reduction 
in the number of people at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion since 2013 helped the country 
reach its 2020 target already in 2015. By 2016, 
the country had remained well within its target 
on GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors, which 
allows emissions to increase by up to 11 % by 
2020 compared to 1990 levels. In 2016, Croatia 
also surpassed its national targets on renewable 
energy and primary energy consumption. Due to 
the gradual increase in the employment rate since 
2014, the country met its employment target in 
2017. In 2016, Croatia slightly increased the gap to 
the national target on R&D expenditure compared 
to 2008 levels.
Figure 6.11: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.11: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 63.6 2017 62.9
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.85 2016 1.4
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 18.0 (1) 2016 11
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 28.3 2016 20
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 8.1 2016 11.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 3.1 2017 4
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 28.7 2017 35
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 1 159 2016 1 220
(1) Provisional data.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Italy
Italy achieved a 17.0 % reduction in GHG 
emissions in non-ETS sectors between 1990 
and 2016, exceeding its national target by 4.0 
percentage points. In 2016, the country also 
surpassed its national targets on renewable 
energy and primary energy consumption for 
a third and fifth consecutive year, respectively. 
Regarding education, Italy had exceeded its goals 
on early leavers from education and training 
and tertiary education by 2017; nevertheless, the 
country had the second lowest share of tertiary 
graduates in the EU in 2017 (26.9 % of 30 to 34 
year olds). R&D expenditure has increased slightly 
since 2008 and in 2016 the country was closer to 
its national target than the EU as a whole was to 
the EU target. In contrast, it is still 4.7 percentage 
points below its national target on employment, 
despite the gradual increase in the employment 
rate over the past three years. The number of 
people at risk of poverty and social exclusion has 
increased considerably between 2008 and 2016; 
Italy would need to lift more than 5.2 million 
people out of the risk of poverty to reach its 
national target by 2020.
Figure 6.12: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.12: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 62.3 2017 67 (1)
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.29 (2) 2016 1.53
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 17.0 (2) 2016 – 13
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 17.4 2016 17
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 148.4 2016 158
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 14.0 2017 16 
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 26.9 2017 26 (3)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 18 137 2016 12 882
(1) National target: 67–69 %. (2) Provisional data. (3) National target: 26–27 %.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Cyprus
Cyprus exceeded its national target on tertiary 
educational attainment by 9.8 percentage 
points in 2017. In the same year, the country 
had also surpassed its target on early leavers 
from education and training by 1.4 percentage 
points. In 2016, Cyprus was the only Member 
State that met its target on R&D expenditure. 
Although the country had already met its goal 
on primary energy consumption in 2015, the 
situation deteriorated in 2016 and Cyprus was 
0.2 percentage points away from its goal. By 
2016, the country had reduced the distance to 
its renewable energy goal to 3.7 percentage 
points. Despite a reduction in non-ETS GHG 
emission between 2008 and 2016, Cyprus 
is still some distance from its Europe 2020 
commitment. Although Cyprus’s employment 
rate has been growing since 2013, in 2017, it was 
still 4.3 percentage points below its 75 % national 
target. Moreover, the country would need to lift 
80 000 more people out of the risk of poverty and 
social exclusion to meet its 2020 commitment. 
Figure 6.13: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.13: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 70.7 2017 75 (1)
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.5 (2) 2016 0.5
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) 0.2 (2) 2016 – 5
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 9.3 2016 13
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 2.4 2016 2.2
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 8.6 2017 10
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 55.8 2017 46
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 234 2016 154
(1) National target: 75–77 %. (2) Provisional data. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Latvia
Latvia has made notable progress on reducing 
the number of early leavers from education 
and training and increasing the share of tertiary 
graduates. The country reached its respective 
targets in 2013 and 2011 and continued to meet 
them in 2017. By 2017, the country had already 
reached its national poverty reduction target by 
limiting the number of people at risk of poverty 
after social transfers and/or in households with 
very low work intensity to 544 000. Unlike the 
EU-level target, Latvia’s poverty target refers to 
monetary poverty and very low work intensity 
only and does not take into account severe 
material deprivation. The country’s GHG emissions 
in non-ETS sectors did not rise notably between 
1990 and 2016, staying within the national target 
to limit emissions increases to 17 % by 2020. Since 
2008, Latvia has fulfilled its commitment on 
primary energy consumption and has steadily 
moved towards its target of 40 % renewable 
energy in gross final energy consumption; this is 
the second most ambitious target for this indicator 
in the EU. By 2017, the country had also exceeded 
its employment target of 73 % by 1.8 percentage 
points. Latvia would need to triple its expenditure 
on R&D to meet its 2020 commitment.
Figure 6.14: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.14: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 74.8 2017 73
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.44 2016 1.5
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) 3.8 (1) 2016 17
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 37.2 2016 40
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 4.3 2016 5.4
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 8.6 2017 10.0
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 43.8 2017 34 (2)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 544 (3) 2017 619 (3)
(1) Provisional data. (2) National target: 34–36 %. (3) Indicator and national target differ from the overall EU target on ‘risk of poverty or social 
exclusion’ as they refer to the two sub-indicators ‘People living at risk of poverty after social transfers’ and ‘people living in households with 
very low work intensity’ only.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Lithuania
In 2017, Lithuania had by far the highest share of 
30 to 34 year olds with tertiary education in the 
EU (58.0 %) and exceeded its national target by 
9.3 percentage points. Additionally, the share of 
early leavers from education and training was 
almost half the EU total rate and well below the 
9 % national target. Notable progress has also 
been made on climate change and energy. By 
reducing its GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors by 
1.9 % between 1990 and 2016, Lithuania has stayed 
well below its target to limit emission increases to 
15 %. The country had also exceeded its renewable 
energy and primary energy consumption targets 
by 2016 for a third and seventh consecutive year, 
respectively. After a sharp drop in employment 
figures between 2008 and 2010, the rate climbed 
up again and in 2017 Lithuania surpassed its Europe 
2020 goal by 3.2 percentage points. Despite some 
progress between 2008 and 2016, the country still 
needs to lift around 57 000 people out of the risk 
of poverty and social exclusion to meet its poverty 
reduction target. In terms of R&D expenditure, a 
gap of 1.05 percentage point remains to be closed 
to reach the target of 1.9 % of GDP.
Figure 6.15: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.15: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 76.0 2017 72.8
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.85 2016 1.9
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 1.9 (1) 2016 15
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 25.6 2016 23
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 6.0 2016 6.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 5.4 2017 9 (2)
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 58.0 2017 48.7
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 871 2016 814
(1) Provisional data. (2) National target: less than 9 %.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Luxembourg
Luxembourg has continuously exceeded its target 
on early leavers from education and training 
since 2009. The country has the most ambitious 
target on tertiary education across the EU, aiming 
for 66 % of the population aged 30 to 34 having 
attained tertiary education by 2020. Despite a 
12.9 percentage point rise between 2008 and 
2017, it still has further to go to meet its national 
target than other Member States. Although in 2017 
Luxembourg was closer to its employment target 
than the EU as a whole, a gap of 1.5 percentage 
points persists. In 2016, the country spent relatively 
less on R&D as a percentage of GDP than the EU 
overall and it has moved further away from its 
national target since 2008. The number of people 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion increased 
by 58.3 % between 2008 and 2016, pushing 
Luxembourg further from its national target. In 
terms of climate change mitigation, it did not reach 
its national target on the expansion of renewable 
energy and had the lowest shares of renewables 
in gross final energy consumption in the EU in 
2016. Also, the 16.1 % reduction in non-ETS GHG 
emissions in 2016 (compared to 1990) was not 
enough for the country to reach its national target 
to reduce emissions by 20 %. On the other hand, 
Luxembourg has continued to meet its target on 
primary energy consumption since 2011.
Figure 6.16: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.16: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 71.5 2017 73
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.24 (1) 2016 2.3 (2)
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 16.1 (1) 2016 – 20
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 5.4 2016 11
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 4.2 2016 4.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 7.3 2017 10 (3)
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 52.7 (4) 2017 66
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 114 2016 66
(1) Estimated/provisional data. (2) National target: 2.3–2.6 %. (3) National target: less than 10 %. (4) Data has low reliability.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Hungary
By reducing its GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors 
by 12.3 % between 1990 and 2016, Hungary 
remained well within its target to limit emission 
increases to 10 % by 2020. In 2016, the country 
also remained within its target on primary energy 
consumption and fulfilled its renewable energy 
commitments. Progress towards the national 
education targets has been ambiguous since 
2008. Although Hungary met its national target 
on tertiary education in 2014, a decline in the 
attainment rate in 2016 and 2017 reopened the 
gap by 1.9 percentage points. An increase in the 
share of early school leavers from education and 
training over the past three years also widened 
the target gap. In terms of R&D expenditure, 
Hungary was 0.6 percentage points below its 
national target in 2016, putting it closer to its 
target than the EU was to its overall target. 
Despite the gradual reduction in poverty levels 
since 2014, about 121 000 people still need to be 
lifted out of the risk of poverty or social exclusion 
for Hungary to meet its 2020 target. Although the 
country has improved its employment rate by 
11.8 percentage points between 2008 and 2017, it 
remains 1.7 percentage points from its 2020 target 
of 75 %. 
Figure 6.17: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.17: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 73.3 2017 75
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.21 2016 1.8
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 12.3 (1) 2016 10
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 14.2 2016 13
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 23.9 2016 24.1
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 12.5 2017 10
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 32.1 2017 34
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 2 465 2017 2 344
(1) Provisional data.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Country profiles
Smarter, greener, more inclusive?  145
Malta
A steady increase in the employment rate since 
2014 helped Malta to reach its respective Europe 
2020 target in 2017. The share of 30 to 34 years olds 
with tertiary education increased continuously 
between 2008 and 2017, bringing the country 
within 3.0 percentage points of its national target. 
Despite a significant drop in the share of early 
leavers from education and training since 2008, in 
2016 Malta had further to go to reach its national 
2020 target than other Member States. In 2016, 
the country met its primary energy consumption 
target of 0.7 Mtoe. Between 1990 and 2016, Malta 
increased its GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors by 
20.3 %, greatly exceeding its Europe 2020 target of 
limiting emission increases to 5 %. Malta also lags 
behind the EU as a whole in terms of renewable 
energy and R&D expenditure. The number of 
people at risk of poverty and social exclusion 
increased by 4.9 % between 2008 and 2016, moving 
the country further away from its Europe 2020 goal. 
Figure 6.18: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.18: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 71.4 2017 70
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.61 (1) 2016 2
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) 20.3 (1) 2016 5
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 6.0 2016 10
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 0.7 2016 0.7
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 18.6 2017 10
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 30.0 2017 33
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 85 2016 74.44
(1) Provisional data.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Netherlands
The Netherlands had already exceeded its 
target on tertiary educational attainment in 
2008 and the share of 30 to 34 year olds with 
tertiary educational attainment has continued 
to rise. In 2017, the country also exceeded its 
national targets on early leavers from education 
and training by 0.9 percentage points. Despite 
a deterioration in labour market conditions 
since 2008, the Netherlands was closer to its 
employment target in 2017 than the EU overall 
was to its target. Since 2008, the country has also 
moved closer to its target on R&D expenditure 
than the EU has to its overall target. In contrast, 
the Netherlands was the country furthest from 
its renewable energy target and still had to 
close a 4.1 Mtoe gap to reach its primary energy 
consumption target. Nevertheless, the country 
surpassed its target on reducing GHG emissions 
in non-ETS sectors by 3.7 % in 2016. The situation 
concerning the number of people at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion has deteriorated 
since 2008. However, it is not possible to make a 
comparison with the national target as it refers to 
people aged 0 to 64 living in a jobless household.  
Figure 6.19: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.19: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 78.0 2017 80
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 2.03 (1) 2016 2.5
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 19.7 (1) 2016 – 16
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 6.0 2016 14
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 64.8 2016 60.7
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 7.1 2017 8
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 47.9 2017 40 (2)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 2 797 2016 : (3)
(1) Provisional data. (2) National target: more than 40 %.  
(3) National target: Reduce by 100 000 the number of people (aged 0–64) living in a jobless household (compared to 2008).
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Austria
In 2017, Austria continued to meet both of its 
education targets, with only 7.4 % of pupils leaving 
school early and 40.8 % of 30 to 34 year olds 
having completed tertiary education. In 2016 
the country was just 0.5 percentage points away 
from its renewable energy target. In contrast, after 
meeting its primary energy consumption target 
for two consequent years, in 2016 Austria was 
0.3 percentage points above its 2020 goal. In spite 
of a 11.8 % reduction in GHG emissions in non-
ETS by 2016 compared to 1990 levels, the country 
is still 4.2 % away from its national target. With a 
75.4 % employment rate in 2017, the country was 
closer to its national target of 77 % than the EU was 
to its overall target of 75 %. Despite having one of 
the highest R&D intensities (R&D expenditure as 
a share of GDP) across the EU, in 2016 Austria was 
still 0.7 percentage points from its target, partly 
because its target was very ambitious to begin 
with. Progress in the area of poverty reduction has 
been slow since 2008; Austria would need to raise 
about 78 000 people out of the risk of poverty 
and social exclusion to meet its Europe 2020 
commitment.
Figure 6.20: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.20: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 75.4 2017 77
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 3.09 (1) 2016 3.76
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 11.8 (1) 2016 – 16
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 33.5 2016 34
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 31.8 2016 31.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 7.4 2017 9.5
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 40.8 2017 38
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 1 542 2016 1 464
(1) Estimated/provisional data. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators) 
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Poland
Despite the crisis, Poland has continuously 
reduced the number of people living at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion since 2008 and in 
2016 exceeded its target for a fourth consecutive 
year. In 2017, the country met its tertiary 
education target for the first time. Only 5.0 % of 
the population aged 18 to 24 left school early 
in 2017, which is the third best result in the EU 
but still above the national target of 4.5 %. In 
addition, Poland was just 0.1 percentage points 
below its employment target the same year. The 
country performed slightly better than the EU 
in terms of R&D expenditure with a distance of 
0.7 percentage points to its 2020 target. In 2016, 
the country continued to meet its goal on primary 
energy consumption. Despite the improvements 
since 2008, in 2016 Poland was still some distance 
away from its renewable energy target. Although 
Poland increased its GHG emissions in non-
ETS sectors by 7.1 % between 1990 and 2016, it 
remained within its target of limiting the increase 
to 14 % by 2020. 
Figure 6.21: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.21: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 70.9 2017 71
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.97 (1) 2016 1.7
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) 7.1 (1) 2016 14
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 11.3 2016 15
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 94.3 2016 96.4
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 5.0 2017 4.5
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 45.7 2017 45
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 8 221 2016 9 991
(1) Estimated/provisional data. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Portugal
By 2016, Portugal had reduced its GHG emissions 
in non-ETS sectors by 16.9 % compared to 1990 
levels, remaining well below its target for no 
more than a 1 % increase by 2020. Since 2011, 
the country has continuously met its target on 
primary energy consumption. By 2016 the country 
had reduced the distance to its renewable energy 
target to 2.5 percentage points. Portugal has 
also reduced the number of people living at risk 
of poverty and social exclusion between 2008 
and 2016 but still needs to lift 38 000 people out 
of being at risk of poverty by 2020 to meet the 
national commitment. The country has achieved 
a notable reduction in the share of early leavers 
from education and training, narrowing the gap 
to its target by 22.3 percentage points between 
2008 and 2017. Despite an 11.9 percentage point 
increase in tertiary educational attainment 
since 2008, the country was still 6.5 percentage 
points from its Europe 2020 target. Portugal’s 
employment rate had been steadily increasing 
since 2014 and in 2017 the country was closer to 
its national target of 75 % than the EU was from 
the overall target. 
Figure 6.22: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below. The 2008 value for early leavers from education and training exceeds 
the axis range. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.22: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 73.4 2017 75
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.27 (1) 2016 2.7 (2)
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 16.9 (1) 2016 1
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 28.5 2016 31
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 22.1 2016 22.5
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 12.6 2017 10
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 33.5 2017 40
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 2 595 2016 2 557
(1) Provisional data. (2) National target: 2.7–3.3 %. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Romania
Romania significantly reduced the number of 
people at risk of poverty or social exclusion by 
2.1 million between 2008 and 2017 and had 
already met its national target in 2013. In 2016, 
Romania exceeded its commitment to reaching 
a 24 % share of renewable energy in gross final 
energy consumption and remained well below its 
national target on primary energy consumption. 
By 2016, Romania had reduced its GHG emissions 
in non-ETS sectors by 3.7 % compared to 1990 
levels, remaining well within its 2020 target to 
limit the increase to 19 %. The country has made 
strong progress by raising the tertiary educational 
attainment rate by 10.3 percentage points between 
2008 and 2017 and remained only 0.4 percentage 
points above its respective target. In contrast, its 
share of early leavers from education and training 
increased to 18.1 % in the same time period, 
widening the distance to the national target to 
6.8 percentage points. Due to a gradual rise in 
the employment rate between 2013 and 2017, 
Romania was just 1.2 percentage points from its 
employment goal. Romania’s R&D intensity fell by 
0.07 percentage points between 2008 and 2016. 
Figure 6.23: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.23: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 68.8 2017 70
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.48 2016 2
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 3.7 (1) 2016 19
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 25.0 2016 24
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 31.3 2016 43.0
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 18.1 2017 11.3
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 26.3 2017 26.7
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands)  6 999 (1) 2017 8 535
(1) Provisional data.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Slovenia
By reducing its GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors 
by 6.7 % between 1990 and 2016, Slovenia 
remained within its target to limit increases to 4 % 
by 2020. Since 2009, the country has continuously 
met its energy efficiency target, which caps 
primary energy consumption at 7.3 Mtoe. Negative 
developments in R&D expenditure and in 
renewable energy consumption over the past few 
years put Slovenia further away from meeting its 
respective national targets than the EU as a whole. 
Slovenia has already met both of its education 
targets, with only 4.3 % of the population aged 18 
to 24 leaving school early and 46.4 % of 30 to 34 
year olds having tertiary educational attainment 
in 2017. After deteriorating continuously between 
2008 and 2013, the employment rate increased 
to 73.4 % in 2017, putting the country within 
1.6 percentage points of its national target. 
Between 2008 and 2016, the number of people 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion in Slovenia 
increased by 10 000, translating to a gap of 50 000 
people to its national target. 
Figure 6.24: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.24: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 73.4 2017 75
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 2.0 (1) 2016 3
Greenhouse gas emissions  in non-ETS sectors (% change since  ESD base year) – 6.7 (1) 2016 4
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 21.3 2016 25
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 6.7 2016 7.3
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 4.3 2017 5
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 46.4 2017 40
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 371 2016 321
(1) Provisional data.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Slovakia
By 2016, GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors in 
Slovakia had fallen by 14.0 % compared to 1990 
levels. The country thus remained well below 
its long-term commitment of limiting emissions 
growth to 13 % by 2020. Since 2011, Slovakia has 
continuously met its energy efficiency target, 
which caps primary energy consumption at 
16.4 Mtoe. In 2016, the country was closer to its 
target on renewable energy than the EU as a 
whole was to the respective EU target. Due to 
continuous growth of the employment rate since 
2014, the Slovakia was just 0.9 percentage points 
away from its national employment target in 2017. 
Although the country had already met its early 
leavers from education and training target in 2008, 
the indicator has since deteriorated and by 2017 
Slovakia was 3.3 percentage points away from 
its respective target. The country has recorded a 
substantial rise in the share of 30 to 34 year olds 
with a tertiary education since 2008, however, a 
gap of 5.7 percentage points remains to be closed 
by 2020. Despite the drop of R&D expenditure in 
2016, the country was still closer to its national 
target than the EU as a whole. Since 2008, Slovakia 
has moved closer to its poverty reduction target, 
which is expressed as the share of the population 
at risk of poverty or social exclusion, and was in 
2016 within 0.9 percentage points of its 2020 goal. 
Figure 6.25: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
2008
National target
Most recent data
Employment rate
R&D
expenditure 
Greenhouse
gas emissions
Share of renewable energy in 
gross final energy consumption  
Primary energy
consumption
Early leavers from 
education and training
Tertiary educational
attainment
Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.25: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 71.1 2017 72
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 0.79 2016 1.2
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 14.0 (1) 2016 13
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 12.0 2016 14
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 15.5 2016 16.4
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 9.3 2017 6
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 34.3 2017 40
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (% of population) (2) 18.1 2016 17.2
(1) Provisional data. (2) The national target uses ’% of the population’ instead of ‘number of people’. 
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Finland
With 44.6 % of the population aged 30 to 34 
having completed tertiary education in 2017, 
Finland continued to exceed its national target of 
42 %. However, its target is defined more narrowly 
than the EU target as it excludes former tertiary 
Vocational Education and Training (VET). Despite 
already meeting its target on early leavers from 
education and training in 2016, in 2017 Finland was 
0.2 percentage points away from its 2020 target 
of 8 %. With a share of renewable energy in final 
energy consumption of 38.7 %, Finland exceeded its 
national 2020 commitment for a third consequent 
year in 2016. The country’s primary energy 
consumption amounted to 33.1 Mtoe in 2016, 
which was below the national target of 35.9 Mtoe. 
Despite a notable 7.7 percentage point reduction in 
GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors between 1990 
and 2016, the gap to the national target remained 
larger than in most other EU countries. As a result 
of the continuous decrease in R&D expenditure as 
a share of GDP since 2010, Finland lost its leading 
position in terms of R&D intensity and moved away 
from its very ambitious national target. Finland’s 
employment rate fell from 75.8 % in 2008 to 74.2 % 
in 2017, increasing the distance to its national target 
of 78 %. The country would also need to lift 79 000 
more people out of the risk of poverty and social 
exclusion to meet its 2020 commitment. 
Figure 6.26: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets
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Most recent data
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Greenhouse
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.26: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 74.2 2017 78
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 2.75 2016 4
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 7.7 (1) 2016 – 16
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 38.7 2016 38
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 33.1 2016 35.9
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 8.2 2017 8
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 44.6 2017 42 (2)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 849 2017 770
(1) Provisional data. (2) Narrower national definition.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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Sweden
With 51.3 % of its population aged 30 to 34 years 
having attained a tertiary education in 2017, 
Sweden exceeded its national 2020 target by 
6.3 percentage points. It also met its commitment 
on early leavers from education and training in 
2015, but the slight increase in the share of early 
school leavers in 2016 and 2017 nudged the 
country away from its target. In the same year, 
the country exceeded its employment target 
by 1.8 percentage points and had the highest 
employment rate in the EU. In 2016, Sweden 
also surpassed its renewable energy target by 
increasing the share of renewables in gross final 
energy consumption to 53.8 % — by far the best 
performance in the EU. By reducing its GHG 
emissions by 22.5 % between 1990 and 2016, 
Sweden met its respective national target for a 
fourth consecutive year. An increase in primary 
energy consumption in 2016 has pushed Sweden 
away from its 2020 national target. Despite having 
the highest R&D intensity across the EU, the 
country has to close a 0.75 percentage point gap 
between 2016 and 2020 to meet its ambitious 
national target of spending 4 % of GDP on R&D. 
Figure 6.27: Change since 2008 in relation to national targets 
2008
National target
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Greenhouse 
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Note: Most recent year for which data are available; see table below.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
Table 6.27: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 81.8 2017 80 (1)
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 3.25 (2) 2016 4
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 22.5 (2) 2016 – 17
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 53.8 2016 49
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 47.1 2016 43.4
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 7.7 2017 7 (3)
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 51.3 2017 45 (4)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 1 799 2016 : (5)
(1) National target: More than 80 %. (2) Provisional data. (3) National target: less than 7 %. (4) National target: 45–50 %.  
(5) National target: Reduction in the percentage of women and men (aged 20–64) who are not in the labour force (except full-time 
students), the long-term unemployed or those on long-term sick leave to well under 14 %.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)
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United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has not adopted specific 
national Europe 2020 targets apart from the 
already existing climate change and renewable 
energy commitments (as a consequence, no 
radar chart can be shown for the UK). After 
rising continuously since 2012, the country’s 
employment rate reached a decade high of 
78.2 % in 2017, exceeding the EU aggregate 
performance of 72.2 %. In the period between 
2008 and 2017, the UK managed to increase its 
tertiary educational attainment rate from 39.5 % 
to 48.3 %. The indicator on early school leavers 
recorded a 6.3 percentage point reduction, from 
16.9 % in 2008 to 10.6 % in 2017. Although more 
than 1.2 million people have been lifted out of the 
risk of poverty since 2013, there were still 290 000 
more people at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
compared to 2008. R&D expenditure increased to 
1.69 % of GDP in 2016, a value close to the 2008 
level. Between 1990 and 2016, the country had 
reduced its GHG emissions in non-ETS sectors 
by 22.4 %, meeting its Europe 2020 reduction 
target of 16 %. Regarding renewable energy, the 
UK was the fourth furthest country (after France, 
Netherlands and Ireland) from its renewable 
energy target in 2015 with a gap of 5.7 percentage 
points. Between 2008 and 2016, the UK reduced 
its primary energy consumption by 29.5 Mtoe, 
shortening the distance to its 2020 target of 
177.6 Mtoe. 
Table 6.28: National Europe 2020 indicators: most recent data and targets
 Data Year Target
Employment rate age group 20–64 (%) 78.2 2017 : (1)
Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 1.69 (2) 2016 :  (1)
Greenhouse gas emissions in non-ETS sectors (% change since ESD base year) – 22.4 (2) 2016 – 16
Share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption (%) 9.3 2016 15
Primary energy consumption (million tonnes of oil equivalent) 181.7 2016    177.6
Early leavers from education and training (% of population aged 18–24) 10.6 2017 :  (1)
Tertiary educational attainment (% of population aged 30–34) 48.3 2017 :  (1)
People at risk of poverty or social exclusion (thousands) 14 359 2016 :  (3)
(1) No target in the National Reform Programme.
(2) Provisional data.
(3) Existing numerical targets under the umbrella of the 2010 Child Poverty Act and the Child Poverty Strategy 2011-2014.
Source: Eurostat (see dedicated web section: Europe 2020 headline indicators)

Abbreviations  
and acronyms
Geographical aggregates and countries
EU-28  The 28 Member States of the European Union since 1 July 2013 (BE, BG, 
CZ, DK, DE, EE, IE, EL, ES, FR, HR, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, HU, MT, NL, AT, PL, PT, RO, 
SI, SK, FI, SE, UK)
EU-27  The 27 Member States of the European Union from 1 January 2007 to 30 
June 2013 (BE, BG, CZ, DK, DE, EE, IE, EL, ES, FR, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, HU, MT, NL, 
AT, PL, PT, RO, SI, SK, FI, SE, UK)
G20   Group of 20 (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, 
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, México, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, 
Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European 
Union)
Note that EU aggregates are back-calculated when enough information is 
available — for example, data relating to the EU-28 aggregate is presented when 
possible for periods before Croatia joined the EU in 2013 and the accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, as if all 28 Member States had always been members 
of the EU. The label is changed if the data refer to another aggregate (EU-27).
European Union Member States
BE Belgium
BG Bulgaria
CZ Czech Republic
DK Denmark
DE Germany
EE Estonia
IE Ireland
EL Greece
ES Spain
FR France
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HR Croatia
IT Italy
CY Cyprus
LV Latvia
LT Lithuania
LU Luxembourg
HU Hungary
MT Malta
NL Netherlands
AT Austria
PL Poland
PT Portugal
RO Romania
SI Slovenia
SK Slovakia
FI Finland
SE Sweden
UK United Kingdom
European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
IS Iceland
LI Liechtenstein 
NO Norway 
CH Switzerland 
EU candidate countries
ME Montenegro
MK The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
AL Albania
RS Serbia
TR Turkey
Abbreviations and acronyms
Smarter, greener, more inclusive?  159
Potential Candidates
BA Bosnia and Herzegovina
XK Kosovo (1)
Units of measurement
% Per cent
°C Degree Celsius
EUR Euro
Mtoe Million tonnes of oil equivalent
PPS Purchasing power standards
Abbreviations
AGS Annual Growth Survey
AMR Alert Mechanism Report
AROPE People at risk of poverty or social exclusion 
BES Business enterprise sector
Cedefop European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training
CIS Community innovation survey
CO
2
 Carbon dioxide
COP Conference of the Parties
ECEC Early childhood education and care
Eco-IS Eco-Innovation Scoreboard
EEA European Environment Agency
EED Energy Efficiency Directive
EFTA European Free Trade Association
EMF European Monetary Fund 
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EPO European Patent Office
ESD  Effort Sharing Decision
ESS European Statistical System
ET 2020 ‘Education and Training 2020’ Framework
ETS Emissions Trading System
(1) This designation is without prejudice to position or status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ 
Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.
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EU European Union
EU ETS EU Emission Trading System
EU LFS EU Labour Force Survey
EU SILC EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions
FEC Final energy consumption
FEAD Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived
GBARD Government Budget Allocations to Research and Development
GERD Gross domestic expenditure on R&D
GDP Gross domestic product
GHG Greenhouse gas
GNP Gross national product
GOV Government sector
HES Higher education sector
ICT Information and communications technology
IEA International Energy Agency
ILO International Labour Organisation
ISCED International Standard Classification for Education
ISCO International Standard Classification of Occupations
LULUCF Land use, land-use change and forestry
NACE  Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European 
Community
NEET Neither in employment nor in education or training
NRP National Reform Programmes
NUTS Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PEC Primary energy consumption
PhD Doctor of Philosophy
PISA Programme for International Student Assessment
R&D Research and development
SCP Stability and Convergence Programme
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
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UN United Nations
UNEP United Nations Environment Program
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US United States
USA United States of America
VET Vocational Education and Training

Getting in touch with the EU
In person
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct Information Centres. 
You can find the address of the centre nearest you at: http://europa.eu/contact
On the phone or by e-mail
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You 
can contact this service 
— by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
— at the following standard number: +32 22999696 or 
— by electronic mail via: http://europa.eu/contact
Finding information about the EU
Online
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available 
on the Europa website at: http://europa.eu  
EU publications
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
http://bookshop.europa.eu. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by 
contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact).
EU law and related documents
For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1951 in all the 
official language versions, go to EUR-Lex at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu
Open data from the EU
The EU Open Data Portal (http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data) provides access to 
datasets from the EU. Data can be downloaded and reused for free, both for commercial 
and non-commercial purposes.
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INDICATORS TO SUPPORT THE EUROPE 2020 STRATEGY
The 2018 edition of Smarter, greener, more inclusive? — 
Indicators to support the Europe 2020 strategy continues the 
series of Eurostat publications providing statistical analyses 
related to important European Commission policy frameworks 
and relevant economic, social and environmental phenomena. 
This publication supports the Europe 2020 strategy by 
monitoring progress towards the targets and goals defined 
under the three mutually reinforcing priorities of smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth. 
The analysis in this publication is based on the Europe 2020 
headline indicators chosen to monitor progress towards 
the strategy’s targets. Other indicators focusing on specific 
subgroups of society or on related contextual issues are also 
used to deepen the analysis and present a broader picture. 
The data used mainly come from official European Statistical 
System sources and are disseminated by Eurostat. The updated 
2018 edition covers the period from 2002 or 2008 up to the 
most recent year for which data are available (2016 or 2017). 
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